Effect of waiver of prescription interest unless it is known that the statute of limitations has expired.

The waiver of filial benefits should be recognized at least as the completion of the statute of limitations, and if it is made without such recognition, the effect of waiver can not be recognized.

Article 184 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 66Da2173 delivered on February 7, 1967 (Supreme Court Decision 1010Da1510 delivered on February 7, 1967, Supreme Court Decision 15Da189 delivered on June 15, 199, Supreme Court Decision 18Da184(3)

Plaintiff, Ltd.

Defendant Corporation

Seoul Central District Court (63A7214) in the first instance trial (Supreme Court Decision 63Da7214)

The original judgment shall be revoked.

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff in the first and second instances.

The plaintiff is seeking a declaration of provisional execution that "the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 229,801 won with 90% interest per annum from October 2, 1961 to 5% interest per annum from October 2, 1961. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant."

The defendant has the same judgment as the disposition of the court.

In full view of Gap evidence Nos. 9-1 to 3, and evidence Nos. 1 to 7 of the court below's witness Gap's testimony and testimony of non-party Nos. 1 to 1 of the court below to acknowledge their authenticity by the testimony of non-party Nos. 1 (1, 2 of the court below), the plaintiff entered into a fire insurance contract with the plaintiff on Oct. 1, 1959, under which the defendant's testimony and testimony of non-party No. 2 of the court below made a loan from the non-party Industrial Bank, which was owned by the defendant as a security, for 5,00,000,000 insurance amount for the above ground buildings and machinery located in 29, Busan-do, Busan-dong, Busan-dong, 50,00, 16:00 through 16:00 on Oct. 16, 1960, the insurance period of the above insurance contract was extended to 116,4120,000 won, respectively.

Since the defendant is a physical contract that prescribes the suspension of the payment of insurance premiums as a condition precedent, it is argued that the plaintiff's insurance contract was not established since it did not pay insurance premiums in this case, but the fire insurance contract is interpreted as a abortion contract that is established when the insurer promises to compensate for the loss of the insured's property caused by fire and the policyholder who is the other party agrees to pay insurance premiums in this case. Therefore,

Then, the defendant asserts that the period of extinctive prescription of the plaintiff's claim for the payment of the insurance premium of this case has expired one year with the lapse of 62 (former Article 63) of the Commercial Act. The defendant's claim for the payment of the insurance premium of this case cannot be acknowledged as being due to the defendant 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 6's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 3's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 1'6's non-party 2's non-party 1's defense.

In this case, as the right to claim the payment of the principal premium against the defendant has already been extinguished by the completion of the extinctive prescription before the institution of the principal lawsuit, the plaintiff's right to claim the principal suit on the premise of the existence of such right is another argument

Inasmuch as there is no reason to go through the judgment, it is impossible to avoid dismissal, that is, the original judgment with different conclusions has been rendered, so that it may be revoked by Article 386 of the Civil Procedure Act, and it is so decided as per Disposition by applying Articles 89 and 96 of the same Act with respect to the bearing of litigation costs.

Judges Cho Jong-dae (Presiding Judge)