In a case where the Defendant was indicted for violating the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (collective, deadly weapons, etc.) and causing death or injury to a large number of subsequent passengers, including A, by punishing the driver of an adjacent vehicle and the driver of an adjacent vehicle in the expressway while driving a motor vehicle, driving the motor vehicle in the vicinity of the vehicle A, driving the motor vehicle rapidly, stopping the motor vehicle in front of the vehicle A by sudden reduction, and stopping the motor vehicle before the vehicle A, and resulting in death or injury to the vehicle A, the case convicting the Defendant all of his/her guilt.

In a case where the Defendant was indicted on charges of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (collective, deadly weapons, etc.) and interference with general traffic by carrying a dangerous object such as vehicle Gap and the driver of an adjacent vehicle Gap while driving a motor vehicle on an expressway while driving the motor vehicle, and threatening Gap to drive the motor vehicle in the vicinity of Gap's vehicle, and stopping the motor vehicle rapidly after sudden reduction of Gap's front, resulting in death or injury to a large number of subsequent passengers including Gap, including Gap, by stopping the motor vehicle, the case holding that the Defendant intentionally committed an act of interfering with the Defendant's own stopping or stopping on an expressway by driving the motor vehicle at a rapid speed above Gap's front, and caused danger and injury to Gap's vehicle, and that the act of the Defendant intentionally committed an act of interfering with Gap's own stopping or stopping on the expressway by driving the motor vehicle at a speed above Gap's front speed, and that the act of the Defendant intentionally committed an act of interfering with the Defendant's own stopping or stopping on the expressway.

Articles 185, 188, and 283(1) of the Criminal Act; Articles 2(1)1 and 3(1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act; Articles 64 and 156 subparag. 3 of the Road Traffic Act

Defendant

1.2 1 others

Attorney Park Yong-con et al.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three years and six months.

At around 10:30 on August 7, 2013, the Defendant driven a car of 140 (vehicle No. 1 omitted) and was driving in the vicinity of the J. D. C., the Defendant changed the (vehicle No. 2 omitted) to a two-lane in order to overtake the (vehicle No. 2 omitted) motor vehicle, and was driving in the vicinity of the J. D. C., the Defendant expressed a conflict with the Defendant’s vehicle in order to turn off the course, and Nonindicted 1 (Age No. 22) who is a driver of the said M. T. C., the victim Non-Indicted 1 (the driver of the said M. Engine No. 22) tried to move the vehicle of the Defendant two to three times.

피고인은 위와 같은 이유로 2013. 8. 7. 10:30경 위 장소에서 위 i40 승용차를 운전하여 피해자 공소외 1이 운전하는 위 쏘렌토 승용차의 앞에 끼어든 후 갑자기 속력을 줄이고, 피해자 공소외 1이 이를 피해 2차로로 변경하자 뒤따라 2차로로 이동한 후 다시 속력을 줄이고 진천 분기점 진출차로로 재차 이동한 후 속력을 줄이며 비상등을 켠 채 운전석 창문을 내리고 손을 내밀어 차를 세우라고 손짓하고, 피해자 공소외 1이 별다른 대응 없이 그대로 지나쳐 2차로로 진행하자 속력을 올리며 뒤따라가 위 쏘렌토 승용차를 추월한 후 2차로로 변경하여 속력을 줄이며 우측 방향지시등을 켠 채 갓길로 이동하고, 피해자 공소외 1이 이를 피해 1차로로 변경한 후 피고인의 차량을 추월하여 진행하자 피해자 공소외 1의 차량과 나란히 진행하며 운전석 창문을 내리고 피해자 공소외 1을 향해 “기다려, 씹할 놈아.”라고 욕설하고, 피해자 공소외 1의 차량을 추월하여 1차로로 진행하다가 피해자 공소외 1이 피고인의 차량을 피해 2차로로 변경하자 뒤따라 2차로로 변경한 후 우측 방향지시등을 켠 채 갓길로 진입하고, 피해자 공소외 1이 별다른 대응 없이 1차로로 변경해 진행하자 속력을 높여 피해자 공소외 1의 차량 앞에 급하게 끼어들었다.

이후 피고인은 피해자 공소외 1이 2차로로 변경하여 진행하는 바람에 차량 간 간격이 벌어지고 피고인의 차량 뒤에 다른 차량들이 진행하게 되자 진행방향 우측 갓길에 차를 정차시킨 후 비상등을 켜고 차에서 내려 2차로로 걸어가며 그를 향해 차를 세우라고 손짓하고, 피해자 공소외 1이 별다른 대응 없이 자신을 피해 계속 진행하자 급하게 출발하여 뒤따라잡은 후 그의 차량 앞에 끼어들어 비상등을 켠 채 속력을 줄이고, 피해자 공소외 1이 이를 피해 1차로로 변경하자 재차 1차로로 변경한 후 우측 방향지시등을 켜고 2차로로 변경하고, 피해자 공소외 1이 별다른 대응 없이 1차로로 그대로 진행하자 운전석 창문을 내린 후 그를 향해 손가락질하고, 피해자 공소외 1이 자신을 지나쳐 그대로 진행하여 2차로로 변경하자 속력을 올려 1차로로 변경한 후 그의 차량 앞에 끼어들고, 우측 방향지시등을 켠 채 갓길로 진입하며 속력을 줄이고 운전석 창문을 내린 후 피해자 공소외 1을 향해 차를 세우라고 손짓하고, 피해자 공소외 1이 별다른 대응 없이 1차로로 변경하여 계속 진행하자 속력을 올려 뒤따라가 그의 차량 앞에 끼어든 후 2차로로 변경하여 우측 방향지시등을 켠 채 2차로의 우측 가장자리를 따라 진행하고, 피해자 공소외 1이 별다른 대응 없이 그대로 진행하자 속력을 올려 뒤따라가 그의 차량 앞에 끼어든 후 2차로로 변경하여 우측 방향지시등을 켠 채 속력을 줄이며 갓길로 진행하였다.

Nevertheless, the victim non-indicted 1 proceeded along the same lane without putting up the vehicle, and all vehicles are continuously proceeding at normal speed, and if the vehicle is loaded on the one lane, the vehicle driving on the one lane may not avoid it and lead to a large accident. However, the defendant immediately moved along the two lanes at about 110 to 120 kilometers per hour depending on the two lanes on the same day, and even though there is no reason to stop the vehicle immediately, the defendant, even though there is no reason to stop the vehicle rapidly in front of the victim non-indicted 1, the speed was reduced at about 6 seconds.

Since then, the victim non-indicted 1 stopped by rapid stopping of the above rocketing truck, and then the victim non-indicted 5 (year 55) driven by the victim non-indicted 5 (year 55) (vehicle number 3 omitted) X-ray truck and the victim non-indicted 3 (year 53) vehicle (vehicle number 4 omitted) vehicle operated by the victim non-indicted 3 (the victim's non-indicted 53). However, after the defendant's vehicle stops, the victim non-indicted 2 (age 5 omitted)'s first 5 ton of modern 5 ton of the victim's non-indicted 2 (age 58) vehicle was driven by the victim non-indicted 5 (age 5 omitted) at approximately 5 to 600 (vehicle number 5 omitted) after the vehicle stops, the above me to get the back part of the above me to see the above me to the left-hand part of the vehicle, and to shock the above me to the left-hand part of the me.

As a result, the Defendant carried dangerous articles, and threatened the victim non-indicted 1 with the above i40 vehicle, stopped the above i40 vehicle on an expressway, at the same time, obstructed the traffic of the expressway, resulting in the victim non-indicted 2, who is the driver of the above car truck, death from low-blood shock shock caused by divers, etc. during the transport of the vehicle after hospital, at around 1:37 on August 7, 2013, and caused the victim non-indicted 3, who is the driver of the above EXM, to death from low-blood shock shock, etc., for about two weeks of treatment, and caused the victim non-indicted 5, who is the driver of the above EXF, to suffer from the above 6 week treatment of the above EXF vehicle, for about two weeks of treatment, such as light catum flor, etc., and to the victim non-indicted 6, who is the driver of the above EXF, for about six weeks of treatment of the above EXF.

1. Partial statement of the defendant;

1. Each prosecutor's protocol of examination of the accused;

1. Each police statement of Nonindicted 8, 3, 5, and 1

1. The statement of Nonindicted Party 1

1. On the spot of a traffic accident, a situation report, a traffic accident actual condition investigation report, on-site photo, vehicle box image pictures, a traffic accident analysis report [Attachment to video CDs at the time of the accident taken by Nonindicted Party 1 on the (vehicle No. 2 omitted) - one CD, Defendant driver’s rear video CDs for the vehicle operated by Nonindicted Party 1] - one CD, and a traffic accident analysis report;

1. Each medical certificate, each medical certificate, and each corpse inspection report;

1. A copy of each chassis, each scrapped certificate, and the register of automobiles; and

1. Article applicable to criminal facts;

Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act, Article 283(1) (a) of the Criminal Act, Article 188 of the Criminal Act, the latter part of Article 188, Article 185 of the Criminal Act (the point of causing interference with general traffic), the former part of Article 188, Article 185 of the Criminal Act (the point of causing interference with general traffic), Article 156 Subparag. 3, and Article 64 of the Road Traffic Act (the point of stopping on an expressway)

1. Commercial competition;

Articles 40 and 50 of the Criminal Act (Punishments on the death or injury by general traffic, the injury by general traffic, and the punishment on the death or injury by general traffic which are the largest between the crimes of violation of the Road Traffic Act)

1. Selection of punishment;

In regard to the general traffic obstruction crime, the choice of a limited term

1. Aggravation for concurrent crimes;

The former part of Article 37, Article 38 (1) 2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act (Concurrent Punishment for Crimes of Death or Injury by General Transport Obstruction which is more severe)

1. Discretionary mitigation;

Articles 53 and 55 (1) 3 of the Criminal Act (The following circumstances considered as favorable to the reasons for sentencing)

1. Summary of the assertion

A. The part concerning the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a collective, deadly weapons, etc.)

The defendant did not have the intention of intimidation, and it cannot be deemed that the defendant's act constitutes a threat of harm that may cause fear to the victim non-indicted 1, or that such notice has reached the victim non-indicted 1.

B. Part concerning the crime of causing death or injury to general traffic obstruction

1) The Defendant did not have any intention to interfere with traffic since it was merely a stop of a vehicle to ask the victim with respect to the cost of trial while driving with Nonindicted Party 1.

2) Even if the Defendant’s act constitutes the element of the crime of interference with general traffic, Nonindicted 2, who died, caused a subsequent accident by violating the duty of care, and thus, the Defendant’s act and the result of the victims’ thought do not constitute the crime of resulting in death or injury by general traffic obstruction.

(c) Insane, mental disorder;

At the time of committing each of the crimes in this case, the Defendant was in a state of mental disability or mental disability by impulse impulse disorder, etc.

2. Determination

A. The part concerning the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a collective, deadly weapons, etc.)

Intimidation in a crime of intimidation refers to a threat of harm that may cause fear to an ordinary person. The subjective constituent elements of intimidation are to recognize and recognize that an actor informss of harm to such an extent. The crime of intimidation is to be established. The content of harm and injury notified should be sufficient to cause fear to an ordinary person in light of various circumstances before and after the act, such as the tendency of the offender and the other party, surrounding circumstances at the time of notification, mutual relationship between the offender and the other party, the degree of friendship and status, etc. between the perpetrator and the other party, and the relationship between the third party and the perpetrator. However, unless the other party recognizes its meaning by notifying such degree of harm and injury, it does not require that the other party realistically feel fear. Thus, the crime of intimidation should be interpreted as satisfying the constituent elements of intimidation regardless of whether the other party realistically promulgated such harm and injury, and if the other party did not have been aware of the freedom to make a decision on the harm and injury as well as the other party’s awareness of harm and injury at all, it does not reach the other party.

In light of the above legal principles, the health stand in this case, according to the evidence duly adopted and examined by this court, on the ground that the defendant's act was obvious during the change of the vehicle and the vehicle driven by the victim non-indicted 1, and the victim non-indicted 1 made a rise to the vehicle driven by the defendant in the meaning of warning, etc., the defendant driving the vehicle at a rapid speed in front of the victim non-indicted 1, thereby hindering the defendant's career by reducing speed or driving the vehicle at a rapid speed in front of the victim non-indicted 1, and driving the vehicle by the victim non-indicted 1, the victim's non-indicted 1, who gets away from the victim's vehicle, and the defendant was able to take a view of his desire to drop and stop the vehicle while driving the vehicle on the side of the victim non-indicted 1, and the defendant's act was found to have not been aware of the harm and injury caused by the defendant's act of spreading the vehicle at least 10:42 meters per hour on the day of the accident, and the victim's his father's fear as well as well as the above.

B. Judgment on the crime of causing death or injury to general traffic obstruction

1) Whether there was intention to interfere with general traffic

The purpose of general traffic obstruction is to punish all acts that cause damage to land, etc. or obstruct traffic by other means, and thus make it impossible or considerably difficult to pass through by means of causing damage to land, etc., as an offense, the protected legal interest of which is the general public’s traffic safety. The so-called abstract dangerous crimes, where traffic is impossible or considerably difficult, the occurrence of traffic obstruction does not necessarily lead to actual occurrence of traffic obstruction (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Do9247, Mar. 14, 2013).

In light of the above legal principles, even though the defendant was able to obstruct the course and stop on the side, such as cutting speed at a rapid speed in front of the victim non-indicted 1, it seems that the victim non-indicted 1's failure to respond to it and the victim non-indicted 1's intention to stop the vehicle seems to be the motive for the defendant to stop the vehicle immediately; the defendant was forced to stop the vehicle in front of the victim non-indicted 1, and it is difficult for the defendant to stop the vehicle at least 6 seconds because it was impossible or difficult to stop the vehicle in front of the victim non-indicted 1, because it was difficult for the defendant to stop the vehicle in front of the victim non-indicted 1, but it was considerably difficult for the defendant to stop the vehicle in front of the vehicle in front of the victim non-indicted 1, and it appears that the vehicle in front of the accident in front of the vehicle in front of the vehicle in front of the vehicle in front of the vehicle in front of the vehicle in front of the defendant's temporary stop, and the vehicle in front of the vehicle in front.

2) Whether there exists causation between general traffic obstruction and the result of thought

Since the crime of death or injury caused by general traffic obstruction is an aggravated crime as a result, there is a possibility of proximate causal relation and the result of thought between the act and the serious result. The proximate causal relation is not the only cause or directly causing the result of the victim's death or injury, but it can be recognized even if the result of the crime is concurrent with the negligence of the victim or a third party. The existence of predictability should be strictly taken into account specific situations such as the degree of the defendant's act and the response status of the victim (see Supreme Court Decisions 90Do1596, Sep. 25, 1990; 2005Do186, Mar. 25, 2005; 2008Da783, Dec. 17, 2008, etc.).

In light of the above legal principles, according to the evidence duly adopted and examined by this court, the defendant intentionally stopped the vehicle on the first expressway, which caused the occurrence of the accident in this case by the victim's failure to perform his duty of care, such as securing safety distance, as alleged by the defendant and his defense counsel, it is difficult to find any grounds for the victim non-indicted 2, who has driven the first towing vehicle, to be presumed to have been negligent. Even if the victim non-indicted 2 violated his duty of care, even if the victim non-indicted 2 was negligent in driving the vehicle at the highest speed of 110 km, the defendant intentionally stopped the vehicle on the first expressway, with intent to interfere with the traffic of the vehicle, and then stopped the vehicle on the first expressway, and thus, it is difficult to view that the defendant's failure to perform his duty of care, such as securing safety distance, constitutes an exceptional accident that makes it difficult to expect the occurrence of the victim's death and injury, and thus, the defendant cannot be seen to have paid the insurance money to the 10th of the case.

C. Determination of mental disorder and mental disorder

In light of the background leading up to each of the crimes in this case, the means and methods of the crime, and the circumstances after the crime, etc., even if the defendant had a shock disorder, it does not seem that the defendant was unable to discern things or make decisions due to such shock disorder at the time of each of the crimes in this case, and therefore, the defendant's assertion is rejected.

The facts of each of the crimes in this case are generally accepted and reflected by the defendant as a substitute for each of the crimes in this case, and it seems that the defendant was due to minor expenses that occurred during driving of each of the crimes in this case, and that the defendant would have caused contingent damage in a state of somewhat interest. The defendant agreed with the victims other than the victim non-indicted 1, 4, and 3, and agreed to pay 50 million won to the bereaved family members of the victim non-indicted 2, and made efforts to recover damage by depositing each of the crimes in the victim non-indicted 1 and 3, and that the defendant has no record of punishment for the crimes in this case.

However, in the case of the instant ordinary traffic obstruction, the result of the instant ordinary traffic obstruction, such as the occurrence of a sudden sudden accident on the one-lanes of low-speed highway, and the victims' loss of their lives or less severe injury. Moreover, in the case of the instant crime of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (collective, deadly weapons, etc.), if the Defendant, who was the starting point, was in the process of overtaking prior vehicles, it appears that the Defendant had a significant degree of negligence, such as violating the relevant laws and regulations of the Road Traffic Act, and thus, the Defendant’s notice of harm and injury caused the Defendant to drive the prior vehicle on the part of Nonindicted Party 1, whose meaning of the warning was expressed, is not good, and thus, it is necessary to sentence the Defendant with severe punishment. Furthermore, in light of the nature of the volume, strength, weight, speed, etc. of the instant ordinary traffic obstruction, it is necessary to put our vehicle in danger to the safety and safety of the human life and body, but it is necessary to keep the safety and safety of the vehicle or to keep the safety of our society without any other reasons.

In addition, the punishment as ordered shall be determined in consideration of the defendant's age, character and conduct, environment, family relationship, motive and background of the crime, means and consequence of the crime, circumstances after the crime, etc. and various sentencing conditions as shown in pleadings.

For transfer of judge (Presiding Judge)