logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 서울고등법원 2012. 9. 7. 선고 2012나10678 판결
[부인의청구를인용하는결정에대한이의][미간행]
Plaintiff and appellant

Amon Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Suwon, Attorney Kang Jae-in, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant, Appellant

The administrator of Agu Office Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Dadam, Attorney Park Ho-jin, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Conclusion of Pleadings

July 27, 2012

The first instance judgment

Suwon District Court Decision 201Gahap8808 Decided December 23, 2011

Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant's claim for denial against the plaintiff is revoked by the Suwon District Court on March 30, 201 and the defendant's claim is dismissed.

Reasons

1. The reasoning for the court’s explanation concerning this case is as follows, or as stated in the reasoning of the first instance court’s judgment, except for adding the following to the tenth one of the 10th decision of the first instance court, the following is the same as the part of the reasoning of the first instance court’s judgment. Thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the text

2. Parts in height:

A. Each “Agreement on February 23, 2010,” respectively, in the seventh and seventh sentence of the judgment of the first instance, is deemed to be “Agreement on February 25, 2010,” the “Agreement on February 23, 2010,” the “Agreement on February 25, 2010,” the “Agreement on February 23, 2010,” the “Agreement on February 25, 2010,” the “final Annex” in the nine second sentence is deemed to be “final Annex,” and the “Agreement on the Supply of Products of February 23, 2009” in the third sentence of the 10th sentence is deemed to be “Agreement on the Supply of Products of February 23, 209,” respectively.

3. The addition;

3) As to this, the Plaintiff asserts that at the time of the subsidiary agreement on February 25, 2010, the Plaintiff did not know to the ASEAN that the cause for termination under Articles 8 and 11(2)1 of the Product Supply Contract (hereinafter “Initial Supply Contract”) of December 23, 2009 was occurred, and that the Plaintiff did not waive the exercise of the right to terminate, or did not agree not to exercise the right to terminate.

In light of the following facts, the Plaintiff was unable to produce products on several occasions prior to the agreement on the initial supply between the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff, before and after the agreement on February 25, 2010, and the subsequent statement Nos. 9, Eul evidence Nos. 11 and 12, and the overall purport of the oral argument, namely, ① the ASEAN was unable to produce products on several occasions prior to the agreement on February 25, 2010, and ② Nonparty 2, the representative director of the Plaintiff, at the time, was at a position to know the circumstances of the chips, such as the establishment of the Plaintiff, and ③ Nonparty 2, the representative director of the ASEAN, at least did not know about the production of the chips to the extent that it would be difficult to obtain some of the production of the chips from the date of production or supply of the chips to the extent that it would be difficult to accept the chips from the date of production or supply of the chips.

4) In addition, the Plaintiff asserts to the effect that even if the Plaintiff’s termination right under Articles 8 and 11(2)1 of the first supply contract is interpreted to be waived in light of the developments leading up to the conclusion of the subsidiary agreement on February 25, 2010, the ground for termination under Article 11(2)2 of the first supply contract occurred after the first supply contract was concluded, and that the Plaintiff exercised the right to terminate due to the ground for termination under Article 11(2)2, i.e., the ground for termination under Article 11(2)2 of the first supply contract, and that

Article 11 (2) 2 of the first supply contract provides that "when an application is filed for bankruptcy, liquidation, corporate reorganization, and the commencement of composition procedures for each other party's bankruptcy, liquidation, and the commencement of composition procedures" as the grounds for termination of the contract, and that the rehabilitation procedure for ASEAN was commenced on April 30, 2010.

Meanwhile, according to the statements in Eul evidence Nos. 14 and 16, the defendant, on July 13, 2010, sent to the plaintiff a certificate of content to the effect that on July 13, 2010, the final agreement in this case is invalid as it is subject to the right to set aside, and that the right to set aside is scheduled to exercise the right to set aside; therefore, the attached agreement in this case is reversed, and that the plaintiff demanded the plaintiff to pay royalties, etc. under the attached agreement on February 25, 2010, including the initial supply contract, and that the plaintiff notified the defendant on July 16, 2010 that all of the attached agreements in this case should be terminated.

In preparation for the aggravation of the debtor's property status between the parties to a contract, where certain facts arise in the process of insolvency, including suspension of payment, bankruptcy, application for commencement of rehabilitation procedures, etc., even if the validity is acknowledged in the case of the so-called "unscheduled termination clause" which provides for the other party to the contract to cancel the contract, the right to cancel the contract may be denied if it is acknowledged that the other party would lose the intent of recognizing the right to set aside in the rehabilitation procedure, or violates public order and good morals (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da38263, Sept. 6, 2007). As to this case, health care is recognized, the Plaintiff already knew of the debtor's property status or credit status at the time of the agreement on February 25, 2010, and at that time, waived the Plaintiff's exercise of the right to set aside in the rehabilitation procedure on grounds of its credit standing, etc. However, it is unreasonable to accept the Plaintiff's first notice of the possibility of exercising the right to set aside in the rehabilitation procedure between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case shall be dismissed without any justifiable reason, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without any justifiable reason. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kang Jong-ju (Presiding Judge) Kim Jong-ho

arrow