(a) Where a sentence of exemption from punishment may be pronounced;

(b) A case for which a summary judgment of exemption from punishment of a prosecuted case violating the Road Traffic Act and the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act became final and conclusive, but such summary judgment has been reversed due to an extraordinary appeal by the Prosecutor General;

(a) in a criminal trial, a sentence of immunity must be imposed on the grounds that the applicable law provides for exemption from punishment or that there are grounds for exemption from punishment, such as self-denunciation and self-denunciation recognized by the criminal law;

B. In the case of violation of Article 114 subparag. 6 and Article 63(3)2 of the Road Traffic Act and Article 1 subparag. 24 of the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act, the judgment became final and conclusive by sentencing a summary judgment of exemption from punishment to the defendant, but the relation of both crimes shall be subject to punishment provided for the crime of violation of the Road Traffic Act pursuant to Article 40 of the Criminal Act as the ordinary concurrent crimes, on the ground that there are no grounds for sentencing exemption for the crime of violation of the Road Traffic Act and there are no other grounds for exemption from punishment under the Criminal Act, and the part of exemption from punishment among the original summary judgment shall be reversed.

(b)Article 52(b) of the Criminal Code; Article 40 of the Criminal Code; Article 114(6) of the Road Traffic Act; Article 63(3)2 of the Road Traffic Act; Article 1(24 of the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act;

Defendant 1 and seven others

Prosecutor General;

Seoul District Court Branch 94, 1839,1840,1841,1842,1843,1844,1844,1845,1846

Each part of the summary trial court's exemption from punishment is reversed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the records, on May 15, 1994, the court below rendered a summary judgment of each of the accused accused cases violating the Road Traffic Act and the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act, and it is evident that the judgment has become final and conclusive.

However, in a criminal trial, in order to declare exemption from punishment, there must be grounds for exemption from punishment, such as the applicable law, or the self-denunciation and self-denunciation recognized by the criminal law, and on record the sentence.

Each defendant's case is a violation of Article 114 subparagraph 6 of the Road Traffic Act, Article 63 (3) subparagraph 2 of the same Act, and Article 1 subparagraph 24 of the Punishment of Minor Offenses Act, and there are no grounds for the sentence of exemption from punishment as above, and there are no other grounds for exemption from punishment under the Criminal Act. However, the relation between two crimes on the records is a so-called commercial concurrent crime that one act constitutes several crimes, and should be punished for a violation of the Road Traffic Act more severe than statutory punishment pursuant to Article 40 of the Criminal Act. Thus, the sentence of exemption from punishment cannot be imposed against the defendants under the law. Even if punishment is imposed pursuant to Article 38 of the Criminal Act by deeming the relation between two crimes as concurrent crimes under Article 37 of the Criminal Act, it is the same as the conclusion that the defendants cannot be sentenced to exemption from punishment.

Therefore, an extraordinary appeal which causes it is reasonable to reverse the exemption from punishment among the original adjudication on the grounds of its reasoning. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)