All appeals by the defendant and the prosecutor are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The sentence of a fine of KRW 3 million imposed by the lower court is too unreasonable.

B. A prosecutor appears to have arranged sexual traffic to D and used the price of sexual traffic acquired by D as living expenses.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below which acquitted the defendant as to the mediation of sexual traffic for business purposes among the facts charged in this case, is erroneous in the misapprehension of the judgment.

2. Determination

A. Determination as to the prosecutor’s assertion of mistake of facts (1) Article 19(1)1 of the Act on the Punishment, etc. of Acts of Arranging sexual traffic provides for the punishment of a person arranging sexual traffic, and Article 19(2)1 of the same Act provides for the aggravated punishment of a person arranging sexual traffic for business purposes.

In this context, it is not necessary to arrange commercial sex acts mainly for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts, but it means arranging commercial sex acts continuously and repeatedly for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts or accompanying such business activities, and engaging in commercial sex acts means managing and operating the pertinent business for the purpose of reverting the economic effect of the pertinent business to himself/herself (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Do12275, Sept. 10, 2015). (2) In light of the above legal principles, the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by the court below, the circumstance that D partially pays for the price of commercial sex acts acquired by the defendant's referral, alone, is that the defendant manages and operates the relevant business with the economic effect of the business related to commercial sex acts, while engaging in commercial sex acts for the purpose of earning profit-making.