The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The gist of the grounds for appeal is that the Defendant driven a two-wheeled vehicle under drinking, and it is difficult to deem that the two-wheeled vehicle, which the Defendant reported to the competent authority on February 6, 2012, cannot be deemed as a two-wheeled vehicle driven at the time of the instant crime, was manufactured after 2003, and thus, it was difficult to deem that the two-wheeled vehicle driven at the time of the instant crime did not suffer from the starting since it was difficult to view it as a manufacturing since it was difficult to view it as a manufacturing since 2

2. Around 17:00 on January 17, 2012, the Defendant driven a scood vehicle without a driver’s license, while under the influence of alcohol content 0.117%, the Defendant driven a scood vehicle without a driver’s license, with approximately KRW 50 meters from the upper corner of the “Dice Vice Commissioner” in the Pcoo City of Pakistan to the 17:01 on the same day.

3. On the grounds of the judgment below, Article 2 subparagraph 26 of the Road Traffic Act provides that the term "driving" means using a motor vehicle or horse on the road in accordance with its original method of use (including steering). Article 2 subparagraph 18 of the same Act provides that the term "motor vehicle" means any motor vehicle driven by a motor without using a railroad or installed line, which falls under any of the following items. Thus, it is necessary to use a motor vehicle or other motor vehicle (motor vehicle and motor bicycle) in order to fall under the act of using a motor vehicle or other motor vehicle according to its original method of use (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da30834, Nov. 12, 199). Therefore, the act of driving a motor vehicle or other motor vehicle while driving the motor vehicle in the state of failing to operate the motor vehicle does not constitute an ordinary driving under the Road Traffic Act.