[1] In a case where a fire that occurred in a part of a building that forms an indivisible unit of structure has been destroyed by another part of the building, the scope of damages due to a lessee’s nonperformance of the duty to return the leased object

[2] The scope of damages where a building is damaged due to a tort, etc.

[1] In light of the scale and structure of a building, where the leased part of the building and other parts are structurally indivisible in maintaining and establishing the building, and where a fire in the leased part is destroyed by burning to other parts of the building and causing damage to the other parts of the building, the lessee is not limited to the leased part, and the lessor is also liable to compensate for the damage incurred by the lessor due to the fire in an indivisible relationship with the maintenance and existence of the building.

[2] In a case where a building is damaged due to a tort, etc., the repair cost is ordinary damages if it is possible to repair, and in a case where the repair cost required to restore the building to its original state because the building was worn out with its useful life at the time of damage exceeds the exchange value of the building, the amount of damages shall be limited within the exchange value range of the building in accordance with the principle of equity, and in a case where the value of the building increases than before the damage due to the repair, the amount calculated by deducting the exchange value increase from the repair cost.

[1] Articles 390, 393, and 618 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 393 and 763 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 86Da1066 delivered on October 28, 1986 (Gong1986, 3116), Supreme Court Decision 97Da41509 delivered on December 23, 1997 (Gong1998Sang, 378) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 94Da3964 delivered on October 14, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2970), Supreme Court Decision 98Da22048 delivered on September 8, 1998 (Gong198Ha, 2415)

Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Young-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Attorney Jeong-hun et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Daejeon High Court Decision 2001Na6792 delivered on June 5, 2002

Of the part of the judgment of the court below as to damages for delay, the part against the defendant ordering payment from August 26, 1999 to May 31, 2003 as to KRW 91,240,711 to the defendant and the part against the defendant ordering payment in excess of an annual amount of 5% from the next day to the next day to the full payment, shall be reversed, and the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked, and the plaintiff's claim corresponding thereto shall be dismissed. The remaining appeal by the defendant shall be dismissed. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be four minutes to the plaintiff, and the remainder shall be borne by the defendant.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

In light of the size and structure of a building, if the leased part of the building and other parts are in an indivisible relationship in the structure of the building in mutual maintenance and existence, and if a fire in the leased part has occurred and damage has been inflicted on the other parts of the building in the fire prevention structure, the lessee is not limited to the leased part, and the lessee is obligated to compensate for the damage incurred by the lessor due to the fire in an indivisible and indivisible relationship with the maintenance and respect of the building (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da41509 delivered on December 23, 197).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the 2, 3, and 4th floor of the building of this case are not independently independent, but through columns and walls inside the building of this case, and that the area of the upper floor is rapidly narrow and is adjacent to the building through the walls, ceilings, and the floor of the upper floor, etc., and that the existence and maintenance of the building are indivisible as to its existence and maintenance. The court below held that the lessee is liable to compensate the Defendant for damages caused by the nonperformance of the obligation to return the leased object of this case as well as by the loss of the remaining parts indivisible as to its existence and maintenance.

Examining the record on the premise of the above legal principles, we affirm the above fact-finding and decision of the court below, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the scope of damages as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal, and since the above Supreme Court precedents are unreasonable or need not be changed, the ground of appeal as to this is not acceptable.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Where a building is damaged due to a tort, if the repair cost is normal, and the repair cost required to restore the building to its original state is an old building with its useful life at the time of its damage exceeds the exchange value of the building, the amount of damages shall be limited within the scope of exchange value of the building in accordance with the principle of equity. In addition, where the value of the building increases than before its damage due to the repair, the amount calculated by deducting the increase in exchange value from the repair cost is the damage.

In the same purport, the court below is just that the defendant's non-performance of the duty to return the leased object of this case is equivalent to the repair cost of the fire caused by the fire of this case, and there is no error in the misapprehension of law as otherwise

3. As to the third ground for appeal

The fact-finding or the ratio of comparative negligence in determining the scope of liability for damages due to nonperformance can be said to be the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court unless it is remarkably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity.

Examining the lower judgment in light of the record, the lower court’s fact-finding or its determination on the grounds for comparative negligence cannot be deemed considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity, and thus, the grounds of appeal on this point cannot be

4. Ex officio determination

The portion of "interest rate prescribed by Presidential Decree" in the main sentence of Article 3 (1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings before the amendment (amended by Act No. 5507 of Jan. 13, 1998 and amended by Act No. 6868 of May 10, 2003; hereinafter referred to as the "former Promotion Act") was decided as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on April 24, 2003. Accordingly, the above amended provisions of the Act and the main sentence of Article 3 (1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (amended by Presidential Decree No. 17981 of May 29, 2003) provide that the statutory interest rate applied after June 1, 2003 shall be 20% per annum, which affected the conclusion of the judgment by applying the interest rate for delay damages.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, of the judgment of the court below as to damages for delay, the part against the defendant ordering payment exceeding five percent per annum from August 26, 1999 to May 31, 2003, and twenty percent per annum from June 1, 2003 to the date of full payment as to damages for delay under the amended Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings shall be reversed. This part shall be sufficient to be directly judged by the court, and therefore, it shall be decided to see it. The judgment of the court of first instance corresponding to the above part shall be revoked, and the corresponding part shall be dismissed, and the remaining appeal by the defendant shall be dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Zwon-won (Presiding Justice)