Whether the legal principle of offsetting negligence applies to medical care benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, in cases where the king has contributed to the expansion of damage in a civil damage case (negative)

Insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act for the purpose of contributing to the protection of workers by establishing and operating insurance facilities necessary for facilitating the rehabilitation of workers suffering from occupational accidents and their return to society through the implementation of the industrial accident compensation insurance business, and by carrying out the projects to prevent accidents and promote workers' welfare, have the nature of directly compensating for damages to workers from the standpoint of the insurer by the State. In addition, the industrial accident compensation insurance system under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act has different nature of guaranteeing the livelihood of workers, as it differs from the system for compensating for damages caused by tort and its purport or purpose. Unless otherwise provided in Acts, the principle of negligence liability or the theory of offsetting negligence is not applicable to the payment of benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. In full view of the legislative purport and basic ideology of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, and the nature of insurance benefits therefrom, etc., in cases of civil damage compensation cases, the court set the amount of damages from the perspective of fairness, and applying the legal principle of offsetting negligence to the expansion of damages, etc. cannot be deemed as applicable to medical benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act.

Articles 1, 5 subparag. 1, 40, and 49 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act; Articles 396 and 763 of the Civil Act

[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff (Attorney Dok-ho et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation (Attorney Park Jong-young, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2009Nu18891 decided February 4, 2010

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

The term "occupational accidents" under the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8694, Dec. 14, 2007; hereinafter "Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act") means diseases, etc. caused by the worker's occupational performance of his/her duties while performing his/her duties. Thus, there is a proximate causal relation between the worker's occupational disease, etc. In such cases, the causal relation between the worker's occupational disease, etc. must be proved by the party asserting such causation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 200Du4538, Jul. 27, 2001; 2006Du4912, Apr. 12, 2007).

On the other hand, the industrial accident compensation insurance under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which aims to contribute to the protection of workers by compensating workers promptly and fairly for occupational accidents through the implementation of the industrial accident compensation insurance business, and by establishing and operating insurance facilities necessary to facilitate the rehabilitation of workers suffering from occupational accidents and their return to society, and by carrying out the accident prevention projects and other projects to promote workers' welfare, has the nature of directly compensating the damages of workers resulting from occupational accidents to be compensated by the employer under the Labor Standards Act from the standpoint of the insurer (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Da38826, May 24, 1994). In addition, the industrial accident compensation insurance system under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, is not subject to the principle of fault liability or the theory of offsetting negligence, unless otherwise specifically provided for in Acts.

Therefore, in full view of the legislative purport and basic ideology of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and the nature of the insurance benefits therefrom, when the king contributed to the expansion of damages in civil damage compensation cases, the legal principles that consider the comparative negligence doctrine by applying the legal principles to the court shall not be deemed as being applied to medical care benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, in a case where the king has set the amount of damages in the civil damage compensation cases.

Nevertheless, the court below, on the basis of its stated reasoning, on the premise that the concept of contribution rate in a civil damage compensation case may be equally applied to the industrial accident compensation insurance system that requires a proximate causal relation between the business and the disease. However, some of the additional diseases in this case were caused by the plaintiff's existing disease or personal vulnerability, etc., but some of them were caused by the initial disease in this case and its treatment process. The first disease in this case and its treatment process in this case were reasonable to be deemed to have contributed to 1/4, and the court below revoked 1/4 of the non-approval disposition on the application for approval of medical care of the additional disease in this case. Accordingly, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on proximate causal relation in the recognition of occupational accident in the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and such illegality affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.

2. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Min Il-young (Presiding Justice)