Main Issues
When there were grounds for a retrial for judicial reconciliation due to changes in Supreme Court precedents where the grounds that could not be grounds for a retrial for judicial reconciliation have become grounds for a retrial.
Summary of Judgment
In the case before the modification of the precedents, if the grounds for a retrial for a judicial compromise could not be the grounds for a retrial after the modification of the precedents have become the grounds for a retrial after the modification of the precedents, such grounds for a retrial shall be deemed to have occurred only on the day of the modification of the precedents. As such, the original judgment concluded that such grounds for a retrial occurred before the judicial compromise, and that the lawsuit for a retrial was
[Reference Provisions]
Articles 206 and 431 of the Civil Procedure Act
Appellant, Appellant
Mayang-gun
Reopening Defendant-Appellee
Subject to this Article
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 62Na1052 delivered on March 21, 1963
Text
The original judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
Reasons
We examine the ground of appeal No. 2 and ground of appeal No. 2 as well as the ground of appeal No. 2.
According to the previous precedents of this Court, a judicial compromise is an agreement under the Civil Procedure Act, the purpose of which is to suspend a dispute over the rights or legal relations which are the subject matter of a lawsuit by mutual concession, and at the same time, if a compromise clause is entered in a protocol, even if it has the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment under the Civil Procedure Act, the validity under the Civil Procedure Act is to be null and void, or null and void, as it is different from the final and conclusive judgment, and in such a case, it may be deliberated and determined by establishing a date for the litigation on which the compromise has been concluded, and a legal action may be instituted on the ground of confirmation or invalidation or invalidation by separate suit (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 1956No229, Sept. 15, 1956). Since a judicial compromise cannot be requested for retrial even if it has any grounds for invalidation, it is unreasonable to conclude that there is no ground for retrial before the final and conclusive judgment becomes null and void, it shall be deemed that there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to have been no ground for retrial.
Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on other arguments, the original judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Judge Lee Young-su (Presiding Judge) of the Supreme Court Justice Lee Young-chul (Presiding Judge)