1. The part against the plaintiff falling under the part of the first instance judgment ordering additional payment shall be revoked.

1. Basic facts

A. B, at around 06:00 on February 28, 2015, driven a sprink vehicle (hereinafter referred to as “fluoring vehicle”) and driven from the 5th apartment screen of the Daejeon Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seoul, the left left-hand turn to the Han-gu apartment near the Daejeon, and shocked the left-hand turn from the right-hand side of the Plaintiff’s left-hand side of the vehicle, which opened a way from the right-hand side to the left-hand side of the vehicle.

(hereinafter “instant accident”). (b)

In the instant accident, the Plaintiff was suffering from 200 square meters, tensions, and a pelle part of an unidentified body part, and a closed injury.

C. The defendant is an insurer who has concluded a motor vehicle insurance contract with B with respect to a household harming vehicle.

[Reasons for Recognition] Class A, Nos. 1, 2, and 4 (including paper numbers)

2. Occurrence of liability for damages;

A. According to the above fact of recognition of liability, the defendant is liable to compensate the plaintiff for the damages caused by the accident of this case, unless there are special circumstances as the insurer of a sea-going vehicle.

B. Whether or not to limit liability is a pedestrian shall cross the road at the shortest distance, and shall not cross the road immediately ahead or behind all vehicles, and shall not cross the road in the part of the road where crossing is prohibited by safety signs, etc. (Article 10 subparag. 3, 4, and 5 of the Road Traffic Act). In the case of sprinks, the evidence submitted in this case alone alone is at the place where crossing of the road in this case is prohibited, or the plaintiff violated the above provision of the Road Traffic Act as to crossing by directly crossing or behind the sea-going vehicle, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise.

Rather, the circumstances revealed by each of the above evidence, namely, at the time of the instant accident, the Plaintiff had entered the opposite lane beyond the vehicle’s operating car, which is the center line while making a left turn.