The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Whether an employee may be deemed to have arranged sexual traffic for business purposes

A. The instant facts charged violates Article 19(2)1 of the former Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc. (amended by Act No. 10697, May 23, 201; hereinafter “the Act on the Punishment of Commercial Sex Acts”), which is a penal provision for a person arranging sexual traffic for the business by arranging sexual traffic while working as an employee of a sexual traffic business establishment located in the Australia City. Thus, the Defendant constitutes a single offense of arranging commercial sex acts.

B. On the ground that an employee who is employed by a business owner, etc. is not a principal of economic benefits from the arrangement of commercial sex acts, the lower court determined that the Defendant cannot be a principal of commercial sex acts, and the prosecutor asserts that the lower court erred.

C. Article 19(1)1 of the Punishment of Commercial Sex Acts provides for the punishment of persons arranging sexual traffic, and Article 19(2)1 of the same Act provides for the aggravated punishment of persons arranging sexual traffic for business purposes.

In this context, it is not necessary to arrange commercial sex acts for the main purpose of commercial sex acts, but it means arranging commercial sex acts continuously and repeatedly for profit by running a business related to commercial sex acts or accompanying such business activities, and managing and operating commercial sex acts for the purpose of economic effects of the business.

In light of the above legal principles, an employee who is paid a certain amount of remuneration shall manage and operate the relevant business for the purpose of reverting the economic effect of the business to himself/herself.