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(영문) 서울행정법원 2013.8.23.선고 2013구단51100 판결
자동차운전면허취소처분취소
Cases

2013Gudan51100 Revocation of revocation of driver's license

Plaintiff

○○ Kim (66 years, south)

Seoul Nowon-gu

Law Firm Woo, Attorney Park Woo-soo

[Defendant-Appellee]

Defendant

The Commissioner of Seoul Local Police Agency

Articles of the Litigation Performers

Conclusion of Pleadings

July 19, 2013

Imposition of Judgment

August 23, 2013

Text

1. On January 16, 2013, the Defendant’s revocation of the revocation of the Class 2 ordinary driving license granted to the Plaintiff.

2. The costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

Purport of claim

The order is as set forth in the text.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

On December 22, 2012, the Defendant issued the instant disposition that revoked the Plaintiff’s Class II ordinary motor vehicle driver’s license on the ground that the Plaintiff driven a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol on December 21, 2012 at around 50:50, while under the influence of alcohol at around 506, Jung-gu, Seoul, Jung-gu, 00, 00: 0. 126% of the blood alcohol content.”

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff, who had a substitute driver drive the car in the above SP area, was dissatisfied with the fee problem while returning home, and the substitute driver set up a two-lane between the upper-class terminal in Seoul Jung-gu and the two-lanes near the upper-class terminal in Jung-gu, Seoul, and caused concerns over interference with traffic or traffic accidents, and forced to stop the car on the three-lane road, and display another substitute driver. The plaintiff's driver's act constitutes an act of emergency evacuation.

Considering the above circumstances of driving and the fact that the Plaintiff is engaged in delivery services, the instant disposition is unlawful as an excessive disposition, which is too harsh to the Plaintiff, considering that the vocational driving is a means of livelihood.

B. Determination

1) The Plaintiff, at around 22 December 22, 2012, sent alcohol to a trade name, “marine Myeonm-dong located in Jung-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government Myeonm-dong,” and then stopped on the two-lanes of the Seoul Jung-gu 506 U.S. and then stopped on the two-lanes of the above three-lanes, taking into account the following facts: (a) evidence Nos. 3 through 6; (b) evidence Nos. 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, and 12; (c) evidence Nos. 13; and (d) evidence Nos. 13; and (e) evidence Nos. 131, 2012; and (e) evidence Nos. 11, 2010; and (e) evidence Nos. 3 and evidence Nos. 3 and evidence No. 506.

B) The road in front of 506-dong 506 is a place where a vehicle is mixed at ordinary places. At that time, there was a considerable traffic volume, and the Plaintiff voluntarily parked a motor vehicle for the designated destination from around 7 to 8 meters to the three-lane of the above road due to concerns over traffic interference or traffic accidents, and then the Plaintiff was driving another proxy driver on behalf of others.

C) On December 22, 2012, 201, an acting driver reported the Plaintiff’s 112 state to the police. On December 22, 2012, a police officer who called out for this reported the Plaintiff’s frank driving to the police station. On December 21, 2012, a police officer inspected the Plaintiff on the part of a motor vehicle outside the motor vehicle on the motor vehicle on the ground of a drunk driving, and was accompanied to the police station on December 22, 2012. On December 21, 2012: a frank measurement was conducted at around 50 and 0.126% of the blood alcohol concentration in the result of the measurement.

D) On January 2, 2013, the Plaintiff is in charge of delivery after becoming a member of *, and there was no fact that the Plaintiff was in charge of driving under influence during the past 15 years, and there was no special violation of traffic regulations in the past 2013). First, as to whether the Plaintiff’s act of drinking under influence constitutes an act of emergency evacuation, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s act of drinking under the influence of alcohol constitutes an act of emergency evacuation with considerable reason to avoid the present imminent danger to others’ legal interests and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

3) We examine whether the following disposition of this case is in violation of the principle of proportionality. While the plaintiff was a substitute driver in order to avoid driving under the influence of alcohol originally, the plaintiff's substitute driver did not stop a vehicle on the two-lanes as it caused a dispute with a substitute driver and so the substitute driver stoppeds on the two-lanes of the three-lanes, so it is merely a driver driving a vehicle on the other side because it is difficult to take into account the plaintiff's motive and circumstance for driving under the influence of alcohol, it is difficult to take into account the plaintiff's motive and circumstance of driving under the influence of alcohol, the plaintiff immediately stopped driving under the influence of alcohol immediately after the plaintiff moved the vehicle to the road and was driving under the influence of another substitute driver. Considering that the plaintiff's occupation is a means of living, it is reasonable to view that the disposition of this case is unlawful since the plaintiff abused discretion, compared to the purpose of the public interest realized by this case.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, we decide to accept the plaintiff's claim and it is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

Judge Lee Jong-hoon

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