The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal is that the Defendant has a duty of care to drive the fiber by taking account of the following: (a) the Defendant is not well-known in front of the direction of proceeding in driving the fiber, and thus, there is no possibility for an accident to occur; and (b) the Defendant has a specific duty of care to prevent an accident to the victim on the ground that the victim could have sufficiently predicted the possibility of the occurrence of an accident to the victim by taking advantage of his/her speed reduction and the possibility of an accident.

I would like to say.

Nevertheless, the lower court rendered a judgment not guilty on the grounds that the Defendant could not have a specific probability of injury to F. The lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion.

2. Determination

A. The lower court: ① (a) when the Defendant and F used two months prior to the instant case’s two months in which the Defendant and F had been driving, and (b) when the Defendant and F got off the fiber yarn to a designated place, F was in charge of checking the volume, and then moving to a safe place, and repeatedly performing the Defendant’s business of transporting the fiber yarn; (b) the F was in charge of assisting the Defendant to smoothly move and stop the fiber; (c) the Defendant was ordinarily driving the fiber pole in a condition that it was entirely impossible to see the fiber pole, because F was well aware of it; (d) there was no accident that the Defendant and F had been engaged in the same business repeatedly in the same manner as above between three months; and (e) the Defendant and F was engaged in the same business as the Defendant and F at the time of the instant case, and (vi) the situation that the Defendant had been extremely limited to the Defendant’s work at the time of the instant case.