Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act provides that the grounds for dismissal and the time of dismissal shall be notified in writing to the employer who intends to dismiss a worker, and the method of stating the grounds for dismissal in writing / The requirements for the refusal of the conclusion of this employment contract at the expiration of the duration of employment, and whether the employer shall notify in writing the specific and substantial grounds for refusal

Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act provides that the employer has the effect of written notification of the grounds for and time of dismissal to dismiss a worker. This is to ensure that the employer is careful in dismissing the worker through written notification of the grounds for dismissal, etc., and that the dispute surrounding the existence and time and reason of dismissal can be resolved in an appropriate and easy manner after the dismissal, and that the employer can properly respond to the dismissal to the worker. Thus, when the employer gives written notice of the grounds for dismissal, it is necessary to specifically identify the grounds for the dismissal in the location of the worker.

Meanwhile, in light of the purpose and purpose of the pilot system that intends to observe, determine and evaluate the eligibility of workers, such as vocational ability, qualities, personality, and sincerity, rejection of this labor contract at the expiration of the pilot period may be more broadly recognized than general dismissal, but even in such a case, there is an objective reasonable ground and reasonable in light of social norms.

In full view of the contents and purport of the above provisions of the Labor Standards Act, and the justification requirements for refusal to conclude this labor contract upon the expiration of the period for probationary employment, if an employer refuses to conclude this labor contract in a probationary employment relationship, the employer shall be notified in writing of the specific and substantial grounds for refusal so that

Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act

Supreme Court Decision 2002Da62432 Decided February 24, 2006 (Gong2006Sang, 494) Supreme Court Decision 2011Da42324 Decided October 27, 201 (Gong2011Ha, 2429)

Plaintiff

The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission

Maeman Park Co., Ltd.

Seoul High Court Decision 2015Nu35767 decided June 18, 2015

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant supplementary intervenor.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 3

A. Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act provides that, in order for an employer to dismiss a worker, the employer shall be notified in writing of the grounds for and time of the dismissal. This means that the employer shall be careful in dismissing the worker through written notification of the grounds for dismissal, etc., and the purpose of this provision is to ensure that the disputes surrounding the existence and time of dismissal and the reasons for dismissal can be resolved appropriately and easily, and that workers shall be able to properly respond to dismissal. Thus, when the employer gives written notice of the grounds for dismissal, etc., the employer must be able to specifically identify the grounds for the dismissal in the location of the worker (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da42324, Oct. 27, 201).

On the other hand, in light of the purpose and purpose of the pilot system to observe, determine and evaluate the work eligibility of the relevant worker, such as occupational ability, qualities, personality, and sincerity, refusal to conclude this labor contract at the expiration of the pilot period may be recognized more broadly than general dismissal. However, even in such a case, there should be reasonable grounds objectively and socially acceptable (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da62432, Feb. 24, 2006, etc.).

In full view of the contents and purport of the above provisions of the Labor Standards Act, and the justification requirements for refusal to conclude this labor contract upon the expiration of the period for probation, if an employer refuses to conclude this labor contract in the employment relationship, it is reasonable to deem that the relevant employee should be notified in writing of the specific and substantial grounds for refusal so that the employer can identify

B. On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s Intervenor’s mere notification to the Plaintiff to the effect that “the Defendant’s Intervenor would dismiss the worker at the expiration of the period of time” would not take effect due to procedural defects, and rejected all the Defendant’s assertion that the Defendant’s Intervenor’s refusal of the contract was not subject to Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act, and that there is no need to specify the grounds for refusal in writing at the time of written notification.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to dismissal or the procedure of refusing to conclude this contract in a temporary employment relationship, omitting judgment, or exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are different from this case, and thus are inappropriate to be invoked in this case.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

The allegation in the grounds of appeal in this part is that the lower court’s erroneous interpretation that the pertinent collective agreement or rules of employment imposes written obligation to notify when refusing to conclude this labor contract is unlawful.

However, insofar as the lower court’s determination that the notice of refusal to enter into this labor contract was invalid in violation of Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act is justifiable, the legitimacy of such interpretation cannot affect the conclusion of the judgment, and thus, this part of the ground of appeal is rejected.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Chang-suk (Presiding Justice)