[1] Where a small-sum case does not meet the requirement of "when a decision contrary to the precedents of the Supreme Court has been made," which may be the ground of appeal, but the Supreme Court can determine the error in interpreting and applying the substantive law

[2] Whether it is equivalent to attachment, provisional attachment, or provisional disposition, which is a ground for interruption of extinctive prescription under Article 168 subparagraph 2 of the Civil Act, in the lease registration under the order of lease registration under Article 3-3 of the Housing Lease Protection Act (negative)

[1] In a case where there is no precedent of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of statutes applicable to a specific case in a small-sum case, there is a case where a number of small-sum case at issue of interpretation of the same Act is pending in the lower court, and there is a case where the Supreme Court terminates the case without making a decision on the interpretation of statutes on the grounds that it is a small-sum case, it would be likely to undermine the legal safety of people's lives if the case is terminated without making a decision on the interpretation of statutes. Therefore, in such a case where there is no special circumstance, even if it does not meet the requirement of "when a decision contrary to the precedents of the Supreme Court," which can be a ground for final appeal, it shall be deemed that the determination ex officio

[2] Unlike seizure, provisional seizure, and provisional disposition, the lease registration under the order of lease registration under the order of lease registration under the Article 3-3 of the Housing Lease Protection Act is a security function that enables a housing lessee to acquire opposing power or preferential right to payment under the Housing Lease Protection Act, or to maintain opposing power or preferential right to payment. Although the Housing Lease Protection Act applies mutatis mutandis to the procedure of judgment on the application for the order of lease registration under the Housing Lease Protection Act and the procedure of provisional seizure under the Civil Execution Act concerning the execution, etc. of the order of lease registration, it is a kind of procedure similar to one another, which is examined and decided by the court at the request of one party, and it cannot be deemed that the lease registration under the order of lease registration under the order of lease registration has the nature of a disposition to preserve compulsory execution against the debtor's general property beyond the original security function. Thus, the lease registration under the order of lease registration under the order of lease registration has no effect corresponding to seizure, provisional seizure, and provisional disposition, which is the cause of interruption of extinctive prescription

[1] Article 3 subparagraph 2 of the Trial of Small Claims Act / [2] Article 3-3 of the Housing Lease Protection Act, Article 168 subparagraph 2 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2003Da1878 Decided August 20, 2004 (Gong2004Ha, 1571) Supreme Court Decision 2015Da50286 Decided December 27, 2018 (Gong2019Sang, 345)

[Defendant-Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorney Cha-hwan et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Defendant 1 and two others

Defendant Intervenor (Attorney Kim Jong-hun et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Gwangju District Court Decision 2016Na57631 Decided April 14, 2017

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff, including the part resulting from supplementary participation.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the second ground for appeal

A. In a case where there is no precedent of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of statutes applicable to a specific case in a small-sum case, there is a case where a number of small-sum case at issue of interpretation of the same Act is pending in the lower court, and there is a case where the Supreme Court terminates the case without making a decision on the interpretation of the relevant statutes on the grounds that it is a small-sum case, it would be likely that the legal safety of people's lives would be harmed if the case is terminated without making a decision on the interpretation of the statutes. Therefore, in such special circumstances, even if the Supreme Court did not meet the requirement of "when a decision contrary to the precedents of the Supreme Court," which can be a ground for final appeal, even if it does not meet the requirements of "when a decision contrary to the precedents of the Supreme Court," it shall be deemed that the determination ex officio on the mistake of interpretation and application of the substantive law can be made

Since there is no precedent of the Supreme Court on whether the interruption of prescription is recognized in the lease registration according to the order of lease registration which is the key issue of this case, and there is no judgment of the lower court, it is judged whether the interpretation and application of the court below

B. Where a deposit is not returned after the lease is terminated, the lessee may apply for the order of lease registration (Article 3-3(1) of the Housing Lease Protection Act). The Housing Lease Protection Act applies mutatis mutandis to the judgment on an application for the order of lease registration, the lessor’s objection against the determination of the order of lease registration and judgment thereon, the application for cancellation of the order of lease registration and judgment thereon, the judgment thereon, the execution of the order of lease registration, etc. under Articles 280(1), 281, 283, 285, 286, 288(1) and the main sentence of Article 288(2), Articles 288(2), 291 and 293 of the Civil Execution Act (Article 3-3(3)).

Furthermore, when the lessee completes the lease registration due to the execution of the lease order, the Housing Lease Protection Act provides that the lessee shall obtain the opposing power under Article 3 (1), (2) or (3) of the same Act and the preferential repayment right under Article 3-2 (2) of the same Act, if the lessee has already acquired the opposing power or preferential repayment right prior to the registration of the lease, he/she shall maintain such opposing power or preferential repayment right, and even if the lessee has lost the requirements for opposing power or preferential repayment under Article 3 (1), (2) or (3) after the registration of the lease, he/she shall not lose the already acquired opposing power or preferential repayment right

Unlike attachment, provisional attachment, and provisional injunction, the lease registration under the order of lease registration under the order of lease registration under Article 3-3 of the Housing Lease Protection Act is mainly focused on the security function that a housing lessee acquires opposing power or preferential right to payment under the Housing Lease Protection Act, or maintains opposing power or preferential right to payment. Although the Housing Lease Protection Act applies mutatis mutandis to the procedure of trial on an application for the order of lease registration under the Housing Lease Protection Act, some of the procedural provisions on provisional attachment under the Civil Execution Act concerning the execution, etc. of the order of lease registration shall apply mutatis mutandis to the procedure of trial on an application for the order of lease registration under the Housing Lease Protection Act, but this is merely a result of a series of procedures examined and decided by a court to entrust the registration and on this ground, it cannot be deemed that the lease registration under the order of lease registration under the order of lease registration has the nature of a disposition to preserve the compulsory execution against the debtor's general property beyond the original security function. Accordingly, the registration of lease under the order of lease registration under the order of lease registration has

C. The lower court determined that, even after the expiration of the lease term of this case, the period of extinctive prescription was expired on August 17, 2004, on the premise that the registration of lease pursuant to the Plaintiff’s order of lease on the premise that the registration of lease does not have any effect on the running of the extinctive prescription, the extinctive prescription of the right to refund the lease deposit of this case was run from August 17, 2004, and that the instant lawsuit was filed on March 18, 2016, and thus, the claim for the refund of the lease deposit of this case was expired.

In light of the above legal principles, such judgment of the court below is reasonable, and there is no error by misapprehending the legal principles on the registration of lease and the progress of extinctive prescription of the lease deposit claims.

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 3

With respect to small claims, an appeal may be filed only when the judgment on whether or not a violation of the Constitution or a violation of an order, rule or disposition is unfair (Article 3 of the Trial of Small Claims Act) or a judgment contrary to the Supreme Court’s precedents (Article 3 of the Trial of Small Claims Act). This part of the grounds of appeal does not fall under any of the grounds prescribed in the subparagraphs of Article 3 of the Trial of Small Claims Act, which is a mere misapprehension of legal principles or a mistake of facts, etc.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party, including the portion arising from participation in the appeal. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kwon Soon-il (Presiding Justice)