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(영문) 서울행정법원 2013.8.23.선고 2013구단51100 판결
자동차운전면허취소처분취소
Cases

2013Gudan51100 Revocation of revocation of driver's license

Plaintiff

00

Defendant

The Commissioner of Seoul Local Police Agency

Conclusion of Pleadings

July 19, 2013

Imposition of Judgment

August 23, 2013

Text

1. On January 16, 2013, the Defendant’s revocation of the revocation of the license for Class II ordinary motor vehicle driving that the Plaintiff rendered.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

Purport of claim

The order is as set forth in the text.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

On December 22, 2012, 2012, the Defendant: (a) around 50, around December 21, 2012, the Plaintiff driven a 41-friendly ○○○○○○○○ in a state of under the influence of alcohol content of 0.126% on the side of ○○-dong 506, Seoul, at around 50: (b) rendered the instant disposition revoking the Plaintiff’s Class II ordinary driver’s license on the ground that “.”

[Ground for Recognition: Facts without dispute, Gap evidence No. 1, and Eul evidence No. 1

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff had a substitute driver drive the above car and brought an dispute with a substitute driver as a fee system while returning home, and the substitute driver is in Seoul ○○-gu ○○-dong.

In the middle of the three-lanes, the driver was inevitably able to drive approximately 7 to 8 meters on the side of the three-lanes in order to cause interference with traffic or traffic accidents while parking the two-lanes in the middle of the two-lanes, and then parked another proxy driver. The plaintiff's driver's act is in emergency evacuation.

Since such circumstances as mentioned above and the plaintiff are engaged in delivery service, a vocational driving is a livelihood.

Considering the fact that the instant disposition is a means to the Plaintiff, it is so excessive that the instant disposition is an excessive disposition that is too harsh to the Plaintiff.

B. Determination

1 ) 갑 제3 내지 6호 증 , 을 제2 , 3 , 4 , 9 , 11 , 12호 증의 각 기재 , 을 제13호증의 영 상 , 증인 ▲▲▲의 증언에 변론전체의 취지를 종합하면 다음과 같은 사실을 인정할 수 있다 .

A) On December 22, 2012, 20: around 40: 40, the Plaintiff: (a) performed drinking at the trade name of “○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○, and had a substitute driver drive his own car and her dispute with a substitute driver on the road in which she was returning home; and (b) the substitute driver stoppeds driving on the road in front of 506, Seoul ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○, and lowered the car on the two-lane of the three-lane.

B) The above ○○ 506-dong road is a place where a vehicle is mixed with another vehicle at ordinary times, and at the same time a considerable amount of time.

The plaintiff had a traffic volume and had concerns over traffic interference or traffic accidents, and the plaintiff voluntarily driven about 7 to 8 meters and parked the car to 3-lanes of the above road, and the plaintiff was driving another substitute driver.

C) On December 22, 2012, an acting driver reported the Plaintiff’s 112 alcohol driving to the police in the vicinity of the above place. On December 22, 2012, a police officer who called for this, inspected the Plaintiff on a car outside the car on the ground of drinking driving, accompanied the Plaintiff to the police station on the ground of a drunk driving. On December 22, 2012, an acting driver measured the alcohol level at around 50, and conducted a alcohol level at around 126% as a result of the measurement.

D) On January 2, 2013, the Plaintiff was employed on January 2, 2013 to be in charge of delivery, and was not engaged in the previous drinking driving, and was in violation of traffic regulations specifically heavy for the last 15 years.

(2).

2) First, as to whether the Plaintiff’s act of drinking alcohol constitutes an act of emergency evacuation, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s act of drinking alcohol alone constitutes an act of emergency evacuation with considerable grounds to avoid the present imminent danger to another person’s legal interests, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this.

3) We examine whether the following disposition violated the principle of proportionality. The plaintiff's motive for driving under the influence of alcohol is merely driving 7 to 8 meters in order to obstruct the initial driving under the influence of alcohol, since the plaintiff was a substitute driver to avoid the driving under the influence of alcohol, due to the occurrence of dispute with the substitute driver, the substitute driver stops a vehicle on the two-lanes of the two-lanes of the two-lanes of the two-lanes of the two-lanes of the two-lane, so it is merely driving 7 to 8 meters of the remaining side of the road, which interfered with or is likely to interfere with

Considering that there are circumstances to take into account the circumstances and circumstances, the Plaintiff’s movement of a car to the road, the Plaintiff’s suspension of a drinking driving as soon as possible after leaving the car to the road, and the fact that the Plaintiff’s driver’s license is a means of living in the Plaintiff’s occupation.

Even if considering the necessity of the public interest to prevent the harm of traffic accidents, etc., the instant disposition has a greater discretion than the public interest to be realized thereby.

It is reasonable to deem it illegal as it has been abused.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, we decide to accept the plaintiff's claim and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

Judge Lee Jong-hoon

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