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(영문) 인천지방법원 2018.02.07 2016나59211
사해행위취소
Text

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1..

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the court's explanation of this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the defendant's determination as to the assertion emphasized by the court of first instance as '2. Supplementary determination'. Thus, it is accepted by the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Supplementary judgment

A. In the exercise of creditor's right of revocation on the Defendant's defense prior to the merits, "the date when the obligee became aware of the cause of revocation" means the date when the obligee becomes aware of the fact that the obligor committed a fraudulent act while being aware that it would prejudice the obligee.

It is not sufficient to say that the debtor merely knew of the fact that he/she conducted an act of disposal of property, and it is necessary to know the existence of a fraudulent act and to know the fact that he/she had an intention to deception on the debtor, and it cannot be presumed that he/she knew of the objective fact of the fraudulent act.

On the other hand, the burden of proof on the expiration of the exclusion period is against the other party to the creditor revocation lawsuit.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2004Da61280 Decided July 4, 2006, Supreme Court Decision 2009Da47852 Decided October 29, 2009, etc.). The Defendant asserts that the limitation period has expired since the Plaintiff and C had been in effect on the ownership of the instant real estate from around 2008 to around January 7, 2014, where the registration of the instant real estate was completed. Since the instant real estate was filed on November 2, 2015, the Defendant asserted that the limitation period expired.

However, the fact that the Plaintiff was confined to a prison from March 13, 2008 to August 12, 2015 is not a dispute between the parties. Thus, the Plaintiff’s appointment of an attorney during the period when the Plaintiff was confined and received a provisional disposition order against C’s shares or filed a lawsuit against C solely on the sole basis that the Plaintiff received a provisional disposition order against C’s shares or filed a lawsuit against C before November 2, 2014.

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