[1] Whether workers can return wages already paid to workers under a collective agreement without their individual consent or authorization (negative)

[2] The case holding that the retroactive application of the collective agreement to reduce bonuses is not permitted unless individual consent or authorization is obtained from workers since the workers' return of bonuses already paid to workers

[1] Wages (including bonuses) or retirement allowances for which a specific right to claim the payment has already occurred are transferred to the worker's private property area and entrusted to the worker's disposition. Thus, a trade union cannot take measures such as waiver or postponement of payment merely by a collective agreement with the employer, unless the trade union obtains an individual consent or authorization from the worker, and thus, it shall not be effective to make a return of wages already paid to the worker under a collective agreement unless there is an individual consent or authorization of the worker

[2] The case holding that the retroactive application of the collective agreement to reduce bonuses is not permitted unless individual consent or authorization is obtained from workers, since the workers return bonuses already paid to them.

[1] Article 29 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act / [2] Article 29 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 99Da67536 delivered on September 29, 200 (Gong2000Ha, 2195) Supreme Court Decision 2007Do1539 Delivered on June 28, 2007 (Gong2007Ha, 1212)

Plaintiff 1 and 180 others (Attorney Lee Jong-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Sam High-speed Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Shin & Yang, Attorney Hun-tae, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2009Na23759 decided August 21, 2009

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Wages (including bonuses) or retirement allowances for which the right to claim the payment has already occurred are transferred to the worker’s private property area and entrusted to the worker’s disposition. Thus, insofar as a trade union does not obtain an individual consent or authorization from the worker, it cannot perform the act of disposition such as waiver or postponement of payment merely by a collective agreement with the employer (see Supreme Court Decision 9Da67536, Sept. 29, 200), and allowing the worker to return the wages already paid under a collective agreement to the worker should be deemed to have no effect unless there is an individual consent or authorization of the worker.

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the defendant entered into a wage agreement in 2004 with the labor union composed of its employees from July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005 with the term of validity from June 30, 2005, and paid wages and bonuses to the plaintiffs since no new wage agreement has been entered into even after the term of validity of the above agreement, and the defendant entered into the wage agreement in 2005 with the above labor union on October 14, 2005 with the above labor union and increased the existing basic salary and decreased the bonus, and applied the bonus retroactively from July 1, 2005. The defendant, on December 7, 2005, after deducting the difference between the bonuses calculated in accordance with the wage agreement in 205 and the remaining amount of the bonus already paid from the bonus in 2005 to the plaintiffs on July 7, 2005 or August 8, 2005, without the consent of the plaintiffs.

Examining this in light of the aforementioned legal principles, the retroactive application of the collective agreement to reduce bonuses is ultimately compelling the Plaintiffs to return bonuses already paid to them, and thus, it is not permissible to grant the Plaintiffs’ consent or authorization unless they obtain individual consent or authorization.

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the defendant is liable to pay the difference equivalent to the above deducted amount to the plaintiffs, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as otherwise alleged.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice)