1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. The real estate stated in the purport of the claim, which is unregistered for the Plaintiff’s assertion (hereinafter “the forest of this case”) was owned by the Plaintiff’s father C, and is not so.

C acquired ownership by the completion of the statute of limitations by occupying the forest land of this case in peace and openly with the intention of ownership for at least 40 years.

However, upon the death of C on December 13, 2007, the Plaintiff succeeded to the instant forest through an inheritance division agreement on October 15, 2013. As such, the Plaintiff sought confirmation against the Defendant that the instant forest is owned by the Plaintiff.

2. According to the records in Gap evidence Nos. 2 through 4, Gap evidence Nos. 5, and Eul evidence Nos. 8, the forest of this case was restored to the land owner on Jan. 5, 1966 without registration, and restored to the forest of this case on Apr. 14, 1966, by C, the plaintiff's father C was residing in the river of this case, and the fact that Eul et al paid taxes, etc. with respect to the forest of this case is recognized.

However, even if the owner's name is stated in the book of forest register voluntarily restored for administrative convenience without any legal basis before the enforcement of the Cadastral Act amended by Act No. 2801 of Dec. 31, 1975, the pertinent owner's right presumption is not recognized (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Da4705, Jun. 24, 2003). The above recognition alone is insufficient to recognize that the forest of this case was owned by the Plaintiff's father C, and there is no other evidence to support this.

In addition, even if C’s possession of the forest of this case was completed by the intention of ownership ownership for at least 20 years and the acquisition by prescription was completed by public performance, such circumstance alone cannot be deemed to have acquired the forest of this case as long as the registration of ownership transfer was not completed.

Therefore, the Plaintiff’s forest of this case is premised on the Plaintiff’s father C’s ownership.