logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 대법원 1968. 11. 26. 선고 68다1727, 68다1728 판결
[근저당권설정등기말소(본소)·건물명도(반소)][집16(3)민,249]
Main Issues

In case where the wife has registered the establishment of a right to collateral security on the property owned by her husband without a special authorization, whether it can be seen as an expression agent.

Summary of Judgment

A. In a case where the wife transferred the property owned by the wife to another person or rendered a ruling on the right to collateral security, the wife had the right to representation on his family, as well as there was an objective circumstance to justify the other party's belief that the wife provided his husband with the right to representation on the act.

B. In a lawsuit claiming the invalidation of the cause of registration, the fact that the Plaintiff’s wife entrusted a judicial scrivener with the preparation of the required registration document and the implementation of the registration procedure with the Plaintiff’s seal does not constitute the reason for converting the need for proof.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 827 of the Civil Act, Article 126 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 64Da1244 delivered on December 2, 1964

Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant), Appellee

Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) (Attorney Kim Jong-su, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff-Appellant

Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) 1

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 2 (Attorney Choi Yoon-do et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

original decision

Daegu High Court Decision 67Na46, 47 decided July 25, 1968

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the defendants.

Reasons

The Defendants’ legal representative’ ground of appeal No. 1 is examined.

The presumption of registration is recognized by the nature of the public register as a public book of the above real estate rights, and its content was correct. The original judgment was originally made on February 10, 196, that the non-party 1 was a provisional registration for preserving the claim for ownership transfer in the non-party 1's name, and the non-party 2's testimony was not based on the facts that the non-party 2 had no authority to prove that the non-party 1 had no authority to prove that the non-party 2 had no authority to prove that the non-party 1 had no authority to prove that the non-party 2 had been transferred to the non-party 6's testimony on June 14 and September 19 of that year, and that the non-party 2 had no authority to prove that the non-party 1 had no authority to prove that the non-party 2 had been the defendant 1's right to claim ownership transfer, and that the non-party 2 had no authority to prove that the non-party 1 had no authority to prove the above facts.

The second ground for appeal is examined.

In light of the facts stated in the judgment below, the above non-party 2's testimony was rejected by the plaintiff and the non-party 6, the non-party 4, and the non-party 5's testimony as well as the facts acknowledged by the non-party 2's testimony and the statement of evidence No. 7, and the above non-party 2 did not have the authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff and there was no reason to justify that the defendants believed that they had no authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff, as well as to act on behalf of the plaintiff (the argument on the credibility of testimony of each witness in the lawsuit is not a separate opinion). The testimony of the non-party 5 and the non-party 6's testimony in the court of first instance cited in the court below's reasoning that the testimony of the non-party 2 had no authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff is a witness in the court of first instance, even though they did not have any influence on the above witness's testimony in the court of first instance.

The third point of the Dong shall be examined.

According to the provision of Article 827 (1) of the Civil Act, although the husband has the authority to act on behalf of each other in the daily home affairs, it is a common sense that the husband's act of allowing the husband's wife to perform the registration procedure for the creation of a right to collateral security, the transfer of ownership, etc., or to perform a legal act which is the cause of each registration thereof belongs to this case. Thus, in a case where the wife's act of the above act on the property owned by the husband without any special authorization, it is only that the wife has the right to act on behalf of the husband in order to act on behalf of the husband under Article 126 of the Civil Act, and it is only that the other party has the right to act on behalf of the husband, and there is an objective circumstance to justify the husband's belief that the other party has given the husband's power to act on behalf of the husband (see Supreme Court Decision 64Da1244 delivered on December 2, 1964). The judgment of the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the above act constitutes an expression on the above legal reasoning.

Therefore, according to the unanimous opinion of all participating judges, it is decided in accordance with Articles 400, 384, 95, and 89 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Judges of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Ma-dong (Presiding Judge) Ma-dong and Ma-dong Na-Gyeong

arrow
심급 사건
-대구고등법원 1968.7.25.선고 67나46
참조조문
본문참조조문
기타문서