1. On November 13, 2014, the Defendant’s disposition of refusing to grant the Plaintiff’s average wage correction is revoked.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On July 24, 2013, the Plaintiff was diagnosed as a groundr for mination of pulvers in the alley of sulvers and received medical care from July 25, 2013 to March 31, 2014 on the ground that the Plaintiff was a daily worker and was subject to the mination of pulvers during the mination work.

B. On May 9, 2014, the Plaintiff received re-treatment approval from the Defendant on the ground of the ground that the Plaintiff was re-processed with respect to the mination of the mination of the mination of the disease from each side of the alleys. From April 26, 2014 to November 30, 2014, the Plaintiff received re-treatment.

C. On June 16, 2014, the Defendant calculated temporary layoff benefits during the Plaintiff’s additional medical care period based on the minimum wage of KRW 41,680, and notified the decision on temporary layoff benefits.

On November 7, 2014, the Plaintiff filed an application for the correction of the average wage related to temporary layoff benefits with the Defendant, but the Defendant, based on April 26, 2014, the date of the diagnosis of additional medical care, had already retired from the existing place of business and did not provide labor. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s application for the correction of the average wage was not accepted on the ground that calculating the minimum wage as temporary layoff benefits under Article 56(2) of the Industrial

(hereinafter referred to as "disposition of this case"). . [Grounds for recognition] without dispute, Gap's 3 to 5, Eul's 1 and 2, and the purport of the whole pleadings.

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. Plaintiff’s assertion 1) Article 52 Subparag. 1 proviso of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act provides that “If there is time and medical continuity with the diagnosis or treatment acknowledged prior to the diagnosis of an injury or disease subject to additional medical care, the date of commencing the examination or treatment.” In the Plaintiff’s case, the disease or injury of the first medical care and the additional medical care are identical, and the additional medical care was commenced only one month after the completion of the first medical care, the date of the first medical care will be the date of occurrence of the cause for calculating the average wage, as otherwise alleged by the Defendant, even if the date on which the cause for calculating the average wage occurred is the date of the additional medical care.