Plaintiff
Lee-gu et al. (Attorney Park Hun-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Defendant
Mayor for the racing market (Attorney Han-ho, Counsel for defendant-appellant)
Conclusion of Pleadings
may 2, 1982
Text
The single disposition that the defendant made against the plaintiffs as of May 22, 1981 shall be revoked in entirety.
Litigation costs shall be borne by the defendant.
Purport of claim
The same shall apply to the order.
Reasons
1. Circumstances of the fractional disposition;
6. The building of the same 1,3,5, 8, and 4. The building of the same 6-1,6. The building of the same 6-1,2, 16, and 10-1,6. The building of the same 6-1, 6-1, 7. The building of the same 6-1, 6-1, 7. 1, 7. 8, 9, 1, 7, 1, 1, 7, 1, 7, 1, 7, 1, 7, 1, 7, 1, 7, 1, 7, 1, 7, 9, 1, 7, 1, 7, 1, 7, 1, 7, 9, 1, 7, 1, 6, 1, 9, 1, 6, 1, 1, 3, 6, 1, 1, 1980. 1, 1, 3, 1,6
2. Assertion and determination
(1) The representative of the plaintiff et al. asserts that the construction ordinance of the local government can only define the aesthetic view of the building in accordance with the delegation by the Building Act or the Enforcement Decree thereof, and Article 2 (5) of the Building Bylaws of the Gyeong-si, which provides that the restriction on the use of the building is invalid beyond the scope delegated by the Building Act or the Enforcement Decree thereof. Thus, this provision also claims that the single-use disposition is unlawful. Thus, according to Article 33 of the Building Act, the matters necessary for the construction of the building in the district designated under the Urban Planning Act shall be determined by the Municipal Ordinance of the local government concerned within the scope of the standards as prescribed by the Presidential Decree. Article 145 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Building Act provides that the construction ordinance of the local government concerned shall not be constructed because, within the aesthetic zone, the location of the building site, the minimum height of the site, the height and size of the building, the height of the building, the building's height and size, the building's form and size of the building beyond the boundary of the building site, and its height.
(2) The plaintiff et al.'s representative argues that the alteration of use of the above-mentioned building is altered between neighborhood living facilities, and thus the use of the building does not correspond to the act of constructing the building. Article 48 of the Building Act provides that the act of altering the use of the building shall be deemed to be the construction of the building under the conditions as prescribed by the Presidential Decree, and Article 174-2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Building Act provides that the alteration of use of the building shall not be deemed to fall under any of the following subparagraphs in terms of the alteration of use of the building under the conditions as provided in Article 48 of the Act and this Decree; subparagraph 1 of paragraph (4) of the Enforcement Decree of the Building Act; subparagraph 2 of paragraph (4) of the same Article provides that the alteration of use of the building's use of the building's No. 1 to No. 7 of this Decree shall be deemed to fall under the alteration of use of the building's exclusive residential areas or the alteration of use of the building's use of the building's industrial areas other than those of exclusive residential areas;
3. Conclusion
Therefore, each claim for revocation is legitimate since the plaintiff et al.'s each claim for revocation is unlawful, and it is so decided as per Disposition with the burden of the losing defendant.
on March 30, 1982
Judges Kim Jong-ju (Presiding Judge)