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The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1, 3, and 4, Article 30(1)4 of the former Customs Act (amended by Act No. 10424, Dec. 30, 2010) and Article 30(1)4 of the Customs Act (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Customs Act”) cited “price using trademark rights and similar rights” as one of the amount adjusted by adding the price actually paid or payable by a buyer to the price of goods sold to be exported to Korea when determining the dutiable value of imported goods.
The substance over form principle that the ownership of income subject to taxation or transaction should be grasped according to the substance, not nominal, is the basic principle regarding the imposition and collection of taxes. Thus, the same applies to the interpretation of the Customs Act that does not explicitly provide for such principle.
Therefore, whether the amount paid by the buyer to the trademark right holder constitutes the price for the use of the trademark right, which serves as an element for adjusting the addition of the dutiable value of imported goods, should be determined depending on whether the substance has the nature of the price for use
(see Supreme Court Decision 2015Du52098, Aug. 30, 2016). The lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning based on the adopted evidence. The lower court: (i) WP charges paid to the U.S. corporate Bakic (hereinafter “U.S. headquarters”) in the import of sports clothing, shoes, etc. with which the trademark “NIKE” was attached, to the Nakic World (Nike, Inc.; hereinafter “NIE headquarters”); (ii) the cost of continuously exposing the name, route, etc. of the trademark owned by the U.S. headquarters; and (iii) such activity is a part of the cost to be used to continuously disclose the name, route, etc. of the trademark owned by the U.S. headquarters; and (iii) marketing support agreements entered into between the Plaintiff and the U.S. headquarters, etc., as a trademark holder, can be viewed as the nature that the headquarters of the