Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act

Nomination

New Electronic Co., Ltd.

Seoul District Court's East Branch (87 Gohap3187)

The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

Expenses for appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The original judgment shall be revoked.

The defendant's dismissal against the plaintiff as of May 18, 1987 is confirmed to be null and void.

From May 18, 1987 to the time when the defendant reinstated the plaintiff to the defendant company, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff an amount equivalent to KRW 4,98.26 per day.

The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant in both the first and second trials, and a provisional execution order with regard to the above amount paid.

On October 24, 1984, the fact that the Plaintiff was punished by the Defendant Company as of May 18, 1987 is no dispute between the parties.

The plaintiff alleged that the above dismissal disposition against the plaintiff was null and void. The defendant stated that the above dismissal disposition was a legitimate disciplinary action against the plaintiff 1. The defendant 1. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the non-party 1. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the non-party 4. The defendant 8. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the non-party 1. The defendant 8. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the non-party 1. The defendant 9. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the non-party 1. The defendant 4. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the non-party 8. The defendant 9. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the non-party 1. The defendant 1. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the non-party 4. The defendant 9. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the non-party 8. The defendant 1. The defendant's dismissal disposition against the above non-party 1. The defendant 4. The defendant 9. The defendant's new dismissal guidelines were stated in the 9. The defendant 1.

The reason why the employer requires an employee to resume when employing a worker in a false modern company is not only for the purpose of surveying his work ability, such as the worker's work experience, but also for the establishment of trust relationship between labor and management, maintenance of business order, and stability by using the personality survey data, such as the settlement of work experience, corporate order, adaptation to corporate norms, and other cooperation. Thus, if the worker's work experience or misrepresentation in the resume affects the employer's trust or maintenance of business order, regardless of the above two purposes, it would have an effect on the worker's work experience or maintenance of business order. If the worker was discovered in advance, the employer did not enter into an employment contract, or if it is recognized that the above work experience was not concluded under the same condition, it would have an important reason to punish the worker (see Supreme Court Decision 83Meu202, Apr. 9, 1985). Thus, the plaintiff's act of leaving his work experience in the above company's work experience and employment order should be widely known to the defendant company, as seen above, to the effect that the defendant company's work experience and dismissal should be interpreted as above.

Then, the plaintiff asserts that the dismissal is null and void because the defendant did not make the above pre-determination of dismissal at least 30 days before the dismissal of the plaintiff as above. However, since the defendant paid the plaintiff 30 days ordinary wages in the above dismissal, it is argued that the dismissal is valid. Thus, Article 52 of the Rules of Employment of the defendant company provides that the matters not prescribed in these Rules are governed by the Labor Standards Act, other Acts and subordinate statutes, company regulations, and ordinary practices, and Article 27-2 of the Labor Standards Act provides that when the employer intends to dismiss a worker, he shall make such pre-determination at least 30 days ordinary wages. If the employer fails to do so 30 days prior to the dismissal, the defendant must pay the above pre-determination of dismissal more than 30 days ordinary wages. Thus, it cannot be acknowledged that the defendant paid the plaintiff 30 days ordinary wages in consideration of the entries of No. 6-2 (written passbook) without dispute in the establishment of the above pre-determination of dismissal and the purport of the plaintiff's pre-determination of dismissal of the court below witness.

Finally, the plaintiff's dismissal of the plaintiff was made as retaliation against the plaintiff's dismissal of the plaintiff at the defendant company. This is alleged to be null and void because it falls under unfair labor practices as stipulated in Article 39 subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union Act. Thus, there is no evidence to believe that some testimony of the defendant's senior debt of the court below, the trial witness's erroneous return of the witness at the court below, and there is no other evidence to recognize it. Rather, the dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendant company is a disciplinary action due to the plaintiff's career, abolition and misrepresentation of the plaintiff's career, etc. under the rules of employment and the personnel committee. Further, considering the whole purport of the arguments in the testimony of the court below's witness at the court below, the defendant company's employees at the time of establishment of a trade union around March 21, 1987, and resolution of voluntary dissolution of the defendant company at around May 8, 198 of the same year, the plaintiff's above assertion is groundless.

Therefore, with respect to the defendant, the plaintiff sought confirmation of invalidity on the premise that the dismissal of the defendant against the plaintiff on May 18, 1987 against the plaintiff is null and void, and in addition, the claim of this case seeking wages from the above dismissal date to the reinstatement of the plaintiff to the defendant company does not need further be judged, and it is without merit. The judgment below is just in this conclusion, and the plaintiff's appeal is without merit, and it is dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff who has lost. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Han-dae (Presiding Judge)