Appellant

Gwangju District Court Order 2014Mata6914 dated August 9, 2016

The appeal of this case is dismissed.

1. Basic facts

According to the records, the following facts are recognized.

A. The South-do Urban Park, an incorporated foundation, filed an application for amendment of the articles of incorporation, such as adding 22,050 square meters of 138 m2,050 m2,050 m2,050 m2 (hereinafter “instant real estate”) to the basic property list of the non-party foundation, in Jeonnam-do, and Jeonnam-do applied for amendment of the said articles of incorporation on March 8, 2013.

B. On April 24, 2013, the non-party corporation completed the registration of creation of a mortgage over KRW 200 million with respect to the instant real estate owned by the non-party corporation (hereinafter “the instant mortgage”).

C. Since then, the Nonparty filed an application for the commencement of voluntary auction at the Gwangju District Court 2014ta, 6914, based on the instant collateral security regarding the instant real estate, and the said court accepted the application and rendered a decision to commence the auction on March 24, 2014.

D. On March 23, 2015, the Gwangju District Court established the following special sale conditions with respect to the instant real estate:

Since the act of disposal of basic property of the voting foundation incorporated in the main text requires the permission of the competent authority, the highest bidder shall not be allowed to sell unless the highest bidder submits the written permission of the competent authority by the date of decision of sale.

E. On the date of sale conducted on July 27, 2016, the appellant reported the purchase of KRW 18,300,000 on the date of sale conducted on July 27, 2016, and the appellant was the highest bidder, but the appellant did not submit a written permission from the competent authority by the date of the decision of sale. As the judicial assistant officer decided on August 3, 2016 that the appellant’s failure to submit a written permission from the competent authority by the date of the decision of sale constitutes “when the highest bidder is not eligible to purchase the real estate” under Article 121 subparag. 2 of the Civil Execution Act.

F. Accordingly, the appellant filed an immediate appeal on August 5, 2016, but the court of first instance rendered the first instance judgment authorizing the decision of the judicial assistant on August 9, 2016.

2. Summary of and judgment on the grounds of appeal

A. The summary of the reason for appeal is that the registration of basic property of the Incorporated Foundation shall be accompanied by the written permission of the competent authority at the time of application for the registration of basic property of the Incorporated Foundation. In such a case, the non-party corporation submitted the written permission of the competent authority at the time of establishment of the instant right to collateral security, and there is no need to obtain the written permission of the competent authority separately at the time of auction due to exercise

B. Determination

In light of the records, since the real estate in this case belongs to the basic property of the non-party corporation, it is proved that there was no written permission from the competent authority at the time of the establishment of the right to collateral security in this case, so long as the appellant did not submit a written permission from the competent authority, which is the special sale condition of the real estate in this case, the decision of the court of first instance authorizing the rejection of the sale in this case is just and there is no other error in the decision of the court of first instance (the appellant), and there is no possibility that the court of first instance may have any grounds for rejection of the sale in this case. The court of first instance claims to the purport that the decision of first instance is unfair on the ground that the possibility of the existence of such grounds alone does not make the decision of rejection of the sale in this case. As seen above, the court of first instance rejected the sale in this case on the ground that the appellant did not submit a written permission from the competent authority until the date of the decision of sale. Thus,

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the decision of the first instance court is just and without merit, and it is so dismissed as per Disposition.

Judges Lee Jae-chul (Presiding Judge)