[1] The relation between "act mediating sexual traffic for business purposes" and "act of providing a building provided for sexual traffic for business purposes" (=actual concurrence)

[2] The case holding that the court below erred by misapprehending legal principles in holding that the crime of violation of the former Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic for which a summary order has become final and that the "act of mediating sexual traffic for business purposes", which is the charge of violation of the said Act committed prior to the issuance of the said summary order, constitutes a single comprehensive crime

[1] Article 2(1)2 of the former Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc. (amended by Act No. 10697, May 23, 201; hereinafter “former Punishment of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc.”) provides that “the act of arranging, soliciting, inducing, or coercing sexual traffic” in subparagraph (a) as “act of arranging commercial sex acts, etc.,” and (c) provides that “the act of providing funds, land, or buildings despite being aware of the fact that they are provided for sexual traffic,” and Article 19 of the former Punishment of Commercial Sex Acts, etc. provides that “the act of arranging commercial sex acts or providing buildings shall be punished against “the person who performs the act of arranging commercial sex acts, etc. through the business,” although the penal provision is the same as in the case of the act of arranging commercial sex acts and providing buildings, it shall be deemed that not only the basic facts such as the method of crime but also the subject are different. In addition, where several acts are likely to be related with each other’s act of arranging commercial sex acts, which are an independent act of providing commercial sex acts.

[2] The case holding that the judgment of the court below which acquitted the above charges on the ground that the crime of violation of the former Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc. (amended by Act No. 10697, May 23, 2011; hereinafter "the former Punishment of Commercial Sex Acts, etc.") was committed and the "act of arranging sexual traffic for business purposes", which is the charge of violation of the Punishment of Commercial Sex Acts, etc. (hereinafter "the former Punishment of Commercial Sex Acts, etc.") committed prior to the issuance of the above summary order, constitutes a separate crime as an independent and independent act.

[1] Article 37 of the Criminal Act; Article 2(1)2(a) and (c) and Article 19(2)1 of the former Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic / [2] Article 37 of the Criminal Act; Article 2(1)2(a) and (c) and Article 19(2)1 of the former Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic / [3] Article 37 of the Criminal Act; Article 2(1)2(a) and (c) of the former Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic (Amended by Act No. 10697, May 23, 201); Article 326 subparag. 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Defendant

Prosecutor

Attorney Yoon So-young

Seoul Northern District Court Decision 2009No1670 Decided April 29, 2010

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Northern District Court Panel Division.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below erred in the crime of violation of the former Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc., for which summary order became final and conclusive, that is, the co-defendants of the court of first instance, etc. engaged in arranging commercial sex acts for business by allowing female employees to do similar acts in sports marina districts located in Seoul Special Metropolitan City, Nowon-gu (hereinafter omitted) on August 29, 2008. On July 1, 2008, the defendant, as the professional owner of the above business, knew that he provided it as a place of commercial sex acts by the co-defendants of the court of first instance and provided it to the co-defendants of the first instance for commercial sex acts (hereinafter referred to as "the first crime"), and the facts charged of the crime of arranging commercial sex acts for a certain period of time prior to the issuance of the above summary order, which are identical or similar to the above crime of arranging commercial sex acts, and thus, it is reasonable that the above defendant's act of arranging commercial sex acts will be combined with the above employees for 905 days.

However, such determination by the court below is difficult to accept. Where multiple acts falling under the same name of crime or continuous acts are continuously conducted for a certain period under the single and continuous criminal intent and legal interests are the same, each act should be punished as a comprehensive crime. However, where the unity and continuity of a crime is not recognized or the method of crime is not the same, each act constitutes substantive concurrent crimes (see Supreme Court Decisions 89Do1309, Nov. 28, 1989; 97Do1201, Jul. 25, 1997; 2002Do5672, May 28, 2004). However, according to Article 2(1)2 of the former Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc., which is an act of providing commercial sex acts, which is an act of providing commercial sex acts, and thus, constitutes an independent act of providing commercial sex acts, which is an act of providing commercial sex acts, and thus, it should not be viewed as an act of providing commercial sex acts, which is an independent act of providing commercial sex acts.

Thus, the above act of arranging sexual traffic and the act of providing a place are deemed to be an inclusive crime, and thus, the judgment of the court below which acquitted the facts charged of this case is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the blanket crime, which affected the conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Young-chul (Presiding Justice)