The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The Defendant is merely an aiding and abetting the crime of “P”, which is the principal offender of the crime of Bosing. B. The sentence of the lower court (one year and six months of imprisonment, three years of suspended execution, etc.) against the illegal Defendant in sentencing is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. As to the misunderstanding of facts, the phishing crime is generally held in the form of acquiring property by deceiving the victim in an intelligent manner by sharing an organizational role, such as a total book, incentive, delivery book, withdrawal book, collection book, etc., and only part of each of the roles he/she takes charge of the phishing through successive public offering.

Therefore, if the accomplices in charge of each role perform their roles properly, they cannot success in the crime, and the role of the defendant's cash collection measures is also an essential process for the completion of the crime, and they did not receive all information on the crime of fraud, such as all the accomplices who participated in the crime or the process of the crime.

Even if a common principal can be established, the common principal can be established.

It is reasonable to view it.

In light of the above characteristics of the crime, a thorough examination of the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below, the defendant, by means of collecting cash from the victims using a false name, and depositing money into an account with a hidden and unsound identity, etc., through which the defendant had dolusive and implicitly conspired to commit the crime, and was in charge of the last important role.

It is reasonable to punish it as a common principal offender in fraud.

The defendant's assertion of facts is without merit.

B. The Criminal Litigation Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the direct principle as to the illegal sentencing, has the unique area of the first deliberation as to the determination of sentencing, and there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first trial, and the first deliberation sentencing exceeds the reasonable scope of discretion.