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(영문) 대법원 1992. 9. 22. 선고 92누930 판결
[취득세부과처분취소][공1992.11.15.(932),3033]
Main Issues

The case holding that acquisition tax is not subject to heavy taxation because it cannot be deemed to have been acquired a high-class recreation center even if the permission for business is temporarily in existence, in case where the studs facilities are all removed and the business is not resumed at the time of acquiring the building.

Summary of Judgment

The case holding that acquisition tax is not subject to heavy taxation because it cannot be deemed to have been acquired a high-class recreation center even if the business license remains temporarily in existence, in case where the studal walp facilities are all removed at the time of acquiring the building and the business is not

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 112 (2) and 112-2 of the Local Tax Act, Articles 77 and 84-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, Article 46-2 (1) 5 of the Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act

Plaintiff-Appellee

Gwangju Bank Co., Ltd., Ltd. and one other, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant-Appellant

The head of Yeongdeungpo-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 91Gu8403 delivered on December 5, 1991

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the following facts based on macrofics as follows: the plaintiff acquired the building in this case for the purpose of using it as the place of business for the plaintiff bank credit branch, and determined that the plaintiff continued to continue to operate the building in this case at the time of acquisition of the building in this case, even if the plaintiff did not acquire the building in this case at the time of acquisition of the building in this case, in light of the following circumstances, such as the fact that the above branch was established at the time of acquisition of the building and the plaintiff's ex officio closure request such as the plaintiff's ex officio closure of the building, and the business facilities of studs in the judgment, which were the second floor of the building in this case, were all removed before May 3, 190 (the lease contract with the former owner and the owner of the building in this case, was revoked) after receiving the order for the day and the transfer of ownership was completed and the construction for the above branch was established on the first and third floors above.

In light of the records, the above recognition and judgment of the court below shall be justified and there is no violation of the rules of evidence as alleged by the theory of lawsuit.

The theory of the lawsuit is that, under Article 86-3 subparagraph 1 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act, if a high-class recreation center is a permitted business establishment, the time when the business is deferred shall be considered as the date when the business is permitted. However, the date when the business is permitted under the above provision is premised on the fact that the building becomes a high-class recreation center. As seen in the above facts of the case, if all the facilities are removed by the parties concerned at the time of the acquisition of the building, and the business is not resumed at the same time, the above provision shall not be deemed as acquiring a high-class recreation center even if the business is temporarily in existence.

All arguments in the judgment of the court below that the court below erred in the violation of the rules of evidence, the misapprehension of the legal principle on heavy taxation regulations on high-class recreation centers, the incomplete hearing, the lack of reasons, and the violation of the principle of substantial taxation cannot

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Choi Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)

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