Where the victim of tort has already received the amount of medical care benefits from the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service pursuant to the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, the scope of the amount to be deducted from the calculation of the amount of the aforementioned benefits.

Articles 393, 763 of the Civil Act, Articles 40 and 80(2) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

Supreme Court Decision 93Da61703 Decided April 25, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 1936), Supreme Court Decision 2010Da77293 Decided June 14, 2012, Supreme Court Decision 2013Da95360, 953777 Decided April 10, 2014

Plaintiff (Attorney Ansan-gun, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Senior Company, Inc. and two others

Busan District Court Decision 2016Na49525 Decided September 15, 2017

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan District Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Compensation for damages is aimed at compensating for damages. As such, deducting the amount of benefits paid in cases where the victim already received medical care benefits, etc. under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act from the amount of compensation for damages can only be limited to those having a mutually complementary relationship, such as the nature of the damage and the period of occurrence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Da61703, Apr. 25, 1995; 2010Da77293, Jun. 14, 2012). Medical care benefits received from the Plaintiff from the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service shall be commensurate with the medical care expenses. However, in order to deduct the amount from the amount of the pre-treatment treatment expenses and the amount of future medical care expenses, only the amount corresponding to the specific portion, which first recognized by the lower court, should be deducted from the amount of the medical care expenses (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Da95360, Apr. 10, 2014).

2. We first examine the future treatment costs. The lower court deemed that the future treatment costs spent on the regular urology and test of the instant medical treatment costs were first disbursed on July 15, 2016, following the date of closing of argument in the first instance court. The amount of each of the following day after the date following the date of closing of argument in the lower court’s trial, deeming that both sex and antiscopic boom removal and the future treatment costs were fully disbursed on the day following the date of closing of argument in the lower court, and it is apparent that this is the period after the medical care benefits for the Plaintiff were paid to the Plaintiff. Moreover, there is no evidence to acknowledge the part of the medical care benefits paid to the Plaintiff as the medical care benefits in advance for the future treatment, barring any special circumstance, there is no amount equivalent to the medical care benefits amount to

3. Next, the lower court examined the period during which the medical care benefit was paid, and determined the amount of the medical care benefit that the Plaintiff received for the same period during which the medical care benefit was paid, by specifying the amount of the medical care benefit that the Plaintiff received for the same period during which the medical care benefit was incurred, and deducting the amount of the medical care benefit paid from the amount recognized as the medical care expense. Nevertheless, the lower court did not specify the amount of the medical care benefit that the Plaintiff received for the same period during which the medical care

4. Therefore, the judgment of the court below that recognized the amount calculated by deducting the total amount of medical care benefits paid to the Plaintiff from the early medical expenses and future medical care expenses claimed by the Plaintiff as the amount of award for the early medical care expenses and future medical care expenses, is erroneous by misapprehending the legal principles on mutual aid for medical care benefits in damages and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion

5. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Ki-taik (Presiding Justice)