Main Issues
The case holding that it is necessary to claim in advance as a lawsuit for future performance
Summary of Judgment
The defendant, as a preliminary claim, sought a claim for the transfer registration of shares due to the completion of prescription as a lawsuit to perform in the future, and thus, it is necessary to claim in advance. Since the plaintiff is currently disputing the expiration of the above prescription period of the defendant with respect to the land in this case, the plaintiff is not expected to immediately perform the obligation of the transfer registration of ownership as to the land in this case after the registration of replotting was made in the future unless the claim is filed in advance, so it is necessary for the defendant as the defendant to execute the future performance immediately after obtaining the title of debt by the claim in this case and making it necessary to execute it immediately after the registration of land substitution was passed through the registration of land substitution.
[Reference Provisions]
Article 229 of the Civil Procedure Act
Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant and Appellant
Plaintiff
Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff and Appellant
Korea
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul Central District Court (72A1658) in the first instance trial
Text
1. The defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff)'s appeal is dismissed.
2. On May 30, 1971, the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) completed the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer due to the completion of prescription on the part of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Plaintiff)’s land substitution registration pursuant to a land readjustment project for each of the above real estate after completing the procedure for the registration of land substitution pursuant to the land readjustment project for each of the above real estate.
3. The costs of litigation shall be borne by all the first and second instances of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant).
The purport of a counterclaim and the purport of appeal
As a principal claim, the original judgment shall be revoked.
On September 20, 1950, the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) performed the registration procedure for transfer of ownership against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff).
All of the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiff, and the judgment of the court is sought as the preliminary claim(s)(s)(s)(s)(s)(s)(s)(s)(s)(s)(s)(
Reasons
In light of the above evidence No. 1 and No. 2 (No. 5) of No. 1, No. 2 (O. 1 and No. 2), No. 7 of No. 9, No. 1, and No. 9 (except for the portion not trusted), No. 13-2 (No. 14-2), and No. 14-1 and No. 2 (No. 14-2) of No. 9, the court below’s testimony and No. 1 and No. 4 were recorded on No. 6 (No. 1 and No. 5), and the facts that No. 9 were not recorded on No. 1 and No. 5 (No. 1 and No. 6), and the facts that No. 9 were not recorded on No. 1 and No. 6 (No. 1 and No. 5) were recorded on No.
As seen earlier, the Defendant, as its principal claim, sold the previous land to Nonparty 6, who is the Plaintiff’s fleet, and Nonparty 8 sold it to the Plaintiff on September 20, 1950. As such, the Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff is liable to implement the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership due to the sale of the said land directly to the Plaintiff. However, as seen earlier, the Defendant purchased the previous land, but the Defendant subsequently purchased it to the Plaintiff, and as to this case where the Defendant was the person who did not agree on the middle omission registration between the above parties, the Defendant did not have any obligation to perform the procedure for the registration of transfer directly to the Defendant. Therefore, this argument is without merit to further determine any other point.
Then, the defendant's conjunctive claim for the acquisition by prescription. Thus, according to the above facts, the non-party 8's possession of part of the land from May 30, 1951 to June 27, 1958, and the remainder of the land from May 18, 1960 as owner's intention. The defendant succeeded to each of the above possession on June 27, 1958 and May 18, 1960, and continued each of the above possession in a peaceful manner with the intention of possession. The possession of the non-party 8, the former possessor, together with the non-party 8's possession, was completed 20 years from May 30, 1951, the beginning of possession at the time of possession at the time of possession at the time of 20 years from May 30, 1951, and since the plaintiff succeeded to the non-party 6's share in this land, the plaintiff has a duty to complete the registration procedure for share ownership in this case.
On the other hand, since the land in this case was publicly announced after the land substitution disposition became final and publicly announced, it cannot be performed unless the land substitution registration has passed through the land substitution registration, so the defendant cannot file a lawsuit for the performance of this case. Thus, since the defendant's lawsuit for the performance of this case is currently disputing the expiration of the above prescription period, the plaintiff's lawsuit for the performance of this case's land is now presumed to be unnecessary. Thus, since the plaintiff's lawsuit for the completion of the above prescription period is now at issue, it is not expected that the plaintiff should immediately understand the right of the land in this case after the registration of land substitution was made in advance, it is necessary to execute this case's future performance claim in advance after obtaining the title of the debt by the claim in advance and immediately after the registration of land substitution was passed through the registration of land substitution. Thus, if this case's future performance claim is the same, the defendant's main claim should be dismissed without the main reason, and as such, the defendant's claim is justified by the decision of the court below and without merit, and the defendant's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.
Judges Kim Hong (Presiding Judge)
A judge Kim Hong (Presiding Judge) is unable to affix his/her signature and seal to a transfer, and such a judge Kim Hong (Presiding Justice)