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(영문) 수원지방법원 2015.09.23 2015노1026
업무상횡령
Text

The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal is objectively clear that the Defendant did not have legitimate authority over the management affairs of the Seocho-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government Ctel (hereinafter “the instant building”), and therefore, it is objectively apparent that the head of the management office is not entitled to conduct the management affairs of the instant building. Since the Defendant was aware of such circumstances, it cannot be said that there was a need to dispute against the Defendant against the prohibition of interference with business, which the management office of the instant building raised against the Defendant.

Therefore, it is the crime of occupational embezzlement that the defendant paid the attorney fee for the above lawsuit in the management expenses.

Nevertheless, the court below found the Defendant not guilty of the facts charged of this case. The court below erred by misunderstanding facts or by misapprehending legal principles, which affected the conclusion of judgment

2. Where a decision is made to suspend the execution of director's duties against a director of the juristic person, it is apparent that the performance of duties by the director who performs the duties of the juristic person in question would substantially interfere with the juristic person's performance of duties. Thus, a juristic person needs to bring an objection against the above provisional disposition unless the absence of director's qualifications is objectively obvious and there is no room for dispute. Thus, even if the representative of the juristic person pays the litigation expenses of the director who is the respondent of the pertinent provisional disposition within the necessary limit, it constitutes the payment of expenses necessary for the performance of duties of the juristic person, and it cannot be deemed that the corporate

(2) Article 23(1) of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings provides that “The owner of a building of this case who obtained approval for use on December 30, 198 shall have sectional ownership (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Do1174, May 30, 200).”

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