1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Basic facts

(a) It is written in the Land Survey Book prepared under the Japanese colonial rule that E residing in D has received the assessment of the Gyeonggi-do Authenticity-gun B 212 and C 153 square meters;

B. Since then, following the change of administrative district, etc., the land B was the same as Pyeongtaek-si B, 701 square meters (hereinafter “the land No. 1”), and the land C was the same as the land No. 506 square meters prior to C (hereinafter “the land No. 2”). As to the land No. 1, April 18, 1990, and as to the land No. 2, each registration of preservation of ownership was made in the Defendant’s name on February 26, 1996.

[Reasons for Recognition] Evidence Nos. 5, 6, and 7, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. However, the plaintiff asserts that the registration of each ownership preservation in the name of the defendant should be cancelled by the invalidation of the cause, unless he was informed of the circumstances of E, his own preference to the land Nos. 1 and 2 of this case, and the defendant did not assert and prove his succession acquisition.

In order for the Plaintiff to seek cancellation of the registration of preservation of ownership completed in the name of the Defendant against the Defendant, the Plaintiff must first actively assert and prove that the Plaintiff has the title to request the cancellation thereof, and if it is not recognized that the Plaintiff has such title, the registration of preservation of ownership in the name of the Defendant may not be accepted, regardless of whether the registration of cancellation should be cancelled or not.

(See Supreme Court Decision 98Da17831 delivered on February 26, 199). We examine the following: (a) Eul evidence No. 4, Eul evidence No. 1-2, and Eul evidence No. 1-2; (b) Eul, the assessment titleholder, completed the registration of initial ownership on June 28, 1921 with respect to the land of this case, and completed the registration of initial ownership transfer due to sale to F on November 22, 199; and (c) as can be seen, Eul already sold the land of this case to a third party; and accordingly, the plaintiff received any right with respect to the land of this case.

As such, the Plaintiff’s assertion is further examined.