The criteria for determining the homeless and the homeless period prescribed by the old Rules on Housing Supply;

Article 13 (2) of the former Rules on Housing Supply (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 527 of September 1, 1993) refers to the head of a household where all members, including the head of a household, do not own a house, and the head of a household, the term “ownership” means the case where the transfer registration of ownership of a house is completed in the future including the head of a household, except for the case falling under Article 187 of the Civil Act in the case of acquisition by succession, not the original acquisition of real estate under our legal system that takes the form of a real right change. Thus, the period of a house without a house shall be determined as of the point of time of transfer of ownership registered in the public register

Article 32 of the Housing Construction Promotion Act, Articles 2 subparag. 7 and 13(2) of the former Rules on Housing Supply (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 527 of September 1, 1993)

대법원 1993.4.13. 선고 92도3203 판결(공1993상,1427) 1993.7.27. 선고 93다2926 판결(공1994하,2596) 1994.2.25. 선고 93도2755 판결ㅍ(공1994상,1142)

Attorney Lee Jae-sung, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Co., Ltd.

Seoul High Court Decision 93Na17074 delivered on October 15, 1993

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

1. Summary of the reasoning of the judgment below

In light of the facts without dispute, the court below acknowledged that the plaintiff applied for the supply of the apartment in this case to the non-permanent apartment in this case to the non-permanent apartment in this case on April 1, 198, on the premise that the plaintiff was "non-permanent apartment in this case for not less than five years" as stipulated in the Rules on Housing Supply (amended by the Ordinance No. 527 of Sep. 1, 1993; hereinafter the same shall apply) with respect to the 13able apartment in the Suwon-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government Housing Site Development Project District supplied by the defendant on March 27, 1992. The plaintiff applied for the supply of the apartment in this case to the non-permanent apartment in this case to the non-permanent apartment in this case on the ground that the non-party 1, the wife of the plaintiff, did not constitute the non-permanent apartment in this case on his name until April 1, 198, it did not constitute the "non-permanent apartment in this case" under Article 13 (2) of the Rules on Housing Supply.

Based on these facts, the court below held as follows. On August 8, 1985, the above non-party 1 sold the main apartment house to the non-party 3 and delivered all registration transfer documents, such as a certificate of the personal seal impression for real estate sale on September 16 of the same year. On the request of the non-party 3 on January 21, 1986, the non-party 2 issued a new certificate of the personal seal impression for real estate sale to the non-party 2 who was the former purchaser. The non-party 2 neglected the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer and completed the registration of ownership transfer after obtaining the certificate of the personal seal impression from the non-party 1 on April 1, 1988. Thus, the non-party 1 cannot be said to own the main apartment house within five years at the time of the subscription of the apartment house in this case. Therefore, the plaintiff's notification of cancellation is null and void, and the plaintiff still did not own the house in the status of the purchaser under the above housing supply contract. Thus, the plaintiff's claim for sale of real estate should be determined as 1.

2. Judgment on ground of appeal No. 1

The term "non-household owner" as stipulated in Article 13 (2) of the Rules on Housing Supply means the householder where all the households, including the householder, do not own a house, and the term "ownership" means the case where the ownership transfer registration for the future of the household members, including the householder, is completed except for the case falling under Article 187 of the Civil Act because the household members, including the householder, acquire by succession, not the original acquisition of real estate, under our legal system that takes the form of a transfer of real rights, which takes the form of a transfer of real rights (see Supreme Court Decision 92Do3203, Apr. 13, 1994). Thus, the period of non-household should be determined based on the transfer of ownership at the time of public record unless there is a nullity or any special reason (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da2926, Jul. 27, 199

The lower court’s determination that Nonparty 1’s above-mentioned period based on the point of time on the registry that transferred the ownership of the above main apartment is justifiable as it is in accordance with the above legal doctrine, and therefore, it should be deemed that there is no need to deliberate on the period

There is no error of misapprehending the legal principles as to the above provisions of the Rules on Housing Supply, or omitting the deliberation and judgment as to the period with no houses. There is no reason for this argument.

3. Judgment on the second ground for appeal

According to the records, it is evident that the notice of the housing supply system (No. 9-2) cited as arguments was made on June 1992 after the conclusion of the apartment supply contract in this case (No. 76 of the record) and there is no other evidence to acknowledge that there was a special agreement on the criteria for determining the period of no houses in this case.

In the lower judgment, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the validity or cancellation of the apartment supply contract of this case, or by misapprehending the grounds for revocation, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the deliberation and judgment. The grounds for revocation are

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)