[1] The purport of the Medical Service Act stipulating that a medical doctor, dentist, or oriental medical doctor shall not perform any medical practice other than those licensed after obtaining a license for each person / Standard for determining whether a medical practice by a doctor or dentist constitutes “medical practice other than those licensed”, and matters to be considered more in the medical practice by a dentist

[2] In a case where the Defendant, a dentist, was indicted for violation of the Medical Service Act on the ground that he performed a medical act other than the licensed one by treating the patient’s eye and tail, using the Stockholm method, the case holding that the Defendant’s act of administering the arche between the patient’s eye and the U.S., cannot be deemed as a medical act other than the licensed one, and that the procedure is not different for beauty purposes

[1] [Majority Opinion] The purport of Article 2(1), 2(2)1, 2, and 3 of the Medical Service Act, Article 5, the main text of Article 27(1), Article 87(1), and Article 87(1) provides that a doctor, dentist, and oriental medical doctor shall not provide medical services other than those licensed, with a license. The purport of the aforementioned provision is to ensure that the public can enjoy better medical benefits, while a doctor, dentist, and oriental medical doctor, who received systematic education in their respective areas, provides medical services beyond the scope of verified expertise and skills in the relevant medical services, thereby preventing risks that may occur to human life, body, or public health, and ultimately protecting and improving the health of the public.

In this regard, the Medical Service Act regulates the establishment and operation of a medical institution (Article 33), the establishment and operation of a specialized department (Article 43), the recognition of qualifications for medical specialists, and the indication of medical specialists (Article 77), etc. on the premise that the three offices of medical doctors, dentists, and oriental medical doctors are distinguished, and criminal punishment should also be imposed in the case of “medical acts other than those licensed.” However, there is no specific provision regarding the contents of “licensed medical acts” to each medical personnel, and the classification according to any standard. In other words, the Medical Service Act strictly divides medical personnel into types such as medical doctors, dentists, oriental medical doctors, etc., and prohibits and punish medical acts other than those licensed on the premise that each license has a certain limit, but there is no provision regarding where the scope of license is included in the scope of license. This is extremely different in terms of the types of medical acts, the concept of medical acts, the development of the society, the development of the society, and the development of the society’s reasonable form of perception and the necessity of law.

Whether a medical practice by a doctor or dentist constitutes “medical practice other than those licensed” ought to be determined reasonably in light of social norms, comprehensively taking into account the legislative purpose of the Medical Service Act, the provisions and purport of the relevant medical practice, the academic principles constituting the basis of the relevant medical practice, the background, purpose, and attitudes of the relevant medical practice, and whether it is possible to secure expertise in the relevant medical practice through curricula, national examinations, etc. of medical colleges, etc.

According to the traditional concept and literal meaning, “a dental doctor” is generally defined as “a medical field where dentists study physiological, pathology, and therapy technology, etc.” and “a dentist” as “a person who specializes in preventing and treating dental or dental diseases or injuries.” However, it is not a divology that a dentist’s medical practice and doctor’s medical practice can be distinguished solely from such traditional concept and literal meaning. Furthermore, the concept of medical practice is not a fixed change, but can vary depending on the development of medical technology, changing times, and consumer recognition and necessity of medical services. Furthermore, the concept of medical practice may change depending on the change and development of medical technology, etc., reflecting the traditional aspects and aspects of medicine and medical technology, etc., beyond the traditional area of dental practice permitted for dentists. Accordingly, it is necessary to examine whether it constitutes “medical practice outside the scope of license” as well as the criteria for determining whether it constitutes “medical practice outside the scope of license” and thus, it constitutes a violation of the Medical Service Act other than the scope of a dentist’s license.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Yong-deok and Justice Kim Shin] Articles 2(1), 2(2)1, 2(3), and 5 of the Medical Service Act clearly distinguish between a doctor and a dentist, dentist, dental department, dental department, health and dental health, and clearly separate the license of a dentist. Furthermore, unlike the general provision of “medical care and health guidance,” the duties of a dentist are set up within the special scope of “medical care” and “or dental health guidance.” This is a comparison between a doctor and an oriental medical doctor’s duties based on the distinction between the duties of a doctor and an oriental medical doctor as a major criteria for distinguishing the scope of license. As such, the academic principle, which serves as the basis for a specific medical practice, is presented as the basis for distinguishing the duties of a doctor and an oriental medical doctor from the duties of a doctor and an oriental medical doctor.

As such, the purport of distinguishing between the license and the scope of a dentist is premised on the premise that the medical basic principle and methodology are not different in quality from that of a dentist. Meanwhile, by separately recognizing the unique areas of a dentist, such as dental treatment, it is intended to take exclusive charge of a dentist’s medical practice. Furthermore, the same purport is to separate the matters concerning the dental health guidance from the area of a doctor’s duties and to induce a dentist to promote the specialization of a dentist by taking exclusive charge of the matters concerning the dental health guidance.

In light of the language, structure, purport, etc. of the Medical Service Act, the distinction between the license and the medical area of a doctor and a dentist by setting the minimum literal indication constitutes a fundamental determination of the Medical Service Act, which is to clearly distinguish between the two while taking into account the inclusive and uncertainty of the definition of concept. Therefore, the limitation of the scope of license ought to be interpreted in a normative manner so as to clearly distinguish the scope of license in accordance with the standard based on the language and text of the Medical Service Act that provides for such distinction. If such interpretation is not made, the distinction between each medical act that a doctor and a dentist may engage in, thereby causing confusion and predictability, thereby adversely affecting the spirit of the principle of no punishment without law.

Medical practice, which is a premise for determining the scope of a dentist’s license, refers to a medical practice for the purpose of prevention, diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation, and dental health (hereinafter referred to as “dental treatment”) of an infant in charge of salutical, oral, and salutical surgery, and an adjacent organization and institution, etc. related to salutical and salutical surgery. Furthermore, medical practice for the purpose of dental treatment can be included in the scope of a dentist’s license in cases of both direct and indirect cases. For instance, if dental treatment for salutic and oral surgery affects the salutine’s organization, it is limited to the extent that the purpose of dental treatment is limited within the scope of the purpose of dental treatment, and if dental treatment is performed beyond the purpose of dental treatment, it shall be deemed to exceed the scope of a dentist’s license.

[2] In a case where a dentist was indicted for violation of the Medical Service Act on the grounds that he/she performed a medical act other than those licensed by using cosmetic surgery, the case holding that the medical law and other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes recognize dental surgery as the area of dental license and provide that dental examination subjects shall be the area of dental treatment; on the ground that treatment of dental surgery in the area of dental treatment outside the mouth or in terms of social norms as well as treatment of “marctal part surrounding the mouth, mouth, adjacent area, and adjacent area,” which overlaps with the area of marry or marological surgery, including dental treatment or marological surgery; on the ground that the amendment history of the relevant regulations and the establishment process of cosmetic surgery; the result of the National Health Insurance Corporation’s provision of medical care benefits, etc., it is difficult to view that dental treatment in the area of dental treatment including dental surgery and dental surgery cannot be seen as the subject of dental treatment without any difference between dental and marological surgery and dental surgery, and the part related to dental surgery and dental surgery within the university or college.

[1] Article 12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; Article 1(1) of the Criminal Act; Articles 1, 2(1), 2(2)1, 2(3), 5, 27(1), 33, 43, 77, and 87(1) of the Medical Service Act; Article 41(1)3 of the Enforcement Rule of the Medical Service Act; Article 2 subparag. 1, 4, and 5-2 of the Emergency Medical Service Act; Article 2 subparag. 1 [Attachment 1] of the Enforcement Rule of the Emergency Medical Service Act / [2] Article 27(1) of the Medical Service Act; Article 87(1)2 of the former Medical Service Act (Amended by Act No. 13658, Dec. 29, 2015); Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act

[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 74Do1114 Decided November 26, 1974 (Gong1975, 822), Supreme Court Decision 2011Do1649 Decided January 16, 2014 (Gong2014Sang, 418), Supreme Court Decision 2010Do10352 Decided February 13, 2014 (Gong2014Sang, 635)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorneys Son Ji-yol et al.

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2012No3688 Decided January 10, 2013

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Central District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The summary of the facts charged of the instant case is that the Defendant, a dentist, was engaged in any medical practice other than those licensed, on October 7, 201, by using the Stockholm surgery at a dental hospital run by him/her on the basis that he/she performed, and performed, any medical practice other than those licensed. Accordingly, the lower court affirmed the first instance judgment convicting the Defendant on the ground that dental practice under the Medical Service Act is limited to the part of the fry, surrounding organization, and mouth, including dental and oral surgery. The instant Stockholm procedure is limited to the gye and gye, and does not fall under the part around the gye and around the gye, and does not fall under the part of the gye and the gyeine. The key issue of the instant case is whether “gye and the gye between the snow using the Stockholm procedure” constitutes a medical practice other than those licensed by a dentist, and thus, constitutes a violation of the Medical Service Act.

2. First, I examine the contents of the Medical Service Act concerning medical practice.

A. The Medical Service Act is established and implemented for the purpose of protecting and improving the health of the people by providing for matters necessary for national medical fees so that all citizens can benefit from high-quality medical care (Article 1). According to the Medical Service Act, medical personnel refer to medical doctors, dentists, oriental medical doctors, etc. licensed by the Minister of Health and Welfare (Article 2(1)); medical doctors refer to duties of medical care and guidance for health; dental doctors refer to duties of dental treatment and dental health guidance; and oriental medical doctors refer to duties of dental care and dental health guidance; and oriental medical doctors refer to duties of oriental medical treatment and dental guidance for health care (Article 2(2)1, 2, and 3), dentists, dentists, or oriental medical doctors, and persons who intend to become oriental medical doctors, shall obtain qualifications and pass a national examination and obtain a license from the Minister of Health and Welfare (Article 5). Moreover, no person, other than medical personnel, may perform any medical practice and any person who violates such duties shall be subject to criminal punishment (Article 27(1) main sentence).

As such, the purport of the Medical Service Act, which provides that a medical doctor, dentist, or oriental medical doctor shall not perform medical acts other than those licensed, is to ensure the specialization of each medical person’s unique area and promote its independent development. Meanwhile, a doctor, dentist, or oriental medical doctor, who receives systematic education in his/her respective area, and conducts medical acts beyond the scope of verified expertise and skills in the relevant country, is to prevent risks that may occur to human life, body, or public health and ultimately protect and promote public health (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Do1649, Jan. 16, 2014).

B. In this regard, the Medical Service Act regulates the establishment and operation of a medical institution (Article 33), the establishment and operation of a specialized department (Article 43), the recognition of qualifications for medical specialists, and the indication of medical specialists (Article 77), etc. on the premise that the three offices of medical doctors, dentists, and oriental medicine doctors are distinguished, and criminal punishment should be imposed in the case of “medical acts other than those licensed.” However, there is no specific provision regarding the contents of “licensed medical acts” to each medical person, and the classification according to any standard. In other words, the Medical Service Act strictly classify medical personnel into the categories of medical doctors, dentists, oriental medicine doctors, etc., and prohibits and punish medical acts other than those licensed on the premise that each license has a certain limit. However, there is no provision regarding where each business area is included in the scope of license, and whether medical acts are specifically included in the scope of license. This appears to be more appropriate in terms of the concept of medical acts and how much changes in the form of medicine and the form of one-fourth of the society can be determined by law.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court has previously ruled that medical practice constitutes an act of diagnosis, autopsy, prescription, medication, or surgery with experience and function based on the professional knowledge of medical science (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 74Do114, supra). Determination has been made as to whether the act at issue by specific case constitutes “medical practice outside the scope of license” or “medical practice outside the scope of license” under Article 27(1) of the Medical Service Act. In other words, whether the medical practice by a doctor or dentist constitutes “medical practice outside the scope of license” should be reasonably determined in light of social norms by comprehensively taking into account the following: (a) legislative purpose of the Medical Service Act classifying a dentist’s license according to specific cases; (b) the legislative purpose of the Medical Service Act; (c) the regulations and purport of the relevant medical practice; (d) academic principles that form the basis of the relevant medical practice; (d) the background, purpose, and attitude of the relevant medical practice; and (e) the curriculum or national examination of medical colleges, etc. (see, e., Supreme Court Decision

C. According to the traditional concept and literal meaning, “a dental department” is generally defined as “a medical field that studies physiological, pathology, and therapy technology, etc.” and “a dentist” as “a person who specializes in preventing and treating dental or dental diseases or injuries.” However, it is not a dentist’s medical practice and medical practice can be distinguished solely from such traditional concept or literal meaning. Furthermore, as seen above, the concept of medical practice does not change depending on the development of medical technology, changing times, and consumer recognition and needs of medical care. Moreover, as seen in the Supreme Court Decision 2011Do1649 Decided the scope of work of a doctor and oriental medical doctor, the concept of medical practice may vary depending on the development of medical technology, changes in the medical situation, and the perception and needs of medical care. In addition, it may be possible to create the area of dental practice permitted beyond the traditional area of dental practice by reflecting changes and development of medicine and medical technology, etc.

Therefore, in addition to the criteria for determining whether the above “medical practice outside the licence” constitutes “medical practice outside the license,” it is necessary to examine whether the Defendant’s act in this case constitutes a medical practice outside the license of a dentist and thus, constitutes a violation of the Medical Service

3. We examine the procedure of this case by the defendant.

A. According to the records and regulations, the following circumstances are revealed.

(1) The academic principle, which serves as the basis of the relevant medical practice, is not different from the other academic principle, and in particular, it is deemed that the dental surgery is a historical part of the surgery and has developed as an independent specialized department from the outer part of the surgery. In wartime, there is a case in which a dentist mainly treated the whole area and the external part of the surgery. As such, there is a case in which it is difficult to clearly distinguish the boundaries of medical treatment and dental treatment, and there is a reality in which both parties are performing all of the surgery, such as a solar surgery or a stokeic surgery.

(2) Article 43(5) of the Medical Service Act and Article 41(1)3 of the Enforcement Rule of the Medical Service Act provide for the “Gumical surgery” as one of the specialized departments of dental hospitals (in a prior sense, the term “Gumical surgery” refers to the starting side of a hole from the entrance to the mouth as an drafting, and the term “Gumical” refers to the mouth, and the term “Gumical” refers to face). Article 3 of the Regulations on the Training, Recognition, etc. of Qualifications of Dental Medical Specialists, a Presidential Decree as delegated by Article 77(4) of the Medical Service Act, provides for “Gumical surgery” as one of the specialized departments of a dentist’s medical specialist.

Article 11 of the Medical Service Act (wholly amended by Act No. 1035, Mar. 20, 1962; Article 30(1)3 of the Enforcement Rule of the Medical Service Act (amended by Act No. 1035, Sep. 27, 1994; Article 30(1)3 of the Enforcement Rule of the Medical Service Act changed the name of the dental hospital into one of the specialized departments for dental care, and was first incorporated into the Acts and subordinate statutes. Around 1962, the Medical Service Act was completely amended (the change to the name of the Korean Association for Emical Madio-Pacific (1989), and the former Association for Emical Madio-Madio (1989; the change to the name of the Korean Association for Emical Madio-Madio National Science; hereinafter referred to as the Korean Association for Emical Madio-Madio-Madio-Madio).

(3) A person who intends to be a dentist shall obtain a degree from a dental college or graduate school of dentistry, pass a national examination, and obtain a license from the Minister of Health and Welfare. Dental colleges and graduate school of dentistry include both the theory and practice on dental preservation, dental surgery, oral medicine, dental correction, dental health, etc., as well as the education on diagnosis and treatment of diseases arising from the oral organization and association of the part outside of the mouth.

According to Article 9 of the Regulations on Dental Practice, Recognition of Qualifications, etc., of Dental Specialists, the annual training courses of Dental Major (Notice of the Ministry of Health and Welfare No. 2003-62; hereinafter “2003 curriculum”) include: (a) external surgery, artificial surgery, malary surgery, malary surgery, dysium infection, dysium infection, hysium infection, hysium infection, hysium, hysium infection, hysium, and hysium 203; and (b) annual surgery, 1) annual surgery and 2) annual surgery, under the premise that the subject is not limited to the 3-year curriculum, and the 1-year surgery and 2-year surgery, including the 1-year surgery and 2-year surgery, which are based on the premise that the 2-year surgery is not limited to the 1-year surgery and 2-year surgery; and (c) the 1-year surgery and 2-year surgery.

(4) Article 9(4) of the Medical Service Act, Article 5 of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Service Act, and subparagraph 1-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Medical Service Act provides that “oralical surgery” shall be one of the subjects of a dentist’s national examination.

(5) From 2011 to 2015, the National Health Insurance Corporation (hereinafter “National Health Insurance Corporation”) paid health care benefits to dentists with regard to their medical practice on a part that is difficult to be seen as either a mouth or a scke in a prior sense, such as an average of at least 1,00 head and other open part of a year’s 1,00 cases, 50 cases or more, and 200 cases or more, and floor-frames.

(6) The term “Ixx” is the name of a medicine that was commercialized and made by Botri-sharing Pyx. Boxs used at the early stage as a medicine for treating at least a frat tension, such as grhymosis and grhys, but, while performing such treatment, it was discovered that the surrounding frat would lose its diameter if the frat was injected, and that it was used for cosmetic treatment. Dental already uses Boxin for various purposes, such as correction of grats through the fratism, treatment of grats, treatment of grats, and treatment of brats, and most of dental colleges and graduate schools of dentistry provide education for Boxx. Dentals have no special risk or high expertise and skills to grats compared with the use of Boxins. There is no obvious discrimination among dentists to allow any other treatment.

B. In light of these circumstances, the following determination may be made as to the dentist’s instant practice of treatment as to the instant case.

(1) The relevant statutes, such as the Medical Service Act, recognize the “oral surgery” as the field of dental practice, and define it as the subject of the national examination for dentists. According to the content of the “203 Curriculum” with respect to the area of treatment “oral surgery” in the field of dental practice, not only the treatment of “oral and oral surgery,” which is considered as a dental practice by social norms, but also the treatment of “oral and oral surgery,” and includes surgery or mal and malical surgery, which overlap with the area of both the area of both the mal and mal and mar surgery. In addition, considering the history of the amendment of the relevant regulations, the developments leading up to the establishment of the relevant academic conference, and the result of the National Health Insurance Corporation’s payment of health care benefit, it is difficult to view that the area of dental practice is all excluded from the scope of dental practice.

(2) Not only difference in academic principles, which form the basis of medical practice, but also have a lot of parts that are common to each university’s curriculum and training. Moreover, even if most dental colleges or graduate schools of dentistry provide education on radioactive surgery, dental practice is being used at the site of dental medicine, and the part of the procedure is inside and outside, it cannot be readily concluded that radioactive procedures are exclusively exclusively used for the area of duties of doctors, given that such education is focused on the diagnosis and treatment of psychotropic areas, such as spawned, spathical, spathical, and spathical, spathical, and surrounding organizations.

(3) “The curriculum of 2012” appears to be premised on the view that the content related to the euthanal marology, which was not covered by the previous dentist’s medical field by considering the development of medical technology, changes in times, awareness and necessity of medical service users, etc., may also be included in dental practice. Moreover, traditionally recognized dental practice as unique and independent area of dental medicine, such as dental correction and crymology, etc. should also be deemed as having the purpose of beauty as well as functional recovery. As such, the purpose of the surgery cannot be distinguished as to whether it constitutes dental practice depending on whether it is functional recovery or cosmetic, and thus, it is not necessarily excluded from dental practice on the ground that it is a medical practice for beauty purposes.

4. Conclusion

A. The purpose of the Medical Service Act is to protect and promote the health of the people by allowing all citizens to benefit from high-quality medical care, and the reason for punishing medical personnel engaged in medical practice other than those licensed is to prevent risks that may occur to human life, body, or general public health, thereby protecting and improving the health of the people.

As seen above, dental treatment cannot be excluded from the scope of dental treatment solely on the ground that dental treatment is not related to dental, dental, and mouths. Since dental colleges or graduate schools of dentistry provide education on the diagnosis and treatment of malkines, it is difficult to view that the Stockholm procedure on the inside and outside of a dentist is likely to cause a higher risk to human life, body, or public health compared to the same medical treatment by a doctor.

In interpreting the relevant provisions of the Medical Service Act, it is also necessary to preferentially consider the improvement of the overall level of medical care so that the benefits therefrom can return to the people. As long as the procedures using Stockholm have already been used for various purposes in dental fields, it is desirable to interpret the relevant provisions in the direction of widely opening the possibility of choice of medical consumers for the purpose of developing medical care and enhancing the medical service level, as long as the risks of public health and hygiene therefrom are not actually high, and systematic education, verification and regulation on the medical profession is being performed.

Ultimately, the Defendant’s act of administering a arche procedure between the eye and the U.S. on the part of the patient cannot be deemed as a medical practice other than those licensed to a dentist, and the procedure does not change for cosmetic purposes.

B. Nevertheless, the lower court found the Defendant guilty of the charges in this case on the premise that the part where the “malinine”, which is the part where the dental treatment is permitted, is limited to the inner part surrounding the threshold. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of a dentist’s licensed medical practice, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation contained in the grounds of appeal on this point is with merit.

Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition.

With the exception of the dissenting opinion by Justice Kim Yong-deok and Justice Kim Shin, the majority opinion by Justice Lee Sang-hoon, Justice Kim Chang-suk, and Justice Park Sang-ok as to this decision is concurring with the dissenting opinion by Justice Kim Shin.

5. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Yong-deok and Justice Kim Shin

The gist of the Majority Opinion is that the Stockholm for cosmetic purposes is included in the scope of a dentist’s license, but it is difficult to agree for the following reasons.

A. Article 2(1) of the Medical Service Act separates a license for a medical person into a medical doctor, dentist, oriental medical doctor, midwife, and nurse. Article 2(2) of the same Act provides that “medical person shall perform each of the following duties in accordance with the classification of medical persons and contribute to the improvement of public health and the securing of healthy life for the people.” As to “medical doctor,” “medical and health guidance” refers to “medical care and health guidance for dentists” (Article 1); and “medical care and health guidance for dental doctors” (Article 2(1)2); and “medical care and health guidance for oriental medical doctors” (Article 5 of the Medical Service Act separates a doctor’s license from a dentist’s license and a dentist’s license. Furthermore, Article 5 of the same Act provides that a license for national examination for each medical doctor or oriental medical doctor’s license is granted in cases where a person who has qualifications determined in the field of medical science or dental medicine passes a national examination, such as graduation of a graduate from a university or graduate school specializing in medical science or dental medicine:

As can be seen, the Medical Service Act clearly separates the license of medical doctors and dentists by distinguishing between medical doctors and dentists, dental medicine, health, and dental health. Furthermore, unlike the general provision of “medical care and health guidance,” the duties of medical doctors are set up and limited to the special scope of “medical care” and “oral health guidance.” This, depending on whether the Medical Service Act is “a limited bank”, provides the academic principle that serves as the basis for specific medical practice as the basis for distinguishing the scope of license depending on whether the duties of medical doctors and oriental medical doctors are “a limited bank,” and is comparison with that of medical doctors, dentists, and oriental medical doctors without any distinction or distinction between medical doctors and oriental medical doctors.

As such, the purport of distinguishing between the license and the scope of a dentist is premised on the premise that the medical basic principle and methodology are not different in quality from that of a dentist. On the other hand, by separately recognizing the unique areas of a dentist, such as dental treatment, it seems that the medical practice corresponding thereto is to be in exclusive charge of a dentist. Furthermore, the same purport is to separate the matters concerning the dental health guidance from the area of the doctor’s duties and to induce the dentist to promote the specialization of a dentist by taking exclusive charge of the matters concerning the dental health guidance.

In light of the aforementioned premise, unlike the qualitative classification of medicine and oriental medicine according to the medical principle and methodology, distinguishing between the two is to distinguish between a doctor and a dentist from the two. The purport of the two is to distinguish the license scope of a doctor and a dentist by distinguishing the license scope according to the external standard of treatment, under the premise that the two is a ppuri doctor in Western medicine. Therefore, it is unreasonable to distinguish the license scope from the license scope of a doctor and a dentist based on the external standard of treatment under the premise that the license scope is a “medical doctor” and the determination criteria of the license scope of a doctor and a dentist. Furthermore, it is also unreasonable to distinguish the license scope from the license scope of a dentist based on the difference between the academic principle of treatment and the qualitative method, and to distinguish the license scope of a dentist and a dentist from the license scope of a dentist. Furthermore, it is also unreasonable to distinguish the license scope of a doctor and a dentist from the license scope of a dentist’s practice under the premise that the license scope can not be determined by the general standard of medical treatment law as well as the general standard of treatment.

In light of the language, structure, purport, etc. of the Medical Service Act, the distinction between the license and the medical area of a doctor and a dentist by setting the minimum literal indication constitutes a fundamental determination of the Medical Service Act, which is to clearly distinguish between the two while taking into account the inclusive and uncertainty of the concept. Therefore, the limitation of the scope of license ought to be interpreted in a normative manner so as to clearly distinguish the scope of license in accordance with the standard based on the language and text of the Medical Service Act that provides for such distinction. If such interpretation is not made, the distinction between each medical act that a doctor and a dentist may engage in is unclear, thereby causing confusion and undermining predictability. Therefore, such distinction would be contrary to the spirit of the principle of no punishment without law.

B. Based on these Daejeons, we examine the normative criteria that distinguish between the scope of the license of medical doctors and dentists under the Medical Service Act.

(1) In the name of a doctor, only can it be known that a dentist has already been performing dental treatment as his/her main duties. Moreover, the Medical Service Act explicitly provides dental treatment and health guidance as a dentist’s duties. As such, a normative standard should be established to determine the scope of a dentist’s license based on the concept of “medical treatment” or “or oral health guidance.”

First of all, the concept of dental medicine or dental surgery, which is the premise for dental treatment, is defined as “purpose science that researches and utilizes the principle and method of preventing or diagnosing diseases that may arise from dental and dental institutions and their adjacent organizations, and at the same time improves dental health by rehabilitation of lost dental function.”

Meanwhile, the term “oral mouth health” is generally defined as “self-helping act to preserve dental health so that dental life may not be reduced,” and the term “oral mouth” is defined as “the first official door of the fire extinguishing engine relationship as an institution receiving food from outside of the body.”

Therefore, in light of the above language, purport, and concept definition of the Medical Service Act, as a matter of principle, dental infants in charge of chewing function, such as dental surgery, mouth, math and mathical area, and adjacent organizations and institutions related thereto, etc. are subject to dental prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation, and the scope of dental health coverage also extends to the whole mouth including dental surgery.

(2) Furthermore, the basic meaning and classification seems not to have been changed since the Medical Service Act was enacted until now.

In the Enforcement Decree and the Enforcement Rule of the Medical Service Act, the name of “oral surgery” was changed to that of “oral surgery,” but this is merely a more concrete substance by reflecting the circumstances in which the body part was inside the previous surgery and the subject of the surgery. In addition, the Enforcement Decree and the Enforcement Rule of the Medical Service Act, the Regulations on the Training and Recognition of Qualifications, etc. of Dental Specialists, etc. stipulate “oral surgery,” as the specialized department of dental hospitals and the specialized department of dentists, and “oral surgery,” and “oral surgery,” as the subject of the national examination for dentists. However, this is merely a change in the name of “oral surgery” and “oral surgery” used previously.

Therefore, even if the term used in the Enforcement Decree or the Enforcement Rule, which is a subordinate norm established for the implementation of the Medical Service Act without the amendment of the scope of a dentist’s license, or the name of a medical specialist was partially changed in the course of the dentist’s training as determined by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the purport of the Medical Service Act solely based on such circumstance cannot be deemed to have extended the scope of a dentist’s license to allow a dentist to perform medical practice without any restriction on the part of a dentist’s license.

(3) Ultimately, medical practice, which is the premise to determine the scope of a dentist’s license, refers to a medical practice aimed at preventing, diagnosing, treating, and rehabilitation dental treatment and dental health (hereinafter referred to as “medical treatment”). In addition, medical practice for the purpose of dental treatment can be included in the scope of a dentist’s license in cases of both direct and indirect cases, as well as in cases of dental treatment for the purpose of dental treatment. For example, in cases where dental treatment for dental and oral medicine affects the tissues of the part, a dentist is able to perform medical treatment. However, even in such cases, it is limited to limited permissible treatment within the scope of the purpose of dental treatment, and if dental treatment is performed beyond the purpose of dental treatment, it shall be deemed as deviating from the scope of a dentist’s license.

(4) Meanwhile, as a result of the development of new medical technology, dental treatment is likely to affect other parts beyond the dentist’s inherent treatment area. As such, there is a phenomenon in which the boundary between the intermediate areas in which dental treatment can be performed, regardless of the inherent area of the dentist and the purpose of dental treatment, directly or indirectly, is unclear. However, even in the case of medical treatment pertaining to the intermediate area, as in the case of both dental treatment and general treatment, it is necessary to consider what the best treatment for patients is for patients in light of the purpose of dental treatment, as in the case of both the medical treatment in which dental treatment and general treatment are necessary, and to resolve it through collaboration and collaboration between the doctor and the dentist, and the distinction between the doctor’s license and the dentist’s license cannot be disregarded

In addition, in a case where a new technology of dental technology has been created and that can be used for dental treatment as well as general medical treatment, a dentist may learn and utilize such technology. However, even in such a case, if a medical practice using such medical technology deviates from the purpose of treatment or treatment that is subject to dental treatment, it shall be evaluated as beyond the scope of the license determined by the Medical Service Act. For example, while the preservation and treatment related to dental surgery has been performed as the main place of dental treatment, recently, plant plant plant surgery has been commercialized in recent years, and the ice procedure for transfer, etc. has been performed for the purpose of dental treatment. However, there is no difference in view of the fact that a dentist exceeded the scope of license of a dentist in a case where a dentist performed such new method of dental treatment, such as arms and legs, and therefore, there is no reason to deem otherwise in a case where a medical practice is performed by a general doctor without any purpose of dental treatment.

C. In light of the foregoing, it is reasonable to deem that a dentist’s license should be extended to a dentist’s license in cases where the dental practice was conducted within the scope of a dentist’s license as seen earlier. On the contrary, it is reasonable to deem that the scope of a dentist’s license as normatively prescribed under the Medical Service Act can be extended by taking into account the reality, such as the contents of the surgery used in the dental surgery, the background leading up to the inclusion of dental science in the curriculum of dental colleges and the subjects of national examination, and partial changes in the training course of the medical resident.

(1) First of all, it is inappropriate to consider the content of the dental college’s lecture and the content of the national examination related to the dental surgery as the basis for dental treatment. In order to become a dentist, it is necessary to provide the relevant medical surgery, which serves as the basis for dental treatment, and to verify its appropriate medical capacity in light of the purpose and purpose of the education and training of medical personnel. Moreover, although the training course for the medical department outside the old dental area as amended in 2012 includes the content of the medical department, radic treatment, Boxa, written therapy, and internal-use type, which is included in the content of the medical department in the training course for the medical department outside the old dental area, it is determined to provide training together with the medical department belonging to the relevant field in order to become a medical department outside the old dental area. As delineated below, the above medical practice is merely a training in light of the fact that the medical department directly or indirectly is related to the purpose of dental treatment outside the old dental area.

Therefore, it cannot be interpreted that a dentist, only with the circumstance that he/she is included in the lecture course of a dental college, the training course of a medical resident, or the subjects of a national examination, can perform medical practice like a doctor with respect to all the contents included therein. For example, the curriculum of a oriental medical school may include the contents of general medical science in the curriculum of a oriental medical school, and the contents of general medical knowledge may be included in the national nurse examination in relation to the nursing department, but there is no theory of interpretation as to the fact that a dentist cannot perform medical practice like a doctor with only an oriental medical doctor or nurse license in the field of general medical science. Furthermore, such an example is commonly seen in other specialized areas. For example, even if a certified judicial scrivener or patent attorney, etc. verifies the relevant legal knowledge through the examination, it is not possible for a legal practitioner to perform the practice as a general public beyond the scope of his/her duties set forth in the license.

In addition, it is unreasonable to affirm the interpretation of the aforementioned purport, rather than as prescribed by the Medical Service Act, that is, it means that the contents of a dentist’s license can be autonomously determined and extended in accordance with the spirit of mind. Furthermore, in light of the fact that the medical school and dental college have a close interest among the interests of medical doctors and dentists, and that the State examination examiners in the pertinent field may also have such relation, depending on changes in the medical market situation, there is room to include a specific intention in the new curriculum or include in the examination delivery system, and as a result, there is a concern that the basic premise of the Medical Service Act, which distinguish the doctor’s license and dentist’s license, might collapse. Moreover, if a new curriculum or national examination for dental colleges, etc. includes a new procedure and thus, including a new procedure, so that a dentist can prevent risks associated with the procedure from occurring in life, body, or public health, it should not be included in the scope of the previous curriculum.

(2) Unlike the general theory of the opening of dental medicine, the meaning of “malinancy” in the dental department provides that “a malinancy refers to an inner body covered by the upper malinite, the upper malinite, and the upper malinite,” and it can be found that new technologies such as Bosa are described for the same purpose as above in the old malinary mar, the 190s, published in the 190s, prior to the 199ss. Therefore, it appears that the traditional meaning “malinite” of dental department or dentist itself was understood to be limited to dental and the malinary malinical system.

(3) The name of the hospital from the mouth outside of the mouth is changed, and it is a kind of medicine in the field of medical treatment with respect to the hospital from the mouth outside of the mouth and the hospital from the mouth outside of the mouth. With the development of the surgery related to dental treatment, the necessity and importance of the autopsy study and the research and acquisition of relevant medical knowledge are growing.

However, even in this case, it should be deemed that there exists a strict limit in the area of medical practice. In other words, even if a dentist’s license is applicable to a medical practice on the part of a dentist, it is determined whether a dentist’s license is permissible in accordance with the “purpose of medical treatment.” For example, in the case of dual-person surgery, draft medicine, and imposition, the subject of medical treatment may be overlapped with a dentist’s license, and the same may apply to cases where the subject of medical treatment is a part of a dentist’s license. However, in such a case, whether the subject of treatment falls within the scope of the license and exceeds its limit may be classified according to the standard of treatment, and in fact, whether the subject of treatment falls within the scope of the license and the subject thereof may be classified into two separate medical practices without any special problems. In other words, even if a dentist’s license is allowed for dental treatment purposes, such circumstance alone does not constitute an exclusive area of treatment by a dentist on the part of a dentist on the part of a dentist on the part of a dentist on the part of a dentist on the part of a general.

This is because, in cases where dental treatment is directly or indirectly related to the purpose of dental treatment, it is limited to the permission of a dentist to perform dental treatment, and the dental treatment cannot be deemed to fall under the unique area exclusively dedicated to the dental treatment of a dentist. Although the purpose of dental treatment is separated from dental license, it is sufficient to resolve the problem by determining the best treatment and treatment for a patient through collaboration as seen earlier, and it is not necessary to grant conditions to perform medical treatment exceeding the purpose of treatment, which is the basis for distinguishing the license, or to consider the exclusive license for only one side. For example, in cases where the body’s clothes and reconstructions are performed incidental to the treatment process, such as the mouth affecting the Chewing function and the dynasium, etc., generated inside and after the dynasium, it can be permitted within the scope of license because it falls under the scope of medical treatment for indirect purpose of dental treatment. However, in such cases, if it is more appropriate for a patient to receive the best treatment in the field of dental treatment, it is appropriate to receive the patient’s best assistance in the relevant area.

(4) In light of the fact that a medical doctor or dentist requires a double license for dental treatment in a foreign country, where dental treatment is distinguished from the license of a doctor or dentist, dental treatment is limited to the mouths including dental and oral surgery, or that a doctor or dentist requires a double license for dental treatment outside the mouth, the scope of treatment in the dental surgery permitted to be provided to a dentist is merely a matter of legislative policy that is determined by considering individual circumstances of each country.

(5) Therefore, solely on the grounds that the area of an area is not excluded from the area of an area where the area of an area is located in the area of an area where the entire area of the area of the area is within the scope of a dentist’s license. The reason why a dentist is able to perform a certain medical act on the part of the area where the area is inside and outside of the area surrounding the area of the area of the area of the area where the area is within the scope of the license, is not because the part falls within the scope of the license, but because the medical act is directly or indirectly for the purpose of the medical treatment permitted under the Medical Service Act.

Even in cases where the treatment field of the Gu dental surgery includes a sex surgery before and after the dental surgery, face type surgery, stoke surgery, and stoke surgery, dental surgery is permitted within the scope recognized as direct and indirect purpose of dental treatment because such surgery may affect the arrangement or stoke function of a baby, etc. On the other hand, it cannot be deemed that such surgery is included in the “stoke type surgery” in the field of dental treatment, for instance, oral surgery irrelevant to the purpose of dental treatment, such as the so-called “stopy surgery,” which is naturally permissible for dentists.

Therefore, it cannot be a sufficient logical premise to determine the scope of a dentist's license.

D. In addition, even if there are cases where a dentist provided credit treatment, such as saves, etc., or medical care benefits are paid therefrom, the scope of a dentist’s license cannot be viewed differently on the sole basis of such circumstances.

(1) Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Emergency Medical Service Act provides that “A patient who is unable to preserve his/her life or who is likely to have a serious mental or physical harm, or who is prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health and Welfare as an emergency patient, due to diseases, childbirth, various accidents, injuries caused by disasters, or other emergency situations without immediate first aid,” and Article 2 Subparag. 1 [Attachment Table 1] of the Enforcement Rule of the Emergency Medical Service Act provides that “a patient with an external symptoms equivalent to an emergency symptoms,” etc. Further, Article 2 Subparag. 4 of the Emergency Medical Service Act provides that medical personnel and emergency medical technicians who provide emergency medical services to an emergency patient within the scope of license or qualification acquired as prescribed by relevant Acts and subordinate statutes as “emergency medical personnel”, while Article 5-2 provides that a person who is not an emergency medical personnel, etc. shall be exempt from civil and criminal liability for the injury inflicted by providing emergency medical services or first aid services to an emergency patient.

In light of the provisions of this Act and subordinate statutes, a person who suffers from a breath or injury is also an emergency patient, and a dentist may be exempted from the license when he/she provides medical services for the treatment of such person. Furthermore, even if he/she does not intend to provide medical services, such as dental treatment, disinfection, and the protection of the upper part of the body, it may be permitted under the social norms even if he/she does not intend to do so. In addition, treating a patient suffering from occupational injury, such as a breath or upper part of the body, in wartime, seems to constitute an emergency medical service and is deemed to fall under the “political act” under the Criminal Act, and such circumstance is also difficult

(2) In addition, even if there are cases where health insurance benefits were paid for treatment, such as the mouth of a part of a dental surface, it is inappropriate to consider only the result that the insurance benefits were provided merely because it was not clear that it was related to dental treatment and whether it was evaluated properly.

E. In accordance with the legal principles pertaining to the normative criteria that distinguish the scope of a dentist’s license, such as bin, the Defendant, a dentist, using the Stockholm procedure method, deemed as constituting a medical practice other than those licensed to a dentist.

(1) Since the part of the Defendant’s treatment cannot be considered as a part of the cryptic body related to a baby, it is evident that it goes beyond the part of the body subject to dental treatment. In addition, the purpose of the treatment is to eliminate the cryptic body around the eye, and thus, it does not entail the purpose of dental treatment, such as prevention, diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation, etc. of the cryptic function, nor is it performed as part of dental health.

In addition, in light of the spirit of the Medical Service Act, where a doctor and a dentist use similar medical treatment technology based on the same medical principle, but the license of a doctor and a dentist are separate, and furthermore, the scope of license is prohibited, even if the Stockholm is used in the course of dental treatment and it is difficult to deem that a dentist has received education in the course of dental treatment or that there is a concern over causing more risk than that of the doctor’s same medical treatment, it cannot be deemed that the Stockholm procedure by a dentist is generally permitted without examining whether it is for dental treatment or not, and any other interpretation is inconsistent with the Medical Service Act.

Therefore, it is clear that the Defendant, a dentist, used the Stockholm procedure to treat gymnasium and fine, is an act beyond the scope of a dentist’s license under the Medical Service Act, regardless of the discussions on the permissible scope of dental surgery by dentists.

Therefore, the decision of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to whether a dentist is a medical practice other than those licensed under the Medical Service Act.

(2) Nevertheless, the Majority Opinion’s apparent act of exceeding the scope of the interpretation of the Medical Service Act as it goes beyond the scope of the interpretation of the Medical Service Act, and the same applies to legislative measures, and the boundary of the scope of the license of a doctor and a dentist as clearly prescribed by the Medical Service Act is inapplicable.

F. (1) The Majority Opinion states that the issue of whether a dentist’s medical practice constitutes “medical practice outside the scope of license” should be determined reasonably in accordance with social norms by comprehensively taking into account the following as a whole: (a) the legislative purpose of the Medical Service Act, the academic principle, which serves as the basis for the pertinent medical practice; (b) the relevant medical practice; (c) the regulatory provisions and purport of the relevant medical practice; and (d) the course and purpose of the pertinent medical practice; and (e) whether a medical school, etc. can secure expertise in the pertinent medical practice through curricula such as medical colleges, universities, etc.; and (e) does not indicate that the specific criteria for distinguishing the license of a doctor and dentist. As a result, regarding the instant Defendant’s practice in the instant case where a eye and U.S. dental surgery were conducted for the purpose of treating me, solely on the ground that the relevant dental school or graduate school provides education on the diagnosis and treatment of meine, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the specific scope of dental practice outside the scope of license or public health risks cannot be determined by using the same medical practice.

(2) However, determining whether a case constitutes “medical practice other than those licensed to a dentist” without specifically disclosing the criteria for distinguishing the license of a doctor and a dentist is in violation of the principle of no punishment without law, by setting the minimum boundary and standard of license classification under the Medical Service Act, and by punishing a medical practice beyond the scope of license in accordance with the ambiguous criteria, thereby impairing legal stability and predictability, thereby violating the spirit of no punishment without law.

The criteria for distinguishing the scope of a dentist’s license should be normatively determined based on the Medical Service Act. Ultimately, it should be based on whether the scope of a dentist’s license is “a dental and dental health guidance” as stipulated under the Medical Service Act. Nevertheless, if the scope of a dentist’s license can be extended due to changes in reality, such as education and training courses of dental colleges, etc. or national examination subjects, etc., or such reality is based on the main basis for determining whether a dentist’s license deviates from the scope of a license, this is the same as that of changing the scope of a dentist’s license under the Medical Service Act by arbitrarily providing training courses, etc. provided by educational institutions, etc., and thus, cannot be accepted as it violates the Medical Service Act. As such, it is difficult to accept to adopt or change the standards prescribed under the Act, even if there exists a clear standard prescribed under the law, and its practical situation is merely a reality formed by a dentist, and thus, it cannot be said that the normative criteria for the scope of a dentist’s license should not be considered as grounds for the change in the normative criteria for the scope of license.

(3) Furthermore, the key issue in the instant case is not related to whether a dentist’s use of Bosa for the purpose of dental treatment is not permissible, but mainly related to whether a dentist can perform Bosa procedure for the purpose of dental treatment. However, even according to the Majority Opinion, whether a dentist’s medical practice constitutes “medical practice outside the scope of license” should be determined by social norms. However, it cannot be deemed that a dentist is permitted to perform medical practice, such as treating, or performing, rasa treatment over the entire part of the part of the part around the eye, and thus, it is objectively accepted by social norms.

In addition, there is no evidence to deem that the number of general doctors or dentists who are able to conduct the Stockholm surgery is insufficient compared to the demand thereof, and it cannot be deemed that a dentist’s expertise in the field of dental practice is significantly limited to the number of “medical persons,” which can be entirely implemented on the part of the part of the body. The benefits obtained by simply increasing the number of “medical persons,” which can be entirely performed on the part of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the doctor and the body of the body of the body of the body of the body of the body.

Therefore, from this point of view, the Majority Opinion cannot be accepted to allow a dentist to view the Stockholm procedure as within the scope of the dentist’s license, inasmuch as it is not related to the purpose of dental treatment solely on the ground that the practical circumstances seen earlier, unlike the social norms, are the same.

(4) In addition, according to the Majority Opinion, it would result in formally permitting dental surgery on the part of a dentist. Moreover, it would be the same as allowing all procedures on the part of a dentist to be performed within the scope incorporated into the curriculum or training course. Even if there is room to determine whether the procedure is beyond the scope of a dentist’s license based on the additional criteria (i.e., whether the procedure is “a public health risk” or whether it is likely to cause such risk rather than the scope of a dentist’s license, it is highly probable that if the procedure is included in the curriculum or training course of a dental college, etc., the risk would not be greater than the scope of a dentist’s license. Ultimately, if the procedure is included in the curriculum of a dental college, etc., the Majority Opinion is difficult to accept from the perspective of “a dental college’s inherent health risk” as the main method of dental treatment, and thus, it is unreasonable to determine whether it is beyond the scope of a dentist’s license as a result of an objective procedure or practice beyond the scope of a dental license.

For the foregoing reasons, we express our concurrence with the Majority Opinion.

6. Concurrence with the Majority by Justice Lee Sang-hoon, Justice Kim Chang-suk, and Justice Park Sang-ok as follows.

A. The Dissenting Opinion argues that the Medical Service Act’s provision of the phrase “a dental” or “oral surgery” differently from a dentist’s duties is based on the fundamental conclusion of the Medical Service Act that intends to distinguish the two according to the external standard of treatment and treatment, on the premise that the two is clearly distinguishable from a dentist’s duties, and that the scope of a dentist’s license is, in principle, limited to dental infants, such as dental surgery, mouth, and adjacent organizations, such as the mouth, mouth, and adjacent areas surrounding adjacent areas, and the scope of dental license is limited to the extent directly or indirectly for the purpose of prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation of dental science and the treatment of dental health, and thus, the Defendant, a dentist, using the Stockholm procedure, is obviously going beyond the scope of a dentist’s license under the Medical Service Act.

However, in interpreting the meaning of medical practice other than those licensed as the subject of the instant punishment under the principle of no punishment without the law, it shall be subject to strict standards. In light of the history, content, and structure of the current medical law, the development of medical technology, and changes in the medical environment, etc., legislators did not make legislative decisions as to the strict distinction between medical practice and dental practice, or the definition of clear concept, and accordingly, there may exist both intermediate, mixed, and heavy overlapping areas. There is sufficient room for the Defendant’s act, which is the subject of the instant charge, to correspond to the same area. This conclusion is reasonable by the Majority Opinion in this case.

Meanwhile, in accordance with the Majority Opinion, the Dissenting Opinion criticizes that a dentist’s treatment may be permitted entirely, but it is clear that a dentist’s treatment should be determined based on the legal principles of this case in a case where the scope of dental treatment is at issue. Therefore, there is no room for interpretation as alleged in the Dissenting Opinion.

B. A dentist’s license is granted to a dentist, but there exists only the unique and independent area of treatment that is not permitted to a doctor, and there is also a medical practice that is not permitted to a dentist. However, the concept of medical practice is not fixed and unreasonable. However, there may be cases where the academic principle is similar to that of a dentist, making it difficult to clearly distinguish the boundaries. In addition, in light of the following circumstances, there may be cases where the scope of a doctor’s license, which is the scope of a dentist’s license, and the scope of a dentist’s license, are either exclusive or exclusive, and it is difficult to view that the scope of a doctor’s license, which is the scope of a dentist’s license, is clearly distinguishable from that of a dentist’s license, and there is sufficient room for the existence of a medical practice that falls under

(1) The content of medical practice is bound to change along with the development of medical science and the development of society, and such progress of medical level should be continuously expected and pursued. With the development of medical expertise and technology and the curriculum thereof, the expertise of medical personnel is strengthened, and the knowledge and area of each medical profession are expanded, so that the work overlaps between each medical profession and each medical specialist or between each medical specialist and that specialist.

In this context, the reality of medical treatment is supported by the fact that the previous malutic surgery, which is implemented in the sexual surgery, is being implemented in the sexual surgery. As a result of the development of medical science, the rapid change in the medical environment, including the phenomenon that the field of beauty and health, which has not been naturally treated, has been expanded to the field of beauty and health, is continuing. In modern medical science, according to the organic development of medical technology and the phenomenon of contact with the development of medical technology, multiple vertical areas are involved in both the middle, mixed, and overlapping medical area, or the appropriate method of medical treatment is inevitably occurring and existing.

Due to the characteristics and phenomenon of modern medicine, it is difficult to satisfy the swift and urgentness of medical staff only by the narrowness between medical staff officers, and the strict classification of medical staff itself may undermine the development of medical technology and expertise in the specific medical field.

(2) According to the opinion of a witness of this court, the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s response submitted by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, on the grounds that the Medical Service Act does not specifically specify the scope of medical practice and dental practice, the Ministry of Health and Welfare has expressed his/her opinion that, if the concept of medical practice is specified in the law, it would cause harm to the development of the medical field, setting the medical technology apart from reality in the event that the content of the medical practice is changed due to the development of the medical technology, rather than that it would cause harm to the development of the medical field. This also supports

C. Article 2 of the Medical Service Act provides that “a dental surgery” refers to a field of study that studies the physiological, pathology, and therapy technology of this and its support organization and drafting. However, there is no need to set the area of dental treatment only in a field that is consistent with the Act on the Purpose and Use of Ordinary Languages.

In mind of the change and development of the medical environment, the medical law does not stipulate the active definition of the medical practice, as well as the individual and specific contents of the medical practice licensed by a dentist and a doctor, or the explicit criteria for classification thereof. Ultimately, what is the medical practice included in the scope of dental license is left to the interpretation of the provisions on the medical practice in a blank state.

In other cases of legislation, there is a difference in the scope of dental practice licensed to dentists. Whether a dentist’s license is allowed to provide dental treatment to an inner part other than the mouth and mouths, and whether a dentist’s license is required to provide additional qualifications or education to provide medical treatment. In particular, in the case of oral and external science, the relevant international academic society or the relevant foreign medical association include both mouth and mouths in the area of treatment, as well as in the area of oral and external medicine, and most of the inner part in a foreign country allows dentists to provide dental treatment to the area of oral and external medicine outside the area of treatment. Accordingly, the pertinent legal system does not establish the precise scope of the licensed medical practice of a dentist without considering the medical practice and the relevant medical system.

Although Article 2 of the Medical Service Act defines dental treatment and dental health guidance as a dentist’s duties, in light of the period of incorporation into, and lapse from, the system of medical laws and regulations with dental surgery outside the mouth, the area of medical treatment conducted therefrom, the area of medical treatment in clinical medicine, the development of medical technology, and changes in the medical environment, etc., the scope of clinical treatment in which each area of dental treatment is in charge, is expanded, the above provision means that dental and dental surgery becomes a center of dentist’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s license holder’s prior meaning does not coincide

D. (1) On the other hand, the interpretation and application of penal provisions must be strict, and the interpretation or analogical interpretation of the meaning of penal provisions in the direction unfavorable to the defendant is not permitted as it is contrary to the principle of no crime without the law. If the scope of inclusion in a certain penal provision is unclear and it is impossible to clearly determine whether an act of instituting a public prosecution constitutes a crime, such act shall not be punished.

In interpreting the latter part of the main sentence of Article 27 (1) of the Medical Service Act that is prohibited against medical personnel, the scope of coverage shall not be excessively interpreted so as not to violate the principle of clarity in the principle of no punishment without law, and it shall not be strictly interpreted in accordance with the Constitution so as to have sufficient predictability for medical practice other than the licensed provisions.

(2) The area of medical practice permissible for dentists is a matter falling under the legislative policy of a country, and it is desirable to legislatively resolve each case rather than by interpretation of the court. However, there is no legislative determination on the definition of dental practice licensed to a doctor and dental practice licensed to a dentist and the definition of dental practice as well as on the clear boundary thereof in the relevant statutes, such as the Medical Service Act, etc. In addition, since the area of dental practice is expanded to the area of dental practice as an internal body, other than dental and oral surgery, there is room for overlap between the area of dental practice and dental area. Accordingly, it is not easy for a dentist to clearly determine whether the act of performing Bosa procedure between the eye and U.S. patients falls under the scope of the license and whether it falls under the scope of dental practice outside the relevant area.

(3) Examining the foregoing principles and circumstances, there is room to interpret that the duties of dentists under Article 2(2) of the Medical Service Act include dental treatment and dental health guidance, and only refer to dental treatment related to dental surgery, including dental surgery. In some cases, the term “dental science” in the dental book is “a study related to dental, dental organization, and its surrounding organization,” and the term “malinancy” is “autical mouth, mouth mouth, and an organization covering it” under Articles 87(1)2 and 27(1) of the Medical Service Act, which are penal provisions, cannot be readily concluded that the inner part of the area of dental treatment outside the mouth of dental surgery, which is determined by the law, is excluded from the scope of dental treatment.

(4) Ultimately, a dentist’s interpretation of medical practice other than those prohibited under Article 27(1) of the Medical Service Act is unreasonable as it goes against the principle of clarity, the core point of which is the principle of no punishment without law, in substance, to interpret that the act of a dentist to administer arche procedure between the patient’s eye and the U.S., constitutes a medical practice other than those licensed by the State solely on the ground that the act of a dentist’s eye and the U.S. is not directly connected to the dental system, or that a dentist exceeded the scope of expertise and skills verified.

(5) As seen earlier, the area of medical treatment is expanding beyond the traditional scope of dental treatment and emotional health, and the intermediate, mixed, and overlapping areas between medical treatment and dental treatment may inevitably appear. In addition, it is difficult to accept in light of the above constitutional request to punish a dentist by deeming the medical treatment to be a medical act other than the licensed one solely on the ground that the medical treatment is not for the purpose of beauty prevention, diagnosis, rehabilitation treatment, not for the traditional meaning of dental treatment. This is true in that the Medical Service Act does not stipulate any provision excluding a dentist’s dental treatment solely on the ground that the medical treatment is for beauty purposes.

E. Such interpretation does not go against the legislative purpose of the Medical Service Act, or the legislative intent of distinguishing between medical practice and dental practice, by allowing all citizens to benefit from high-quality medical care, in light of the following circumstances as stated in the Majority Opinion.

(1) The reason for punishing medical personnel who performed medical acts other than those licensed as medical doctors and dentists lies in preventing risks to human life, body, or general public health, which may arise in the event that medical persons undergo systematic education and perform medical acts beyond the scope of the country’s verification of expertise and technology. Therefore, the request for punishment may be considered when there is a concern over causing risks to public health and hygiene beyond the scope of the area where dental expertise and technology are verified, depending on the relevant parts, specific attitudes, etc.

On the other hand, a medical person who has basic medical expertise and skills beyond the scope of the license can be deemed to have relatively lower risk than when a person who did not obtain a license from the State with respect to medical practice beyond the scope of the license does so. In the instant case where the issue is whether the Defendant’s medical practice outside the license of a dentist is a medical practice outside the scope of the license of a dentist, the circumstance that the degree of risk differs relatively may be taken into account.

(2) When performing a medical act, such as the surgery of the patient, it is important to accurately diagnose the symptoms of the disease and ensure the safety and effectiveness of the medical act by selecting the best treatment method, while at the same time, to properly cope with side effects or confluences that may normally be affected by alcohol. However, even if the procedure using the Stockholm at issue in this case is already used for various purposes, it is difficult to view it as medical act to the extent that high level of expertise or specialized skilledness is required due to serious risks likely to cause side effects on the body due to its ingredients or treatment method, even if it is a medical act that is likely to cause side effects on the body, it is difficult to view it as a medical act to the extent that high level of expertise or specialized skilledness is required. Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence to find that there is serious side effects that may not be regulated by criminal punishment, or that there is a practical harm to the health of the people.

F. Meanwhile, the Dissenting Opinion criticizes the Majority Opinion that, to the extent that the traditional method of surgery on the part of a dentist as well as the traditional method of surgery is incorporated into the curriculum, all procedures on the part of a dentist regarding the part of a dental license may be permitted to the extent that the new procedure related to the part of a dental license may be incorporated into the curriculum. Accordingly, the Dissenting Opinion criticizes that, according to the purport, the new procedure related to the part of a dental license may be within the scope of a dentist’s license, such as inception and visual treatment of the part of a dental license, and inception of the part of a dental license using a new method of surgery,

However, the Majority Opinion is clear in its reasoning that it is not the purport of generally allowing dental treatment without limit, but it is not determined within the scope of a dentist’s license as to the act mentioned in the Dissenting Opinion.

In other words, the Majority Opinion determined that the current Medical Act and subordinate statutes can not be deemed as a medical practice other than the licensed medical practice of a dentist, on the following grounds: (a) dental surgery has already been used in dental surgery for various dental treatment, such as the correction of spathum, gale, and the treatment of spathy, and the treatment of spathical instruments; (b) there are no special risks to the spathy in comparison with such procedures or medical treatment; (c) there is no evidence to acknowledge that high expertise and skills are needed; (d) systematic education and verification and regulation for the occupational profession; and (e) it is desirable to interpret the relevant legal regulations in the direction that widely opens the possibility of choice of medical consumers for the development of medical services and the improvement of the level of medical service.

Whether the act mentioned in the Dissenting Opinion is a dentist’s practice within the scope of license or a medical practice outside the scope of license should be determined on the basis of individual and specific circumstances based on the legal principles stated in the instant case for each of the issues at issue.

As above, I express my concurrence with the Majority Opinion.

7. Opinion concurring with the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Shin

The concurring opinion with the Majority points out that, on the premise that there is no legislative determination of the Medical Service Act as to the concept of medical practice within the scope of a dentist's license or the criteria for classification thereof, it is not permissible to punish a dentist as a medical practice outside the scope of a dentist's eye and U.S., and thus, it is not against the principle of no punishment without the law.

However, although the Medical Service Act does not separately stipulate the concept of “medical practice”, there is a explicit provision that clearly distinguish between a doctor and a dentist, and such express provision provides clear guidelines for the interpretation of “a dental practice,” accordingly, it is possible to interpret “a dental practice” and the scope of the license of a doctor and a dentist is sufficiently distinguishable. For example, the reason why a general doctor is unable to treat ging diseases and a dentist is unable to treat ging, and that a dentist is not able to perform ging diseases, is that the Medical Service Act clearly separates the scope of the license of a doctor and a dentist. Accordingly, there is no legislative determination as to the distinction between medical practice and dental practice under the Medical Service Act.

Nevertheless, we cannot accept the supplementary opinion with respect to the Majority Opinion that asserts that the Defendant’s instant act constitutes “medical practice other than those licensed to dentists” is contrary to the principle of no punishment without law.

Although the Medical Service Act provides dental treatment and dental health guidance for a dentist’s scope of license, the Majority Opinion’s concurring opinion with the Majority Opinion argues that the Defendant’s act of treating snow and scarcitys by using the Stockholm procedure is contrary to the principle of no punishment without the law if it is judged as a violation of the Medical Service Act. If such logic is followed, the Majority’s conclusion is that the scope of license of a doctor and dentist is unclear, and that, if a dental college’s act is included in the curriculum, a dentist cannot be punished in light of the principle of no punishment without the law, even any medical act that falls under the scope of license of a dentist. This conclusion is unreasonable in light of social norms, and that the Majority Opinion cannot be accepted.

The principle of no crime without the principle of no crime without the law acts in cases where it is impossible to clearly determine whether a prosecuted act constitutes a crime due to the absence of a clear provision, or in cases where the law has clear provisions and its interpretation can clearly be derived, it cannot be used as grounds for interpreting penal provisions in favor of the defendant in the same case as the instant case where the interpretation can be clearly derived. Nevertheless, the concurring opinion with the Majority Opinion cited the logic that, even if the Medical Service Act does not interpret the clear boundary between a doctor and a dentist's license by itself, it goes against the principle of no crime without the law unless it is interpreted in the direction to resolve such a result on the ground that the boundary and standard are ambiguous. However, the conclusion is contrary to the social norms cited in the Majority Opinion as an important argument.

For the foregoing reasons, the concurring opinion with the Majority is unreasonable, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the Dissenting Opinion.

Justices Lee In-bok (Presiding Justice)