1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1..

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited the same reasoning as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the following "2. height", and thus, it is acceptable to accept it in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the

2. The dismissal of the part of the judgment of the court of first instance is as follows, the 8th and 12th to 10th are as follows.

We examine whether the dividend of this case was appropriated for the repayment of any claim out of the claims Nos. 1 and 2.

The provisions of Articles 476 through 479 of the Civil Act concerning the satisfaction of an obligation are voluntary provisions, and if an agreement is different from the above provisions, the effect of the satisfaction of obligation arises pursuant to such agreement, and in the absence of such an agreement, if the offering of an obligation does not extinguish in whole, the effect of the satisfaction of obligation becomes effective by the designation of an appropriation of obligation under Article 476 of the Civil Act, and the effect of the satisfaction of obligation takes effect by supplement of the order of the satisfaction of obligation under

(see Supreme Court Order 2009Ma1942, Mar. 10, 2010). The order of statutory appropriation of performance under Article 477 of the Civil Act ought to be determined at the time of offering an obligor’s performance.

(2) In light of the aforementioned legal principles, the Plaintiff asserted that the instant dividend was appropriated for the repayment of the second claim, but there is no evidence to acknowledge it. Rather, the following circumstances, i.e., the Plaintiffs asserted that the instant dividend was appropriated for the repayment of the second claim (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Da71712, Nov. 26, 2015). In other words, the Plaintiffs asserted that the said designated appropriation was made only as the statement of the preparatory document dated June 19, 2017, which was the first instance court’s co-defendant, and the Plaintiffs asserted that the said designation appropriation was made after April 4, 2017.