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1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.
Reasons
1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance concerning the instant case is as follows: (a) the part of the grounds of the judgment of the court of first instance, i.e., Chapters 2, 18, and 3, 5, i.e., the grounds of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the dismissal as set forth in the following Paragraph (2). Thus, it is acceptable to
2. However, according to the respective statements in Gap evidence Nos. 2-4 and Eul evidence Nos. 5, although the investigation of the above fire site was conducted on the possibility that the above fire was caused by electrical factors, it is acknowledged that the heat source and fire extinguishing factors were not clearly identified, and the evidence submitted by the plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize that the above fire was caused by the lessor's violation of the duty to maintain and repair the lessor, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this otherwise.
Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is without merit.
Furthermore, the following circumstances acknowledged by comprehensively considering the overall purport of evidence Nos. 2 and 4-1 through 5, 6-1, 2, and 10-1 and 2 of the evidence Nos. 1, 2, and 10-2, namely, the extension of the second floor of the building of this case, which was a building on the ground of the use of the original business and sales facilities, by the Defendant, and the Plaintiff appears to have agreed to operate the entertainment tavern, etc. after he/she performed construction of the wall and ceiling on the second floor, and leased the building, such as the wall and ceiling on the second floor. ② The Plaintiff appears to have been equipped with the wall, ceiling construction, electrical construction, etc. at his/her own expense, and the instant singing part among them, which was seen to have been installed in the instant singing section, for a long time after the Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement on the said second floor on June 30, 2009, and the lease agreement was relatively continued for the lease agreement or lease agreement on the second floor of this case.