Main Issues
The case affirming the judgment of the court below that the disciplinary procedure is lawful without the attendance of the worker, although the worker had known that the disciplinary action against the worker was taken in the process of defending the officer, etc. before the disciplinary resolution was made, unless the worker requested the subsequent appearance in the disciplinary procedure.
Summary of Judgment
The case affirming the judgment below's determination that the disciplinary procedure is legitimate without the worker's attendance, on the grounds that the worker's finding the president, executive director, or director of the company's office before the disciplinary action against him/her was conducted, and he/she knew that the disciplinary action against him/her would be taken in the course of explaining the accident caused by the disciplinary action or explaining the circumstances, and that the worker did not request the worker to attend the disciplinary procedure for himself/herself thereafter, it did not err in the misapprehension of the provisions concerning the disciplinary procedure under the collective agreement and rules of employment.
[Reference Provisions]
Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act
Plaintiff-Appellant
[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other
Defendant-Appellee
Silsi High speed Co., Ltd.
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 90Na341 delivered on October 19, 1990
Text
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.
Reasons
The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.
1. On the first ground for appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the plaintiff's act of causing a traffic accident, such as the time of original adjudication, and the act of receiving conviction due to such act constitutes Article 18 subparagraph 11 of the above collective agreement, Article 31 (3) (e) and (j) of the above personnel regulations, Article 28 (3) 12 and 14 of the above employment rules, and Article 37 subparagraph 10 and 13 of the above employment rules, on the ground that Article 18 of the collective agreement between the defendant company and the defendant company's trade union, Article 31 (3) of the personnel regulations of the defendant company, and Articles 28 (3) and 37
In light of the records, it is reasonable to view Article 31(3) of the above personnel regulations and Article 28(3) of the Rules of Employment as a provision concerning ordinary dismissal. The grounds for disciplinary dismissal stipulated in Article 37 of the above Rules of Employment also cannot be a ground provision for disciplinary action in comparison with the grounds for disciplinary action stipulated in the above collective agreement. However, as duly established by the court below, the act of the plaintiff causing damages as stated in its judgment caused by his negligence to cause damages as stated in its reasoning falls under at least Article 18 subparag. 11 of the collective agreement among the grounds for disciplinary action under the collective agreement and rules of employment of the defendant company in light of the circumstances leading up to the accident, degree of negligence, damage caused by his negligence, etc. recognized by the records, at least Article 18 subparag. 11 of the above collective agreement among the grounds for disciplinary action under Article 18 subparag. 11 of the above Rules of Employment.
2. On the second ground for appeal
The theory of the lawsuit is based on the presumption that the court below's assumptive judgment and Article 17 of the above collective agreement are a provision concerning disciplinary dismissal, not ordinary dismissal, rather than a disciplinary dismissal against the plaintiff. As seen above, the disciplinary action against the plaintiff does not constitute a ground for disciplinary dismissal under Article 17 of the collective agreement, even though it does not constitute a ground for disciplinary dismissal under Article 18 of the above collective agreement, as long as the above ground for disciplinary dismissal against the plaintiff constitutes a ground for disciplinary dismissal under Article 18 of the above collective agreement, the disciplinary action is legitimate. Therefore, the appeal to this point is without merit.
3. On the third ground for appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts of the judgment, such as the procedure of disciplinary action prescribed by the rules of employment, personnel regulations, etc. of the defendant company, the composition and resolution procedure of the disciplinary committee, and the case where the attendance of the person to be disciplined is required, and the decision of disciplinary action against the plaintiff in this case was lawful. According to the records, it can be seen that the plaintiff was aware that the disciplinary action against the plaintiff was taken in the course of proving the facts or making statements about the accident of this case by finding the president, executive director, general director, etc. of the defendant company before the resolution of this case was made. Thus, in this case where the plaintiff did not request the attendance of the disciplinary procedure, the judgment of the court below that the disciplinary procedure without the attendance of the plaintiff is legitimate, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the provisions on the disciplinary procedure of the collective agreement and the rules of employment alleged by the plaintiff.
4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Choi Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)