Whether it is permissible for a person who has completed the repayment of distributed farmland within the period prescribed in Article 3 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act (amended by December 22, 1994), to request the performance of the procedure for direct ownership transfer registration against the heir of the original owner of the distributed farmland on the ground of the abolition and invalidation of Article 16-2 of the former Farmland Reform Act, etc., which serves as the basis for the procedure for the acquisition of ownership of distributed farmland and the transfer of ownership in a simplified method, etc. (affirmative)

A person who acquires ownership by law seeks the implementation of the procedure for registration of transfer of ownership based on the restoration of real name in lieu of seeking the cancellation of registration against the current registered titleholder by means of restoring the title of registration. This legal doctrine is equally applicable to cases where a distributor who has completed the repayment of distributed farmland or his/her heir seeks the implementation of the procedure for registration of transfer for the restoration of real name against the current registered titleholder who has completed the registration of invalidation of cause as to distributed farmland. Furthermore, the procedure is equally permissible in light of the above legal doctrine as it is deemed necessary for a distributor who has completed the repayment of distributed farmland to demand the implementation of the procedure for registration of transfer for the restoration of real name, and the procedure for the acquisition of ownership for the distributed farmland and the transfer of ownership for a simplified method accordingly, under Articles 15, 16, and 16-2 of the former Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act, Act No. 4817, Dec. 22, 1994).

Article 186 of the Civil Act; Articles 15, 16, and 16-2 of the former Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act (Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994); Articles 2 and 3 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act (Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994)

Supreme Court en banc Decision 89Meu12398 Decided November 27, 1990 (Gong1991, 189) Supreme Court Decision 2001Da20103 Decided September 24, 2002 (Gong2002Ha, 2498) Supreme Court Decision 2007Da14940 Decided July 12, 2007 (Gong2007Da43856 Decided October 11, 2007)

Plaintiff

Defendant (Attorney Kim Dong-young et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Changwon District Court Decision 2008Na4272 decided July 11, 2008, 2008Na4289 decided July 11, 2008

The part of the lower judgment against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) regarding the counterclaim is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Changwon District Court Panel Division.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the farmland of this case, which is the land prior to the subdivision of the farmland of this case Nos. 1 and 2, was purchased from the State due to the implementation of the Farmland Reform Act, and was distributed to the deceased non-party who is the father of the defendant Counterclaim (hereinafter "the defendant"), on March 31, 1953, when the non-party died and the defendant who is his heir completed the repayment in around 1956, acquired ownership of the farmland of this case and the land Nos. 1 and 2 of this case divided from this time. The court below abolished the farmland of this case and the farmland of this case, as Article 2 of the Addenda to the Farmland Reform Act (Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994; hereinafter "farmland Reform Act"), since the transfer registration for ownership transfer to the farmland of this case was not necessary for the state's intermediate registration in the name of the plaintiff Counterclaim, and thus, the part of this case's claim for the transfer registration is unlawful.

However, the provisions of Article 16-2, etc. of the Farmland Reform Act, which are the legal basis for the State to grant a registration of ownership transfer based on the direct completion of the repayment to a person who has completed the repayment of distributed farmland, shall have expired by the expiration of the three-year period as stipulated in Articles 2 and 3 of the Addenda of the Farmland Act, which was enforced from January 1, 1996. Thus, even though the distribution of farmland has completed the repayment up to that time, even though the distribution of farmland does not lose ownership on the ground that he did not complete the registration, even if he did not lose ownership on the ground that he had not completed the registration, the legal interest in the claim for counter-claim cannot be denied on the ground of the provisions of the repealed Act.

Meanwhile, this part of the counterclaim is a claim for the implementation of the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership to the original owner who acquired ownership as a matter of course by the person who acquired ownership from the government upon the promulgation of the Farmland Reform Act at the same time and completing the repayment of distributed farmland which acquired ownership from the original owner, and as a matter of course, without registration, can be seen as a claim for the implementation of the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership for the restoration of real name in light of its purport. In addition, the claim for the implementation of the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership for the restoration of real name is permissible under the law as long as it is deemed necessary (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 89Meu12398, Nov. 27, 199; 2007Da14940, Jul. 12, 2007; 2007Da14940, Jul. 12, 2007). 207.

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the acquisition of ownership following the completion of the repayment of distributed farmland and the transfer of ownership for the restoration of authentic title, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant regarding the counterclaim is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)