The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. The time to claim remuneration, which serves as the starting point of the extinctive prescription in a construction contract, shall be determined by the special agreement between the parties, if any, and shall be determined by the custom unless otherwise stipulated (Articles 65(2) and 656(2) of the Civil Act), and when construction is completed unless there is any special agreement or custom.

B. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveals the following facts.

(1) The Defendant entered into a contract with the Plaintiff under which the Electric Fire Fighting Corporation (hereinafter “instant electrical construction”) among the instant extended construction works (hereinafter “instant electrical construction”) and the instant fire fighting construction (hereinafter “instant construction”) together with them to subcontract the said construction to KRW 33,880,000 for construction cost (hereinafter “instant subcontract”).

At the time of completion of the instant construction, the Defendant agreed to pay the price after receiving the certificate of electrical fire fighting construction from the Plaintiff.

(2) After completing the instant electrical construction on January 6, 2012, the Plaintiff delivered it to the Defendant and received a certificate of electrical construction performance from the Defendant. On March 13, 2012, after completing the instant fire construction, the Plaintiff received a certificate of completion inspection of fire-fighting systems from the chief of Ansan fire station and provided it to the Defendant.

The instant extension corporation was completed on April 6, 2012.

C. Examining the foregoing facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the timing for the payment of the instant construction cost, which serves as the starting point of the statute of limitations, ought to be deemed as March 13, 2012, when the Plaintiff completed the instant construction pursuant to the agreement stipulated in the instant subcontract and issued the certificate of completion of fire-fighting systems

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, it does not recognize facts in violation of logical and empirical rules and beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, or does not exhaust all necessary deliberations, or is "time of payment of construction cost" and