1. As to motor vehicles listed in the separate sheet:

A. On August 20, 2015, the sales contract between the Defendant and B was revoked, and B.

Facts of recognition

On September 1, 2014, the Plaintiff entered into a credit transaction agreement with the loan principal of KRW 13,00,000, the loan period of KRW 36 months, the loan interest rate of KRW 29.5%, and the loan principal and interest of KRW 36 months.

At the time of the contract, B paid 34% delay damages for the remaining debt in the event of a cause for loss of benefit of time.

B On August 20, 2015, a motor vehicle listed in the separate sheet (hereinafter referred to as “instant motor vehicle”) as the sole property of the Defendant, who is a child, sold at KRW 4,500,000 (hereinafter referred to as “instant sales contract”), and completed the ownership transfer registration on August 25, 2015.

B From August 2015, from around August 2015, the Plaintiff lost the benefit of time due to delay in the repayment of loan obligations to the Plaintiff. At the time of the instant sales contract, the principal and interest of the Plaintiff’s claim against B is KRW 10,641,382.

On the other hand, B did not have any other active property except the instant vehicle at the time of the instant sales contract, while it was a small property, the obligation against the Plaintiff, other than the above obligation against the Plaintiff, was added to the liability of KRW 13,837,00 for Hyundai Card Co., Ltd.

[Reasons for Recognition] Evidence A, Evidence B, Evidence B Nos. 1 and 2, and the purport of the whole pleadings, and the debtor's act of selling real estate, which is only the property of his own, and changing the money which is easily consumed or transferring it to another person without compensation, shall be deemed a fraudulent act against the creditor unless there are special circumstances. Thus, the debtor's intent to harm is presumed to be a fraudulent act against the creditor, and the burden of proof that the purchaser or the transferee did not have bad faith is the beneficiary.

(See Supreme Court Decision 200Da41875 delivered on April 24, 2001, and Supreme Court Decision 2003Da60891 delivered on October 14, 2005, etc.). B sold to the Defendant, who is the sole child of the instant automobile, in excess of the obligation, as seen earlier.