A. Whether it constitutes a disposition under Article 405(2) of the Civil Act where an obligor completed a registration of ownership transfer in his/her name after vicarious exercise of the right to claim ownership transfer registration (negative)

(b) Where a subsequent purchaser of real estate has made a provisional disposition against the transferor (third-party debtor) by subrogation of the transferee in order to preserve the right to claim the transfer registration of ownership against the transferee and the transferee after such provisional disposition, the right to be preserved and the validity of the transfer registration that the transferee received from the transferor after such provisional disposition;

A. After the creditor exercises the debtor's right on behalf of the debtor and notifies the debtor, or after the debtor becomes aware of the fact that the creditor has exercised the right on behalf of the debtor, the debtor cannot perform an act of disposal such as transfer or renunciation of such right, and the right acquired through the debtor's act of disposal cannot be set up against the creditor. However, the debtor's receipt of repayment cannot be deemed a act of disposal, and the debtor's act of completing the registration of ownership transfer in his name cannot be deemed a act of disposal even after the exercise of the right on behalf of the debtor is completed

B. In cases where the subsequent purchaser of real estate (creditor) made a provisional disposition against the transferor (third debtor) by subrogation of the transferee in order to preserve the right to claim ownership transfer registration against the transferor (third debtor), the right to be preserved is only the right to claim ownership transfer registration against the transferor of the transferee, not the right to claim ownership transfer registration against the subsequent purchaser, but also the right to claim ownership transfer registration against the subsequent purchaser, even if the disposition against the third party was prohibited in the provisional disposition decision, it does not include the transferee among the third parties, and the ownership transfer registration that the transferee transferred from the transferor after the provisional disposition does not violate

(b)Articles 404 and 405 of the Civil Code;

A. Supreme Court Decision 85Meu1792 Decided January 19, 1988 (Gong1988,442) A. B. Supreme Court Decision 88Meu25274,25281 Decided April 27, 1990 (Gong1990,1147) (Gong1990, 1147). Supreme Court Decision 87Meu3155 Decided April 11, 1989 (Gong1989, 737) Decided May 9, 1989 (Gong1989,8955)

Kim Jong-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

[Defendant-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant-Appellee]

Cornings

Anthale

Busan High Court Decision 90Na899 delivered on September 5, 1990

The plaintiff's appeal against the promotion committee for the establishment and operation of a complex of household affairs shall be dismissed.

The Plaintiff’s appeal against the Changwon city and the appeal against the Intervenor’s supplementary salary class to the Plaintiff’s supplementary fund promotion committee for the building and operation of a new complex is dismissed.

The litigation costs incurred by the plaintiff's appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff, and the litigation costs incurred by the appeal by the above assistant intervenor shall be borne by the above assistant intervenor.

1. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal on Defendant Chang-si

(1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the defendant committee purchased the real estate of this case from the defendant city on December 20, 1979 and the above real estate on 3.124/129/129 as to the share of 400 square meters and 2.29/129/129 of the real estate of this case from the defendant city on April 8, 1989, as to the remaining share of July 24, 196 of the same year, the defendant Changwon-si (hereinafter "the defendant city") by subrogationing the defendant committee on behalf of the defendant committee on December 20, 1979, the defendant committee had already acknowledged that the ownership transfer transfer registration procedure had already been extinguished on July 24, 198 as to the remaining share of the defendant city on December 24, 196 of the same year.

In theory, the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's lawsuit when he completed the above registration of transfer of ownership to the defendant committee. Nevertheless, the defendant did not fulfill his duty as the third debtor in the subrogation claim that he passed the registration of transfer of ownership without any notification to the plaintiff.

After a creditor exercises the debtor's right on behalf of the debtor on behalf of the debtor and notifies the debtor or becomes aware of the fact that the debtor has exercised the right on behalf of the debtor, the debtor loses the right to dispose of such right, and thus, it cannot be set up against the creditor. However, the debtor's right acquired through an act of disposal cannot be set up against the creditor. However, the debtor's repayment receipt cannot be a disposal act, and the debtor's act of completing the registration of ownership transfer in his name cannot be deemed a disposal act. Therefore, the debtor's exercise of the right on behalf of the creditor does not have any reason to obstruct the exercise of the debtor's right to claim the registration of ownership transfer or the performance of the third debtor's obligation. Thus, since the transfer registration is aimed at the creditor, it does not interfere with the debtor's registration of ownership transfer in his name even after the exercise of the right on behalf of the creditor

(2) In cases where the subsequent purchaser of real estate (creditor) made a provisional injunction against the transferor (third debtor) by subrogation of the transferee in order to preserve the right to claim the transfer registration of ownership against the transferee and the seller (third debtor), the provisional injunction is aimed at preventing the subsequent purchaser from disposing of the ownership transfer, etc. in order to preserve his/her right to claim the transfer registration of ownership against his/her transferee. Thus, the preserved right is the right to claim the transfer registration of ownership against the transferor, and even if the subsequent disposition was prohibited in the decision of the provisional injunction, it does not include the assignee among the third parties, and accordingly, it does not violate the above provisional injunction on the ground that the subsequent transferee received the transfer registration from the transferor after the provisional injunction, and it does not constitute a violation of the right to claim the transfer registration of ownership against the subsequent purchaser (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da1416, Mar. 22, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 80Da6488, May 9, 1989).

According to the records, the plaintiff received a provisional disposition on February 23, 1989 from the defendant committee on behalf of the defendant committee to preserve the right to claim the transfer registration of ownership against the defendant committee on behalf of the defendant committee on the real estate of this case and completed the provisional disposition on February 23, 1989, and thereafter the registration of transfer of ownership was made in the future at the defendant committee. The court below held that the above provisional disposition on the transfer registration of ownership is valid because it does not violate the validity of the provisional disposition on the transfer registration of ownership. Such

2. As to the Plaintiff’s appeal against the Defendant Committee

The Plaintiff’s appeal against the Defendant Committee is a party who won the entire appeal, and there is no interest in the appeal. Therefore, the above appeal is unlawful, and thus, it cannot be dismissed.

3. As to the appeal by the Intervenor joining the Defendant Committee on the grade of the school

According to the records, the above supplementary intervenor or the defendant commission did not submit the appellate brief despite the notice of receipt of the records of trial by the party members on October 22, 1990 to the above supplementary intervenor.

Therefore, the plaintiff's appeal against the defendant committee is dismissed, and all appeals against the defendant's city and appeals against the defendant's assistant intervenor at the defendant committee are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party's share and are so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice)