(영문) 전주지방법원 2016.9.29.선고 2015구합2045 판결

2. The disposition to terminate a contract for occupancy that the Defendant concluded against the Plaintiff on October 13, 2015 and the disposition to revoke the registration of the factory is unlawful; and

Purport of claim

The Defendant’s disposition to terminate a contract for occupancy with the Plaintiff on October 13, 2015 and revoked the disposition to revoke the registration of the factory.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff is a company established to carry on the manufacturing and selling business of high pressure containers, and the Defendant entered into an occupancy contract (hereinafter referred to as the “the occupancy contract of this case”) with the head of Jeollabuk-do branch office in the instant industrial complex under the Industrial Cluster Development and Factory Establishment Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Industrial Cluster Development Act”). On April 1, 2009, the Plaintiff entered into a contract with the head of Jeollabuk-do branch office in the instant industrial complex to occupy the factory at the location of the factory (hereinafter referred to as the “instant industrial site”).

C. On December 209, the Plaintiff entered into a land lease agreement with D Corporation, the owner of the instant industrial site, based on the instant occupancy agreement, and newly built three-story factories of the general steel structure, sandbd position plate site (5,041.6 meters of a 1st floor factory, 262.19 square meters of a 2nd floor factory, 340 square meters of a 3rd floor factory; hereinafter “factory of this case”). On February 8, 2010, the Plaintiff completed factory registration.

D. The Intervenor C (hereinafter referred to as the “Supplementary Intervenor”) as to the instant factory

10.8. The registration of transfer of ownership based on the sale by voluntary auction was completed on October 13, 2015. Afterwards, the Defendant terminated the occupancy contract of this case based on Article 42 of the Industrial Cluster Act (hereinafter “instant termination disposition”) on the ground of successful bidding by the Plaintiff on October 13, 2015, and issued a disposition revoking the registration of the instant factory based on Article 17 of the same Act (hereinafter “instant cancellation disposition”).

E. On October 14, 2015, D Corporation terminated a site lease agreement on the instant industrial site on the ground that the Plaintiff rendered the foregoing dispositions. On October 19, 2015, the Defendant concluded an occupancy contract on the instant industrial site with a supplementary intervenor pursuant to Article 38 of the Industrial Cluster Act.

[Ground of recognition] A without dispute, Gap evidence 1 through 6, Eul evidence 1, Eul evidence 1, Eul evidence 1, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiff's assertion

A. 1) In order to terminate a contract for occupancy of defects in the process of the instant termination disposition, it must undergo corrective orders pursuant to Article 42(1) of the Industrial Cluster Act and hearing of opinions pursuant to Article 42(5) of the same Act, and the Defendant issued the instant termination disposition without following the above procedure. The instant termination disposition is unlawful. According to each subparagraph of Article 42(1) of the Industrial Cluster Act, a successful bidder of auction is not a ground for termination. Thus, the instant termination disposition is not a legal ground, and there is deviation or abuse of discretionary power that violates the purpose of the Industrial Cluster Act or the principle of proportionality, and is obviously null and void.

B. According to each subparagraph of Article 17(1) of the Industrial Cluster Act regarding the revocation of the instant disposition, a successful bidder at auction is not a reason to revoke the registration of a factory. The instant revocation disposition is illegal on the ground that there is no legal basis, and there is deviation or abuse of discretion that violated the purpose of the Industrial Cluster Act or the principle of proportionality.

Even if the cancellation disposition of this case is made pursuant to Article 21 (2) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Cluster Act, as long as the cancellation disposition of this case is unlawful, the cancellation disposition of this case is also unlawful.

3. Relevant statutes;

As shown in the attached Form.

4. Determination:

A. Article 42(1) of the Industrial Cluster Act provides that "if an occupant enterprise or a support institution falls under any of the following subparagraphs, a management agency may issue a corrective order within a period prescribed by Presidential Decree, and if it fails to comply with such order, the occupancy contract may be terminated." Article 54 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that "the period prescribed by Presidential Decree under Article 42(1) of the Act refers to six months," which provides that "if a cause for termination of the occupancy contract occurs, it shall be ordered to correct the cause for termination within six months, and the occupancy contract may be terminated only if it fails to comply with such order." Article 42(5) of the Industrial Cluster Act provides that "if a management agency intends to terminate the occupancy contract pursuant to paragraph (1), it shall hear the opinion of the parties to the contract in advance."

With respect to the instant case, there is no dispute between the parties that the Defendant did not issue a corrective order in advance for the Defendant’s auction auction of the instant factory, and that the Plaintiff’s opinion was not heard. Thus, the instant termination disposition is unlawful due to lack of the procedure of the corrective order as the requisite for the termination right.

B) As to this, the Defendant and the Intervenor lost the qualification to maintain the occupancy contract because the Plaintiff was unable to operate the instant factory due to the successful bid for the auction of the instant factory. Since the Intervenor, who was awarded the contract, submitted the occupancy plan for the purpose of operating the instant factory, it is legitimate to conclude that the instant termination disposition was not subject to prior notification, etc. on the ground that it constitutes an exception under each subparagraph of Article 21(4) of the Administrative Procedures Act, and even if it was procedurally unlawful, the procedural defect was cured and the instant termination disposition was lawful.

In light of the following, the termination disposition of this case is an infinite administrative disposition ordering the Plaintiff to terminate the occupancy contract, so long as it does not fall under the grounds for exception under the Administrative Procedures Act, prior notice and the opportunity to present opinions should be given. The mere fact that the ownership of the factory of this case transferred to the supplementary intervenor, and the supplementary intervenor requested the occupancy contract by submitting the occupancy plan to the supplementary intervenor, it is difficult to see that the supplementary intervenor does not constitute the grounds for exception under each subparagraph of Article 21(4) of the Administrative Procedures Act, and that it cannot be deemed that the supplementary intervenor provided the Plaintiff with sufficient opportunity

2) According to Article 39(1) of the Industrial Cluster Act and Article 49(7) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, where an occupant enterprise that owns a factory, etc. in an industrial zone, etc. intends to dispose of a factory, etc. before the lapse of five years from the reporting on completion of the establishment, etc. of a factory under Article 15(1) of the same Act, it shall transfer the factory, etc. to a management agency. Article 42(1)6 of the Industrial Cluster Act provides that where it disposes of a factory, etc. in violation of Article 39(1) of the same Act, a management agency shall order correction thereof within six months, and if it fails to comply with such order, the occupancy contract may be terminated. Meanwhile, Article 39(3) of the Industrial Cluster Act provides that an occupant enterprise possessing an industrial facilities, etc. intends to dispose of the factory, etc. in question after five years from the reporting on completion of establishment, etc. of a factory under Article 15(1) of the same Act or the commencement of business under Article 15(2).

13. It deemed that the transfer of the ownership of the instant factory to the supplementary intervenor constitutes a case of disposing of a factory, etc. in violation of Article 39(1) of the Industrial Cluster Act, and thus, the instant termination disposition was rendered on the ground of Article 42 of the Industrial Cluster Act. On February 8, 2010, five years have passed since the registration of the instant factory was completed, and on October 8, 2015, the fact that the instant factory was disposed of on the ground of voluntary auction as seen earlier is that it does not constitute a case of disposing of a factory, etc. in violation of Article 39(1) of the Industrial Cluster Act, and Article 42 subparag. 6 of the Industrial Cluster Act cannot be a legal ground for the instant termination disposition.

In this regard, the defendant, according to Article 38 (2) of the Industrial Cluster Act, where an occupant enterprise intends to change matters prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy during a contract for occupancy, he/she shall conclude a new contract for change, each subparagraph of Article 7 (1) of the Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Cluster Act shall apply for change of factory site area, construction area construction area, and incidental facilities area change. Article 42 (4) of the Industrial Cluster Act provides that a change of matters prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy may be terminated if it is not entered into a contract for change pursuant to Article 38 (2) of the same Act, and Article 42 (4) of the Industrial Cluster Act provides that the legal basis for the cancellation of the contract of this case is Article 42 (4) of the Industrial Cluster Act. In addition, in an appeal suit seeking cancellation of an administrative disposition, it is difficult to say that the disposition authority can add or change new grounds only to the extent that it is identical in basic factual relations, and it is not allowed to claim the same reason for cancellation of the contract of this case as the above.

B) Meanwhile, even though there was no particular defect at the time of the disposition, and there was no separate legal ground for the withdrawal thereof after the disposition, the disposition agency which has conducted an administrative act may withdraw the original disposition by a separate administrative act which would lose its validity where there was no need to maintain its original disposition, or where there was a need for the important public interest. However, where the disposition is revoked or withdrawn, it would infringe upon the people's vested rights. Thus, even if there is a reason for revocation, the exercise of the right of revocation, etc. is determined by comparing and comparing with the disadvantage suffered by the other party only when there is a need for the important public interest to justify the infringement of the vested rights or when the protection of the interests of a third party is necessary, and where the disposition is considerably unfavorable to the other party than the need for the public interest, it is unlawful (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Du7606, Jul. 22, 2004).

In other words, it is reasonable to view that the termination disposition of this case was a de facto withdrawal of a contract of this case in light of the significant change in circumstances that have become unnecessary to continue the original disposition after the contract of this case was concluded, that is, the Plaintiff’s successful bid would lose ownership of the factory of this case and caused the termination disposition of this case. In full view of the aforementioned legal principles and the following circumstances in the judgment on May 1, 200 in detail, even if the Defendant failed to meet the requirements of the Industrial Cluster Act in making a termination disposition of this case, it is difficult to view that the termination disposition of this case, which can be deemed unlawful merely because the Plaintiff asserted, is a de facto withdrawal of a contract of this case.

Ultimately, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

3) The degree of illegality

In light of the importance of infringement on the Plaintiff’s rights and interests, the Plaintiff’s right to additionally construct another factory in the instant industrial site and the right to preferentially purchase the instant industrial site were extinguished due to the instant termination disposition, and thus, in light of the importance of infringement on the Plaintiff’s rights and interests, the instant termination disposition is alleged to be null and void, but the instant termination disposition only contains procedural defects, but the degree of the defect is limited to the grounds for revocation, and it cannot be deemed to be significantly obvious that it constitutes grounds for invalidation. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

As seen earlier, the termination disposition of this case is deemed to be unlawful due to procedural defects, and thus, it is not necessary to separately determine the Plaintiff’s assertion that the termination disposition of this case was unlawful by abusing and abusing discretion.

B. According to the evidence and the purport of the entire argument as to the disposition of cancellation of this case, it is recognized that the defendant issued the disposition of cancellation of this case at the same time on the ground that it was successful bidder of the factory of this case. According to the above facts of recognition, it is reasonable to view that the defendant issued the disposition of cancellation of this case on the ground of the case where the contract for occupancy has been terminated pursuant to Article 17 (1) 3 of the Industrial Cluster Act and Article 21 (2) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Cluster Act (limited to occupant enterprises). As seen earlier, as long as the disposition of cancellation of this case is unlawful, the disposition of cancellation of this case based on this is also illegal

In regard to this, the defendant and the supplementary intervenor asserted that the disposition of revocation of this case is legitimate because the factory under Article 17 (1) 1 of the Industrial Cluster Act is destroyed, the use of the building is changed, and the factory under subparagraph 2 is closed or the manufacturing facilities are destroyed. However, the plaintiff only lost ownership of the factory building of this case and it is difficult to regard it as falling under each of the above subparagraphs solely on the fact that ownership is changed. Thus, the above argument by the defendant and supplementary intervenor

5. Judgment of assessment;

A. The defendant's assertion

Even if the cancellation disposition and cancellation disposition of this case are illegal, the defendant asserts that there is a need for a ruling of assessment under Article 28 of the Administrative Litigation Act, since multiple legal relations are formed based on this case's termination disposition and cancellation disposition are contrary to public welfare, and even if there is a judgment, any damage to the plaintiff who lost the ownership of the factory of this case

(b) judgment;

1) In a case where there is an error in administrative procedure, the procedure becomes an independent ground for the administrative disposition in question, and in a case where the administrative disposition is unlawful, it is the principle for the cancellation or modification thereof, and the cancellation or modification thereof is extremely inappropriate for the public welfare. Thus, the application of an assessment judgment shall be limited under extremely strict requirements, and the application of the assessment judgment shall be determined by comparing and comparing the need for the cancellation or modification thereof, and the situation against the public welfare that may arise from the cancellation or modification thereof, and the application thereof shall be determined (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Du8359 delivered on December 10, 209).

2 ) 살피건대, ① 산업집적법 제38조 제1항은 산업단지에서 제조업을 하거나 하려는 자는 산업통상자원부령이 정하는 바에 따라 관리기관과 그 입주에 관한 계약을 체결하여야 한다고 규정하고 있는데, 원고는 앞서 본 바와 같이 임의경매로 인한 매각을 원인으로 하여 이 사건 산업용지에 있는 이 사건 공장의 소유권을 상실함으로써 이 사건 공장에서 더 이상 제조업을 운영할 수 없는 상황이고, 원고 소유의 다른 공장은 없으므로 결국 원고는 이 사건 산업용지에 대한 입주자격을 상실하였다 할 것이므로, 피고는 위와 같은 중대한 사정변경을 이유로 기존에 원고에 대하여 승인해 주었던 산업단지 입주계약을 철회할 수 있다고 봄이 상당한 점, ② 원고는 이 사건 산업용지 상의이 사건 공장 부지를 제외한 나머지 토지에 다른 공장건물을 추가로 신축하여 계속하여 제조업을 할 수 있다는 취지로 주장하나, 산업집적법 제39조의2 제1항에서는 관리권자, 관리기관 및 사업시행자가 소유하고 있는 산업용지를 분할하고자 하는 경우 최소분할면적 이하로 분할할 수 없도록 규정하고 있고, 같은 조 제2항에서는 만약 입주기업체가 이를 분할하고자 할 경우에도 최소분할면적 이하로 분할할 수 없도록 함과 아울러 미리 관리기관과 협의하도록 규정하고 있는데, 이는 산업집적법 제1조에서 정한 산업의 집적을 활성화하고 공장의 원활한 설립을 지원하며 산업단지를 체계적으로 관리하고자 하는 이 법의 목적을 달성하기 위하여 산업용지가 일정한 면적 이하로 분할되거나 임의대로 분할됨으로써 공장이 난립되는 것을 막기 위한 것으로, 이 사건 공장의 소유권이 보조참가인에게 이전된 상태에서 원고가 이 사건 공장 부지를 제외한 나머지 토지에 다른 공장건물을 추가로 신축할 수 있도록 입주계약을 유지한다면 이는 위와 같은 산업집적법의 입법 목적에 반하고, 산업입지 및 산업단지를 체계적으로 관리하는 것은 그 자체로서 중대한 공익적 가치가 있으며, 이 사건 해지처분으로 달성하고자 하는 위와 같은 공익목적에 비하여 이미 이 사건 공장의 소유권을 상실한 원고가 입게 될 불이익은 그다지 크지 않을 것으로 보이는 점, ③ 산업집적법 제40조 제1항은 경매나 그 밖의 법률에 따라 입주기업체의 산업용지 또는 공장등을 취득한 자가 그 취득한 날부터 산업통상자원부령으로 정하는 기간 내에 입주계약을 체결하지 못한 경우에는 그 기간이 지난날부터 산업통상자원부령으로 정하는 기간 내에 이를 제3자에게 양도하여야 한다고 규정하고 있고, 같은 조 제3항은 제1항에 따라 산업용지 및 공장등을 취득한 자가 기존 입주기업체가 아닌 경우에는 미리 제38조 제1항 또는 제3항에 따라 입주계약을 체결하여야 한다고 규정함으로서 공장 등을 경매로 취득하는 것 자체를 금지하고 있지 않고 경매취득자에게 입주계약 체결을 강제하고 있을 뿐인바, 피고가 경매취득자와 사이에 이 사건 산업용지에 대한 입주계약을 새로이 체결해야 하는 상황에서 이 사건 공장에서 제조업을 운영하는 것이 사실상 불가능하게 된 원고와 사이에서 이 사건 산업용지에서 제조업을 운영할 것을 전제로 체결된 이 사건 입주계약을 계속하여 유지하게 된다면 불필요한 법적 분쟁을 초래하고 ( 이 사건 산업용지에 관한 임대차계약을 해지한 D공사와의 분쟁도 예상된다 ), 새로이 입주계약을 체결한 보조참가인의 법적지위가 불안정해질 염려가 있는 점, ④ 원고는 산업집적법 제42조 각 호에서 ' 제조업을 하거나 하려는 자 ' 의 의사여부를 판단하는데 엄격한 기준점을 제시하고 있고, 위 규정과 산업집적법 제39조 제1, 2항, 같은 법 시행령 제49조 제7항을 유기적으로 해석하면 원고가 제조업을 하려는 의사만 있다면 산업집적법 제42조 제1항 제1 호를 유추 적용하여 경락일로부터 3년 내에 공장의 건설에 착수하지 않는 경우에 한하여 입주계약을 해지할 수 있다고 주장하나, 위와 같이 해석하여야 할 아무런 근거가 없는 점, ⑤ 원고는 이 사건 해지처분이 있지 않았더라면 D공사와 사이에 체결된 이 사건 산업용지에 대한 용지임대차계약을 유지하고 있었을 것이고, 보조참가인이 이 사건 공장의 소유권을 취득하였다고 하더라고 공장건축물이 존립할 권원이 없으므로 이 사건 공장을 원고에게 매도하거나 다시 임차해 줄 수밖에 없었을 것이라고 주장하나 , 건물의 소유를 목적으로 하여 토지를 임차한 사람이 그 토지 위에 소유하는 건물에 저당권을 설정한 때에는 민법 제358조 본문에 따라 저당권의 효력이 건물 뿐 아니라 건물의 소유를 목적으로 한 토지의 임차권에도 미친다고 보아야 할 것이므로, 건물에 대한 저당권이 실행되어 경락인이 건물의 소유권을 취득한 때에는 특별한 다른 사정이 없는 한 건물의 소유를 목적으로 한 토지의 임차권도 건물의 소유권과 함께 경락인에게 이전되는바 ( 대법원 1993. 4. 13. 선고 92다27950 판결 참고 ), 이 사건 산업용지의 임차권도 이 사건 공장의 소유권과 함께 경락인이자 이 사건 산업용지에 대한 입주계약을 체결한 보조참가인에게 이전되는 것으로 보아야 할 것인 점, ⑥ 원고는 이 사건 공장의 소유권을 상실한 후 현재까지 이를 취득하지 못하여 이 사건 산업용지에서 더 이상 제조업을 영위하는 것이 불가능하므로 이 사건 각 처분으로 인해 별다른 손해를 입었다고 보기 어려운 점, ⑦ 피고가 산업집적법 제42조의 적법한 절차를 거쳤을 경우에도 원고는 이 사건 공장에 대한 소유권을 다시 회복하지 못하여 이 사건 입주계약은 결국 해지되거나 철회되었을 것으로 보이고, 그에 따라 이 사건 공장등록도 적법하게 취소되었을 것인 점, ⑧ 그리하여 이 사건 각 처분을 취소하고 다시 적법한 절차를 거치는 것은 무익한 절차의 반복에 그칠 것으로 보이는 점 등에 비추어 보면, 이 사건 각 처분을 취소하는 것은 오히려 현저히 공공복리에 적합하지 아니하다고 인정된다 . 3 ) 이상의 이유로 원고의 청구에 관하여 행정소송법 제28조에 따라 사정판결을 하기로 한다 .

6. Conclusion

Therefore, all of the plaintiff's claims shall be dismissed. However, the illegality of the plaintiff's claims shall be specified in the order, and the burden of litigation costs, including the part arising from the participation in the assistance, shall be decided as per Disposition by applying Article 32 of