(a) Whether it is limited to the act of bearing the obligation concerning the basic property of the school juristic person in question where the permission of the supervisory authority should be obtained under Article 28 (1) of the Private School Act;

(b) Whether it is required to obtain permission from the supervisory authority for each act related to ordinary expenses naturally accompanying the management of the enterprise for profit of the school juristic person;

1. Where an educational foundation intends to bear obligations under Article 28(1) of the Private School Act, the provisions that the supervisory authority should obtain permission should not mean only an act of bearing the fundamental property itself;

2. The act of bearing the same obligation as the check guarantee, which naturally involves the management of an enterprise for profit of a school juristic person, is included in the budget for profit-making business of the school juristic person, so it is not necessary to newly obtain permission from the supervisory

Articles 28 and 6 of the Private School Act

Plaintiff

Defendant 1 and one other Defendants, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul Central District Court Decision 76Na515 delivered on May 27, 197

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of the appeal lawsuit shall be borne by the Defendants.

The defendants' attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

With respect to No. 1:

The lower court rejected lawfully some evidence consistent with the Defendants’ defenses that the instant check amount was fully repaid, and, in particular, recognized that the evidence No. 2 was partially altered and thus, did not constitute evidence of this case.

In light of the records, the above measures of the court below are just and it is not recognized that there is a violation of the rules of evidence such as the theory of lawsuit. There is no reason to discuss.

With respect to the second ground:

The court below held that, although Article 28 of the Private School Act provides that a school juristic person should obtain permission from the supervisory authority when it intends to impose obligations on the school juristic person with regard to the responsibility to guarantee the check of this case on the part of the defendant school juristic person, it cannot be denied that there is the primary purpose of protecting the property of the school juristic person, but if it is deemed null and void without the supervisory authority's permission for all acts of imposing obligations, the private economic activities of the school juristic person should be generally permitted by the supervisory authority, so it cannot be said that the private economic activities of the school juristic person cannot be reduced and the autonomous activities of the school juristic person cannot be reduced. This phenomenon eventually results in denying the existence of the school juristic person's system in order to maintain the autonomy and integrity of management of the property remaining for a certain educational purpose, and it cannot be said that most transactions between the school juristic person and the interested parties cannot be viewed as the act of restricting the transaction of fundamental property to outside the protection right of the law, and therefore, it cannot be viewed that the obligation to pay the check of this case itself is a joint check issue.

However, the above interpretation by the court below is not erroneous since Article 28 of the Private School Act provides that when a school foundation intends to assume an obligation, it should obtain permission from the supervisory authority, and it does not limit the act of imposing such obligation to basic property. However, the above interpretation by the court below is not erroneous. However, in light of the circumstances leading up to the check guarantee act by the defendant foundation, as duly established by the court below, the chief director of the defendant foundation, who is the representative of the profit-making chain of the defendant foundation, and the representative of the bigtoererer, operated the connection with the above defendant foundation, borrowed business funds from the plaintiff while operating the above defendant foundation, and the plaintiff paid the money while operating the clothes storage in this case, the defendant 1 already received the above loan and the obligation to return the deposit and the obligation to pay interest, and the obligation to pay for profit-making businesses secured by the checks in this case, and the defendant 1, as a matter of course, submitted the business plan and the obligation to pay for profit-making businesses in the name of the chief director of the defendant foundation, and reported the three of the Private School Act.

If so, the conclusion of the judgment below to the same purport is justifiable, so the error in the interpretation of the above law does not affect the original judgment, and therefore, the appeal on this point is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed and the costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Ahn Byung-soo (Presiding Justice) (Presiding Justice)