Whether or not the applicant for provisional disposition has always become a ground for revocation of disposition in a lawsuit on the merits.

Even if the judgment against the lawsuit on the merits becomes final and conclusive, if the change of circumstances is applicable only to cases where the right to be preserved is denied by the judgment, and if the right to be preserved is lost by the method of exercising the right, it shall not be considered to constitute a change of circumstances uniformly, and eventually, it shall be deemed that there is a change of

Articles 715 and 706 of the Civil Procedure Act

Applicant

Respondent

Gwangju District Court (81Ka4223)

The judgment of the first instance is modified as follows.

The decision of provisional disposition rendered by the Gwangju District Court on December 2, 1969 with respect to the real estate recorded in the attachment as 69Ka1714 shall be revoked only in the size of the attachment drawings Ga, B, C, D and 50 square meters.

The remainder of the petitioner is dismissed.

The litigation costs shall be divided into two parts, one of which shall be borne by the respondent, and the remainder by the applicant, respectively.

Paragraph (2) may be provisionally executed.

The decision of provisional disposition rendered by the Gwangju District Court as No. 69Ka1714 on December 2, 1979 shall be revoked.

Litigation Costs shall be borne by the respondent and a declaration of provisional execution

With respect to 4 Ga-ro (number omitted) 134 Ga-ro, Dong-gu, Gwangju-si:

The respondent sold 50 square meters only to the applicant, but the registration of transfer of all of the remaining parts is made on the ground that the respondent's application for preservation for the restoration of the title of registration was made on December 2, 1969 on the ground of the cancellation of title trust on the remaining part, Gwangju District Court 69Ka1714, and the decision of provisional disposition was made on September 23, 1974 on the provisional disposition order by the petitioner's filing of a lawsuit against the applicant on September 23, 1974, the respondent filed a lawsuit against the applicant on September 23, 1974, but the specific part of the respondent's claim at 84 square meters in the second instance is different from the part indicated in the separate sheet (i.e., part of 50 square meters), and the fact that the judgment became final and conclusive by the Supreme Court on the ground that the entire claim was dismissed on the ground of the cancellation of title trust on the remaining part, and there is no dispute between the parties in light of the purport of pleading before the pleadings.

Meanwhile, according to each content of Gap's Nos. 1, 2, 3, Eul's evidence, Eul's evidence Nos. 1, 2 (each judgment), and Eul's evidence No. 5 (a certified copy of the register), which have no dispute over the establishment, it can be recognized that 134 of this case is currently an applicant's ownership transfer registration in the name of the applicant, and the respondent has held title trust with the exception of 50 square meters in the attached drawing, which is a part of which the respondent's display drawings, the right to be preserved still remains. The above judgment against the defendant does not deny the above part's right to be preserved, but does not deny the above part's right to be preserved, and it constitutes a change of circumstances only in the above 50 square meters where the right to be preserved is denied, and therefore, it constitutes a case where there is change of circumstances after a provisional disposition for a part of the land, which has no right to be preserved, and therefore, it is not recognized that the whole part of the land is unreasonable.

Therefore, an applicant's application is reasonable within the above scope of recognition and the remainder of the application is dismissed without merit. The judgment of the court of first instance is partially unfair and the appeal of the respondent is partially reasonable. Thus, the applicant's application is dismissed with modification of the above recognition, and the cost of the application is dismissed, and the provisional execution declaration is so decided as per Disposition by applying Article 92, Article 96 of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 199 of the same Act.

Judges Lee Jae-chul (Presiding Judge)