1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of this court’s judgment citing the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as the ground of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following modifications or additions, and thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of

The second part of the second part of the judgment of the first instance is that “F vehicle is driven on April 6, 2017” and “F vehicle is driven on April 6, 2017.”

The second part of the judgment of the court of first instance refers to "alley" in the second part of the judgment of the court of first instance as "alley."

The second part of the judgment of the court of first instance is "C" in the second part of the judgment of the court of first instance as "C with respect to the above F vehicle".

Article 58 of the Road Traffic Act shall be applied to Article 63 of the Road Traffic Act in the third first instance judgment.

After the third 16th of the first instance judgment, “An occurrence” was added to “(at the time of the instant accident, street lamps were not flicked at the point of the instant accident, and D was put in the color clothes, so it is not easy for C to detect D.).”

After the fourth instance judgment of the first instance court, “I had no” in the first instance judgment, “(the Plaintiff had access to the point where the instant accident occurred even before the instant accident occurred with some of the investigative statements made by C, and even before the instant accident occurred several times, and thus C should have been operated with the warning and speed reduced. However, C is merely merely a statement to the effect that, prior to about one hour prior to the instant accident, D had discovered and released the fact that D was on board the expressway, and it is merely a statement to the effect that other persons, other than ordinary D, have entered the expressway beyond drick and do not statement to the effect that there was a case where other persons, other than ordinary d, have entered the expressway. Accordingly, there is no evidence to acknowledge that there was frequent access of ordinary pedestrians at the point of the instant accident, and thus C cannot require C to have a duty of care exceeding the driver’s duty of care as an average expressway driver.”

2. The judgment of the first instance is justifiable, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.