[1] Where a claim for the completion of extinctive prescription is not permissible as an abuse of right

[2] The case holding that a party to whom the advance payment of disability pension was excessively paid due to the clerical error of the Korea Labor Welfare Corporation's determination of average wage does not constitute an abuse of rights against the Corporation's assertion that the Corporation exercises its right to defense of extinctive prescription against the

[1] The debtor's exercise of the right to defense of extinctive prescription may be limited by the principle of good faith or the prohibition of abuse of rights, which is the major principle of our legal system, and therefore, in special circumstances, such as where the debtor, prior to the completion of extinctive prescription, was unable or considerably difficult to exercise the creditor's right or act to believe that such measures are unnecessary, the creditor was unable to exercise his right, or there was an objective obstacle to the creditor, or where the debtor, after the completion of extinctive prescription, made the right holder trust, or when there were circumstances such as where the debtor received the repayment of the debt under the same conditions as the need to protect the creditor, or where other creditors of the same conditions are remarkably unfair or unfair, the debtor's assertion for the completion of extinctive prescription cannot be allowed as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith.

[2] The case holding that the claim by the Corporation against which the person who received the advance payment of disability pension under consideration due to the clerical error of the Korea Labor Welfare Corporation on the determination of average wage did not constitute an abuse of rights where the person sought the difference against the Corporation

[1] Article 2 of the Civil Code / [2] Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 96 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da32053 delivered on March 31, 1992 (Gong1992, 1406) Supreme Court Decision 93Da27604 delivered on December 9, 1994 (Gong1995Sang, 434) Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Da22927 delivered on December 19, 196 (Gong197Sang, 75) Supreme Court Decision 95Da29895 delivered on December 12, 197 (Gong198Da42929 delivered on December 7, 1999)

Plaintiff

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Seoul High Court Decision 2002Nu5568 delivered on October 11, 2002

The part of the lower judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Summary of the judgment below

원심은, 그 채용 증거를 종합하여, 원고는 공소외 주식회사 소속 근로자로서 1993. 5. 13. 업무상 재해를 입고 척수손상 등의 상병으로 산업재해보상보험법(이하 '산재법'이라 한다)상의 요양을 받아오다가 1996. 3. 20. 치료를 종결한 사실, 원고는 산재법상 장해등급 제1급 제3호에 해당하는 연금지급대상자임을 이유로 1996. 3. 21. 피고에게 산재법상의 장해연금지급청구를 하면서 연금 중 4년분의 선급금 지급을 구하였고, 이에 따라 피고는 1996. 3. 27. 원고의 평균임금을 1일 99,379.23원으로 결정하여 4년분(1996. 4. 1. - 2000. 3. 31.) 연금 선급금으로 130,783,060원을 지급한 사실, 노동부(1994. 12. 22. 법률 제4826호로 산재법이 전면 개정되어 1995. 5. 1.부터 시행되기 전까지는 산업재해보상보험에 관한 업무를 노동부가 주관하였다)는 임금대장을 근거로 원고의 재해 당시의 평균임금을 79,561.29원(적용기간 : 1993. 5. 13. - 1994. 5. 12.)으로 산정하였고, 피고는 이를 기준으로 하여 원고의 평균임금을 89,490.53원(적용기간 : 1994. 5. 13. - 1995. 5. 12.) 및 99,379.23원(적용기간 : 1995. 5. 13. - 1996. 5. 12.)으로 각 증액하는 결정을 하였는데, 원고에 대한 장해연금 선급금은 신청 당시의 평균임금인 99,379.23원을 기준으로 산정된 것이었고, 한편 위 각 평균임금을 증액함에 있어서 피고는 원고의 개별적인 신청 없이 스스로 관련자료를 검토하여 결정한 사실, 그런데 피고가 1994. 5. 13. - 1995. 5. 12.까지 적용되는 평균임금을 결정함에 있어서 원고와 동종의 근로자의 임금변동률인 19.67%를 적용하여야 함에도 불구하고, 피고는 전 근로자의 월평균 정액급여의 변동률인 12.48%만을 적용함으로써 평균임금을 잘못 결정하였고, 이에 따라 원고의 장해연금 선급금의 산정기준이 되는 평균임금(적용기간이 1995. 5. 13. - 1996. 5. 12.까지)을 결정함에 있어서도, 위와 같이 잘못 결정된 평균임금을 전제로 계산한 결과 99,379.23원으로 산정된 사실, 피고의 위와 같은 평균임금 결정의 잘못으로 인하여 원고가 지급받지 못한 장해연금 선급금은 8,359,980원인 사실 등을 인정한 다음, 원고의 이 사건 장해연금 선급금 차액 상당액 지급청구권이 산재법 제96조 소정의 3년의 소멸시효기간 경과로 소멸하였다는 피고의 항변에 대하여, 원고가 미지급 장해연금 선급금의 지급을 청구한 2000. 6. 15.에는 4년분의 장해연금 선급금을 수령한 1996. 3. 27.부터 기산하여 이미 3년이 경과하였음은 역수상 명백하므로, 일응 원고의 장해연금 선급금 중 미지급 부분에 대한 소멸시효기간은 경과한 것으로 보이나, 그 판시와 같은 사정 즉, ① 피고는 근로자의 업무상의 재해를 신속하고 공정하게 보상하는 것을 목적으로 산재법에 의해 설립된 공법인으로서, 원고는 이러한 피고의 평균임금에 관한 결정을 신뢰하여 피고가 결정한 장해연금 선급금에 대하여 아무런 이의를 제기하지 않은 채 소멸시효기간을 도과시킨 것으로 보이고, 원고가 이와 같이 피고의 결정을 신뢰한 것에 잘못이 있다고 할 수 없으며, 또한 위와 같은 사정을 감안하면, 위 선급금의 지급기간인 4년이 경과하기 이전에 원고에게 장해연금 선급금 중 미지급금에 대하여 소멸시효의 진행을 중단시키는 조치를 취할 것을 기대하기는 어려웠던 점, ② 원고는 피고의 평균임금 결정 과정에 전혀 관여하지 않았고, 피고가 공소외 주식회사로부터 관련 자료를 받아 일방적으로 평균임금을 증액하여 왔는데, 이 사건에서 문제된 1994. 5. 13. - 1995. 5. 12.까지의 기간 동안의 평균임금의 증액과 관련하여 공소외 주식회사가 1994. 3. 1.자로 원고와 동종의 근로자들의 임금이 19.67% 인상되었음을 이유로 평균임금의 개정을 신청하는 평균임금 개정신청서를 제출하기도 하였던 점, ③ 원고는 평균임금이 잘못 산정되었음을 알고는 곧바로 평균임금의 정정을 신청하였고, 피고가 평균임금을 정정하면서도 원고에게 미지급한 장해연금 선급금을 지급하지 아니하자 즉시 정정된 평균임금에 따라 계산한 장해연금 선급금 중 미지급금의 지급을 청구한 점, ④ 피고 역시 원고에 대하여 지급한 장해연금 선급금이 정당한 금액에 미달함을 인정하고 있고, 2000년 4월분의 장해연금은 정정된 평균임금에 따라 계산하여 원고에게 지급한 점 등에 비추어 보면, 이 사건에 있어서 피고가 소멸시효 완성을 이유로 원고에게 미지급한 장해연금 선급금의 지급을 거절하는 것은 현저히 부당하거나 불공평하게 되는 특별한 사정이 있다고 보아야 할 것이므로, 결국 피고의 소멸시효 완성 주장은 신의성실의 원칙에 반하는 것으로서 허용될 수 없다는 이유로 피고의 소멸시효 항변을 배척하고 원고의 청구를 인용하였다.

2. The judgment of this Court

However, the lower court’s determination rejecting the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription cannot be accepted for the following reasons.

The exercise of the obligor's right to defense of extinctive prescription may be limited by the principle of good faith or the prohibition of abuse of rights, which is the major principle of our legal system, and therefore, in special circumstances, such as where the obligor has committed an act that makes it impossible or considerably difficult for the obligee to exercise the obligee's right or the interruption of prescription before the completion of prescription, or where the obligee has objectively obstructed the obligee from exercising his right, or where the obligor has shown the same attitude that the obligor would not invoke the prescription after the completion of prescription, or where the obligor has made the right holder trust as such, or where other creditors have received the repayment of the obligation under the conditions that require the protection of the obligee, and where it is remarkably unreasonable or unfair to allow the obligor to claim the completion of the extinctive prescription as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da42929, Dec. 7, 199).

However, according to the records of this case, if there is an error in calculating the average wage in the process of determining the amount of advance payment of the disability pension of this case or in calculating the amount thereof, the defendant did not have expressed his/her intent to return the difference without legal proceedings or to waive an objection to the extinctive prescription, and did not have done any act such as preventing or obstructing the plaintiff's filing of a lawsuit, and there was no objective obstacle that prevents the plaintiff from exercising his/her right, and there was no same attitude that the defendant does not use the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Unlike the creditors of the advance payment of the unpaid disability pension, there is no special need to protect only the plaintiff of this case, and there is no circumstance that other conditions are different from the creditors of the advance payment of the unpaid disability pension, and it cannot be found that the defendant's rejection of payment due to the completion of the statute of limitations is remarkably unfair or unfair, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the defendant's assertion for the completion of the statute of limitations violates the principle of trust and good faith (the plaintiff's own calculation of average wages and its trust, even if it does not violate such principle).

Nevertheless, the court below held that the defendant's defense against the extinctive prescription violated the principle of good faith and thus it cannot be permitted. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles under Article 96 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Act on the extinctive prescription of the right to advance payment of unpaid disability pension, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.

However, as long as the Plaintiff did not actually receive the disability pension which may be paid in advance due to clerical error in the Defendant’s determination of average wages, the right to claim the payment of pension for the difference remains. Meanwhile, Article 40(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16871 of Jun. 27, 2000) provides that the pension benefits shall be paid in four equal installments each year and shall be paid in February, May, August, 8, and November, respectively. Thus, the right to claim the payment of disability pension which the Plaintiff did not receive in advance shall be a credit with a final time limit that reaches each due date, and the base date of the extinctive prescription arrives every three months after May, 196 and after March 31, 200. Therefore, it shall be deemed that the period of extinctive prescription for the portion that the Plaintiff requested the payment of the unpaid disability pension should be calculated and paid within six months from June 13, 200 to March 31, 200.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the lower judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Cho-Un (Presiding Justice)