All appeals by the Defendants and the Prosecutor are dismissed.

Summary of Grounds for Appeal

The defendants (e.g., imprisonment with prison labor for 1 year, 2 years of suspended execution, 120 hours of community service, 7 million won of fine) sentenced by the court below are too unreasonable.

In full view of all the AG’s statements consistent with AF’s statements, the causal link between the Defendant’s intimidation act and the AF’s disposal is recognized, and the Defendant’s act constitutes a crime of intimidation, given that the Defendant’s act constitutes a crime of intimidation.

The sentence imposed by the court below of unfair sentencing is too uneasible and unfair.

In a criminal trial for determining the mistake of facts and misapprehension of legal principles by a public prosecutor, the burden of proving the facts charged is to be borne by the public prosecutor, and the conviction is to be based on evidence with probative value sufficient to cause a judge to have a reasonable doubt that the facts charged are true. Therefore, if there is no such evidence, even if there is suspicion of guilt against the defendant, it is inevitable to determine it as the benefit of the defendant

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 201Do7261, Nov. 10, 201). The lower court, in light of other circumstances, did not believe that each of the statements made by AF investigation agencies and by the lower court at the lower court are difficult to recognize credibility, thereby resulting in the appearance of AF by intimidation, etc. of Defendant A.

The lower court acquitted Defendant A of this part of the facts charged on the ground that it is difficult to deem the causal relationship between Defendant A’s attack and Defendant A’s dispositive act.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment closely with the evidence, the lower court’s judgment is justifiable.

This part of the prosecutor's argument is without merit.

In comparison with the first instance court's judgment on the assertion of unfair sentencing, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing, and the first instance's sentencing is reasonable in its discretion.