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집행유예
(영문) 의정부지법 2018. 11. 21. 선고 2018고단3340 판결
[업무상과실치사] 항소[각공2019상,73]
Main Issues

In a case where: (a) a child of a child care center operated by Defendant B, who was transferred to a school driver of a child care center, who was accompanied by Defendant B’s concurrent school vehicles by the driver of the vehicle at the child care center; (b) the leader of the child care center, Defendant C, Defendant C, Defendant C, Defendant C’s teacher, and Defendant Non-Party B did not find any fact that he left the school vehicle within the school vehicle and was left the school vehicle by leaving the school vehicle at the high temperature for 7 hours and 14 minutes; and (c) the principal of the child care center, Defendant C, Defendant C, Defendant C, Defendant C’s teacher, and Defendant Non-Party A was charged with death by occupational negligence on the ground that he did not leave the school vehicle at the high temperature for 7 hours and 14 minutes; and (d) the Defendants were convicted of death by occupational negligence, the case affirming all the Defendants.

Summary of Judgment

The victim Gap (the third and third years of age) was the child of the child care center operated by the defendant Eul, and the leader Gap was transferred to the school driver of the child care center school school's school's school vehicle's concurrent school vehicle's school's home before the guardian Gap's house, and went to the back seat of the school's front seat, and arrived at the child care center parking lot. The child care center's director Eul and driver Eul, the defendant Byung, the leader teacher's teacher's teacher's teacher's teacher's teacher, the teacher's teacher's teacher's teacher's teacher's teacher did not find the fact that the plaintiff remains in the school's vehicle's school's vehicle's house's house's house's house's house's house's house's house's house's house's house's house's house'

The above accident was caused by the negligence of 3 persons directly committing the act, namely, the safety level of Gap who was at the rear seat of the school at the time of leaving the school, and not notifying Gap's boarding and leaving the school of the situation of Gap's boarding and leaving the vehicle at the time of leaving the school. The defendant Byung opened the vehicle at the time of leaving the vehicle at the time of leaving the school and did not confirm the presence of Gap's boarding and leaving the vehicle. The defendant Byung did not take any measures to confirm Gap's whereabouts such as contact with his guardian even though Gap was absent without any contact, it is reasonable to view the accident as a whole due to the lack of safety system of the child care center and safety awareness and negligence of the infant care staff, and as a result, if the accident occurred with Gap's duty of care and supervision, it is reasonable to recognize the defendant Byung's duty of care due to the failure of care and supervision of the child care center, and the result of the defendant Byung's failure to perform his duty of care and supervision, and the defendant Byung's duty of care and supervision of the infant.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 30, 268 of the Criminal Act, Articles 18(1), 18-2(2), and 24(1) of the Infant Care Act, Article 23 [Attachment Table 8] of the Enforcement Rule of the Infant Care Act, Article 53(3), (4), (5), 53-3, 56(1), 138-2(2), 156 subparag. 9, and 159 of the Road Traffic Act

Escopics

Defendant 1 and three others

Prosecutor

Ham Iron et al.

Defense Counsel

Attorneys Kim Jong-soo et al.

Text

Defendant 1 shall be punished by imprisonment without prison labor for a year and six months, and by imprisonment without prison labor for a year and one year.

However, with respect to Defendant 4, the execution of the above punishment shall be suspended for two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive.

To order Defendant 4 to provide community service for 400 hours.

Criminal facts

Defendant 3 as a child care teacher of “○○○○ Child care center” ( Address 1 omitted) where the victim Nonindicted 1 (k), who is the said child care center, belongs to the “△△△△△△△△△△”, and Defendant 1 was a child care teacher in charge of the leading duties of the child, including the victim, who moved in the (vehicle number omitted) school operated by the said child care center at the time of July 17, 2018 and moved in the (vehicle number omitted), who is operated by the said child care center, and Defendant 2 is a driver of the said child care center, and Defendant 4 is the head of the said child care center.

On July 17, 2018, at least 09:03, Defendant 2 and Defendant 1 entered the above child care center on the following day: (a) the mother of the victim before the victim’s house transferred the victim from Nonindicted 2 before the victim’s home; (b) the mother of the said child-care center arrived at the rear seat of the said school; (c) on the same day. In such cases, Defendant 2 and Defendant 1, as the driver of the children’s school and the infant care teacher boarding the school, shall safely deliver the infant at the time of their operation to the school’s guardian or guardian; and (d) Defendant 1, upon arrival of the vehicle at the child care center, shall check whether all of the children’s attending school and the infant are safely delivered; and (e) shall check whether the children’s child-care teacher or infant were on duty of care to ensure the safe operation of the vehicle and to ensure the safe operation of the vehicle as the guardian of the children’s school and the infant and child-care teacher, and shall check the situation of the vehicle.

Nevertheless, at around 09:26 on July 17, 2018, Defendant 1 entered a child care center without checking whether the victim had no son remain in the above vehicle, even though she did not get out of the above vehicle, and Defendant 2 parked in the above child care center parking lot around 09:26 on the same day without checking whether the son remains in the above child at the child care center parking lot, and the son left the above vehicle due to the termination of the operation of the vehicle. Defendant 3 failed to verify the situation of 10:50 on the day 7:0 on which 1:0 on the day 1:0 on which 1:6 of the above 4:3:0 on the day :0 on which 1:6:0 on the day 1:0 on which 1:6:0 on the day :0 of the above 1:6:0 on the day 1:0 of the day she did not inform her of the fact that the son was not in contact with the son.

After all, the Defendants jointly caused the death of the victim by the negligence of the above occupational negligence.

Summary of Evidence

1. The respective legal statements of Defendant 1, Defendant 2, and Defendant 3

1. The defendant 4's partial statement

1. Each police officer and each prosecutor's protocol of suspect examination against Defendant 3;

1. Each prosecutor’s statement concerning Nonindicted 2, Nonindicted 3, and Nonindicted 5

1. A corpse of corpse;

1. The scene of a disaster or death and photographs of a dead person;

1. Photographs taken of public Handphones in the ○○○ Child Care Center;

1. A weather information list, and climate information from the Korea Meteorological Administration for each day;

1. Images of CCTV on board a motor vehicle that causes a change in the victim's accident;

1. Copies of authorization for child care centers;

1. A copy of the operating logbook of nursery facilities;

1. A certificate of completion of report on school bus;

1. Measurement photographs of temperature by hour for vehicles involved in the ○○ Child Care Center;

1. A copy of the acquisition of insured status;

1. CCTVs outside the ○○○ Child Care Center, and CCTVs on board a motor vehicle for children of Nonindicted Party 1;

1. Each investigation report (the sequence 61, 65, 66, 68, 75 of the evidence list);

1. A written autopsy and appraisal;

1. Guidance on infant care services, 2018;

[Defendant 4]

1. The Defendant and his defense counsel asserted that, as the head of the child care center of this case, the Defendant has a duty to manage and supervise Defendant 1, Defendant 2, and Defendant 3 (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant 1, etc.”) who are the child care staff under their control, the Defendant and his defense counsel are liable for the instant accident, but they are not liable under the criminal law.

2. However, in full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by this court, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant has a duty of care to always exercise due care, and to manage and supervise Defendant 1, etc. with respect to the verification of the unloading of school vehicles or the verification of the arrival status, and that the instant accident occurred due to the Defendant’s failure to perform his duty of care. Therefore, the Defendant may be fully convicted of the facts charged.

(a) Details of duty of care in the line of duty;

1) As a private child-care center, the instant child-care center is a private child-care center, with 97 young children under its jurisdiction (9 persons). 8 teachers, 3 assistant teachers, 3 drivers, 2 cooks, and 1 sanitary inspectors except the president. The area of each floor on the three floors is 176.04 square meters, and 3 vehicles (34, 15, 12, respectively) are operated. In light of the size and status of the instant child-care center, it cannot be said that the Defendant, the president of the instant case, has a duty of care to check whether he/she has left the vehicle at the lower site of the vehicle directly attending the school, and to check whether he/she is absent from the school without prior contact.

2) However, as revealed through the details of the attached statutes, the head of a kindergarten has a duty of care to exercise overall control over childcare centers, guide and supervise infant care teachers and other employees to protect the lives of infants, ensure safety, and prevent risks (Articles 18(1) and 18-2(2) of the Infant Care Act).

In addition, the Enforcement Rule of the Infant Care Act provides for the operation of child care centers: “The child care centers shall have a day-of-day and attending school; safety regulations shall be attached to all vehicles in operation; safety inspection shall be conducted pursuant to the Integrated Safety Inspection Table; drivers and infant care technicians who board school vehicles shall take measures so that infants can safely be delivered to their guardians, such as infant care teachers or parents; and whether all infants are safely delivered.” The Road Traffic Act provides for the operation of school vehicles as follows: “The driver of a school shall operate the school vehicle along with the infant, and the infant care staff shall take measures necessary for the protection of children, such as checking the safe unloading of the infant at the time of the infant's unloading. The driver of a school vehicle shall ensure that the infant has left the vehicle and the infant has left the vehicle after the operation of the vehicle; the driver of a school vehicle and the driver of a school shall always be subject to safety education; the driver of a school shall not always have a person who has not received safety education for children or a minor fine, and the driver of a school shall always be subject to a fine or a minor fine of Article 5.

In accordance with the relevant statutes, the Ministry of Health and Welfare has prepared a "nicking Business Guidelines", which is an administrative rule that further details of the guidelines, and has been published each year, and distributed it to a day care center including the child care center in this case. In addition to the provisions of the above-mentioned statutes, the guidelines also include the names of children, the date of attendance, and the number of hours of day-to-day attendance in the child care center. The head of the child care center shall thoroughly protect and supervise all the infant in order to prevent safety accidents, and shall take measures to provide safety education to all the infant care staff and to ensure that they receive professional safety education at the relevant institution. The passenger, such as the infant care teacher, must check the number of infants and children attending the child care center at the time of arrival of the vehicle and notify the school teacher without delay. The school teacher shall contact with the guardian of the vehicle without permission to have infants and children attending the school to check whether the infant and children are on the vehicle without permission, and the head of the school shall not include the vehicle's duty to attend the school in the front vehicle and the vehicle.

3) In light of the above relevant statutes and guidelines of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Defendant, as the head of a child-care center, has a duty of care to ensure that the driver and the guide teacher who is the same passenger, as the head of the child-care center, check whether all children have left the school after completing the operation of children-care vehicles, and each anti-school teacher has a duty of care to pay attention to and supervise each anti-school teacher to check and report the situation of their withdrawal from the school for children.

4) In addition, such duty of care is a duty of care required to the director of a child care center in light of the following circumstances of the amendment of the Act and the frequency of accidents similar to the accident in this case, and the characteristics of infants and children who are the subject of the child care in this case and the predicted results in the occurrence of the accident, and it cannot be deemed that the child care center fulfilled its duty of care to the extent that it performed the ordinary level of education, care, and supervision

A) As in the instant accident, guardians such as parents or child care teachers and staff such as parents or child care teachers and staff have left the vehicle, they shall be forgotten for the fact that infants have left the vehicle, and the case where infants died or died significantly due to heat, illness, physical appearance, etc., or frequently occurs. If members of the society are not easy if they are members of the society, they are fully aware of the risk of actions left the vehicle to leave the vehicle. The recent case seems to have been aware of the fact that in Gwangju Metropolitan City on July 29, 2016, the case where infants were confined in the school vehicle at the kindergarten in Gwangju Metropolitan City and the case where brain damage occurred, and the case where the sons and staff outside the Seoul-gun-gun, around July 4, 2018, who was prior to the occurrence of the instant accident, left the son who is infants and children, left the vehicle in their own vehicle. Each of the above cases is the defendant who is the operator of the child care center at issue.

B) The amended Road Traffic Act, which was amended by Act No. 14356, Dec. 2, 2016, went into effect on June 3, 2017, imposed on the driver of a school vehicle a duty to verify the vehicle at the time of leaving the vehicle (Article 53(4)). The purpose of criminal punishment for the driver who violated the provision and the individual who employed the same (Article 156 subparag. 9, Article 159), was newly established. This means that our society has formed a consensus that re-consting the seriousness of a type of accident, such as the instant accident, and preventing re-re-re-re-re-re-re-constition of such accident.

C) The average temperature of the instant child-care center on the date of the occurrence of the accident was 26.8°C, the highest temperature was 32.2°C, and such further weather has been continued since June. It is obvious in light of the empirical rule that the indoor temperature of a vehicle that is not ventilation is very high, and that even adults are healthy, it is difficult in light of the fact that such environment is not visible even for adults. After the instant accident and the verification was conducted on similar weather, the last left left of the instant vehicle that was the victim of the instant accident was turned down to the extent that it cannot be viewed as grandchildren depending on the south of time, and the highest temperature in the vicinity was 4.9°C.

D) A child-care center is entrusted by a guardian, such as parents, to have infants take over all their lives, such as meals, rest, play, and waters on behalf of the guardian, and accordingly, the relevant infant is under the control of the principal of the child-care center and the child-care staff under his/her control, who are the principal of the child-care center, from the moment the infant was transferred to his/her school until he/she returned to the guardian. Most infants do not have the ability to protect their own life or body from external danger, and all infants are bound to fully depend on their guardians. In cases where the guardian entrusts the infant to the child-care center, the child-care center is responsible for the same responsibility at the child-care center. Accordingly

E) The duty of care required for the performance of duties varies depending on the nature of the duties. In general, the level of the duty of care is increased as much as the result that may be caused by the breach of the duty of care is serious. However, a considerable number of children of the child care center of this case subject to the Defendant’s childcare cannot be seen as one’s own force like the victim, and there was no ability to open a vehicle or a glass and escape from the vehicle. Therefore, if the vehicle is left alone on the vehicle, it is highly likely that the infant would escape and die. As such, if the infant is left alone on the vehicle due to neglecting the duty of checking the vehicle's getting off of the vehicle, or the duty of checking and reporting the situation of leaving the vehicle, it is highly likely that the infant might lead to the serious result of the infant’s death at least, and thus, the child care teachers and staff in charge of the relevant duties, as well as the head of the child care center, who should be responsible for management and supervision, should be the child care center, and any other duties of the child care center.

5) In the organization having the form of division as in the instant childcare center, it cannot be said that a person in the position of overall control, management and supervision, who is in the position of overall assistant, has the duty of care to directly verify the performance of the duties once and to correct the error at that time. However, at least the duty of care to verify the departure of the school vehicles from the school, and to confirm and report on the departure of the school vehicles from time to time, constitutes a very important job for the protection of the lives and bodies of the infants subject to childcare, and the Defendant who should manage and supervise the vehicle since the obligation falls under a very important job for the protection of the infants and children subject to childcare, should not neglect the duty of care by providing multiple repeated and continuous education, direct on-site guidance, and correct the error. In allocating and organizing the duties of the childcare center, the Defendant has the duty of care to properly establish the system so that such accidents do not occur.

B. Whether the duty of care was breached

1) The instant accident occurred by the negligence of three direct actors. In other words, Defendant 1, a leading teacher, did not remove the safety level of the victim who was on the rear seat of the front seat of the school vehicle and did not notify the victim of the situation of the victim's getting on and off the vehicle while only the remaining children left the vehicle. Defendant 2, a driver, left the vehicle and left the vehicle without confirming whether the driver remains on the vehicle, and Defendant 3, a teacher, did not take measures to confirm the location of the victim, such as contact the guardian, even though the victim was absent from contact without any contact. Even one of the three childcare staff members, it was confirmed that the victim had been on the vehicle and did not have been on the part of the victim.

In this case, Defendant 1 had a career in other child care centers, but at least worked at the child care centers of this case from July 2, 2018, and since from July 16, 2018, the day before the accident occurred, Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 did not have an opportunity to be continuously managed and supervised by Defendant 2 and Defendant 3, compared to Defendant 3. However, Defendant 2 had operated school vehicles from July 2017, which had been working for more than one year at the time of the accident of this case, and had been sufficiently informed of the method of managing the vehicles down to the child care centers of this case, and Defendant 3 had been working at the child care center of this case from around July 2014 to the day of the accident of this case. Although Defendant 3 had sufficiently been well informed of the fact that each of the child care centers of this case was working at the child care center of this case, Defendant 3 did not have a duty of care and supervision, Defendant 3 did not know that each of the accident of this case was “the child care center of this case.”

In full view of the above circumstances, the accident of this case is not a frush for the victim. The accident of this case is a result of the brush safety system of the childcare center of this case and the lack of safety awareness and the negligence of duty of the childcare staff. If the defendant, who is the general manager of the childcare center of this case, fulfilled his duty of care, such as the duty of management and supervision of the childcare staff, as argued in the above, he would not have neglected his duty of care.

2) Based on the Defendant’s assertion that he/she fulfilled his/her duty of care, the child care center of this case prepared the “nurse site for the operation of day care facilities” and “an integrated safety inspection table of school vehicles”, and the Defendant provided education related to the management of the vehicle for the vehicle for the school in the process of the original test at the time of employing the child care teacher and staff, and Nonparty 6 or Nonindicted 7 gave due attention to the relevant part to Defendant 1 and Defendant

In fact, the childcare center operation log of this case (hereinafter referred to as the "operation log") was prepared every day at the childcare center of this case (hereinafter referred to as the "care center of this case"), there was a column for confirming that the driver of the vehicle of this case and the driver of the school of this case did not wish to do so inside the vehicle. The integrated safety inspection log of the school of this case, prepared in accordance with the form of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, includes the items of inspection that "it is confirmed whether the infant in the vehicle has left the vehicle or not." In addition, it appears that the childcare center of this case has been equipped with the system for verifying the unique situation of their arrival at the school of this case. In other words, each half of the school of this case was left from the vehicle of this case and returned every half of around 09:50, after the teacher was present, it was stated in the operation log of the school of this case, and the operation log is the date of operation, and the defendant is in charge of the guardian's last rescue and resolution without contact with the head of the kindergarten.

3) However, in light of the following circumstances, it is difficult to view that, notwithstanding the existence of the above account books or the system for verifying the situation of release, Defendant 1, etc., substantial caution, management, and supervision by the Defendant with respect to Defendant 1’s obligation to manage, or verify and report the situation of release.

A) From July 16, 2018, the day immediately before the accident occurred, Defendant 1 was assigned a leading teacher of a vehicle to school from July 16, 2018. From July 10, 2018 to July 13, 2018, Defendant 1 appears to have told Nonindicted 6, who was the teacher in charge, to undergo practical training related to the boarding of the vehicle, such as confirmation of the getting out of the vehicle, and to the effect that an infant remains in the vehicle at the time of getting out of the vehicle. However, it is difficult to view that Nonindicted 6, who was the assistant teacher, notified Defendant 1, a new infant care teacher, to such purport while informing Defendant 1 of his duties related to the boarding of the vehicle, and the head of the child care center was unable to be deemed to have consistently performed the duty of care, management, and supervision over the boarding of the vehicle to which he belongs, even if it is deemed to have been performed, it is difficult to deem it to have been performed. Rather, Defendant 1 and the infant care teacher, who was given his own testimony in the process.

In the case of Defendant 2, even though he had previously completed safety education regarding school buses for children under Article 53-3 of the Road Traffic Act, in light of the contents and degree of the Defendant’s duty of care as seen earlier, the child-care center of this case shall be the principal, separate from the safety education, and shall continue to provide continuous and repetitive education and individual instructions and supervision, such as guidance. However, Defendant 2 consistently stated, in the investigation and trial process, that “There was little opportunity for the president to take part in the course of the investigation and trial, and there was no opportunity for the president to take part in the course of the education.”

In short, even if there are objective circumstances to evaluate that Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 are in career or have completed relevant education, the duty to manage and supervise the childcare staff of the Defendant, the president, is not mitigated. Article 56(1) of the Road Traffic Act provides that “A person who employs a driver shall always be careful and supervised to comply with this Act,” is interpreted as the same context.

Of course, Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, who have different interests from the Defendant, are not able to completely eliminate the possibility that they made a false statement in the intention of intending to make their criminal liability less exceptionally. However, in light of the above witness’s attitude and content, consistency with the statement made in the investigative agency, etc., the statement can be generally reliable. Thus, it is difficult to reject the credibility of the statement solely on the abstract possibility or suspicion that there is a motive for a false statement, and the circumstance of the accident in this case is visible only if Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 were unable to receive a sufficient instruction and supervision from the Defendant.

B) We examine the books, such as the Operating Date and the Integrated Safety Inspection Table of School Vehicles.

The Defendant asserts that Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 have had Defendant 2 perform the duty of checking the unloading of school vehicles through the aforementioned recording of the books. However, given the inherent nature of the books, the books are not a means to confirm whether the childcare staff in charge prepares false documents at any time, and if false documents are prepared, the actual performance of the duties of the relevant childcare staff is not a means to confirm the actual performance of the duties of the relevant childcare staff. In other words, the books are large that the person in charge of the books did not recognize the contents of the books, or that they did not check the contents of the duties to be verified without any thoughts, or that they did not check the contents of the duties to be verified for a long time, or that they did not check the contents of the duties to be verified for a long time before the approval and confirmation by the superior.

In fact, Defendant 1 did not sign or affix a seal on the “on the day of the instant accident,” as well as on the day immediately before the accident. Defendant 1 consistently stated, in the course of the investigation and trial, Defendant 1 stated that “In fact, there was a challenge to identify the leading teacher in the place of operation, but it was not known about the meaning thereof. It was only known that he was working as the leading teacher in the school.” In addition, Defendant 2 also made two private persons in the course of investigation and trial, “in the presence of one in the middle, one in the lower part, and one in the lower part. However, the private person in the lower part did not know of what purport it was.” In particular, in this court, Defendant 1 consistently stated that “If a private person (Nonindicted 3) became aware of the fact after the occurrence of the instant accident, he did not know of the content thereof.”

In addition, according to the following contents in the operation log, unlike the defendant's assertion, it can be known that the operating log was not properly managed and that there was a considerable portion different from the fact (i.e., the investigation record 186 pages). In other words, (ii) the vehicle operated by the defendant 2 is designated as "12 passenger car number △△△," but in fact, from March 2018, the vehicle involved in the accident of this case is "12 passenger car number △△," and (iii) the operating log was prepared differently from the fact that the vehicle was operated for four months until the accident of this case. (ii) Although the operation log assistant was written as Non-Indicted 5, Non-Indicted 5 was actually written on March 22, 2018 to which Non-Indicted 8 was written on July 8, 2018 to which Non-Indicted 1 was written on his own, and Non-Indicted 1 was written on his day after Non-Indicted 3 was written on his day’s day-to-day bulletin.

Defendant 2 made a statement to the effect that, in relation to the integrated safety inspection slip for school vehicles, “it was prepared in June 2018, but the next day after the end of the check,” it appears that the check was not prepared properly, and that Defendant 2 was unable to properly manage and supervise whether Defendant 2 performed the duty of confirmation on the actual day of the day, solely on the check slip.

C) Meanwhile, with respect to Defendant 1’s omitted signature, the Defendant asserted that Nonindicted 5, who confirmed that Defendant 1’s signature was omitted in the order of confirmation on the leading teacher in the operation log on the day immediately before the instant accident occurred, instructed Defendant 1 to sign, and that Nonindicted 5’s statement in the prosecutor’s investigation is consistent with this. However, Defendant 1 stated in this court that “I have no memory in receipt of such instructions from Nonindicted 5.” In addition, Defendant 1 stated to the effect that “I have no memory in receipt of such instructions” in this court, and the content of the instructions do not appear to be sufficient to supplement Nonindicted 5’s signature omitted for the completion of the book, not to mention that “Defendant 1 actually confirmed whether the vehicle remains after the leaving of the school vehicle.”

D) According to the Enforcement Rule of the Infant Care Act and the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s child care business guidelines, child care centers should prepare and keep the attendance book for all children including the name of children, the date of attendance, and the hours of sub-committees. In the instant child care centers, it appears that each half of each of the child care centers was prepared by a teaching staff member and obtained approval from the Defendant, who is the president of each month. Defendant 3 stated in the police that “I have a attendance book, and the △△△ Group, to which the victim belongs, took charge of the △△△△△△△ Group, and did not have a body of attendance after the occurrence of the accident.” (No. 16 pages of the investigation record). The Defendant did not control and supervise the Defendant 3, who is the teaching staff member, to prepare the attendance book including the time of her children’s attendance and sub-committees.”

E) Other evidence to support the Defendant’s assertion that he/she fulfilled his/her duty of care, which was submitted by Nonindicted 10, Nonindicted 6, Nonindicted 3, Nonindicted 4, and Nonindicted 9, but there is no reasonable doubt in recognizing that the said evidence alone was negligent in managing and supervising Defendant 1, etc., by continuing and repetitive education, individual instructions, and guidance.

C. Compared causal relation

In a criminal negligence, the causal relationship between the perpetrator's breach of duty of care and the occurrence of the result is required. However, if the perpetrator's breach of duty of care is not the only cause of the occurrence of the result, and if the perpetrator's breach of duty of care is a simple condition that is far away from the occurrence of the result or is a condition that arouses the result, it can be recognized that the criminal negligence is established.

In this case, a person who is in direct face-to-face and performs infant care services and bears the duty of care for the infant is Defendant 1, etc., and the defendant is the director of a child care center who bears the duty of care to administer and supervise the child care staff, including Defendant 1. As seen earlier, if the defendant breached his duty of care and fails to perform his duty of care, management and supervision, and the defendant 1 et al. significantly neglected his duty of care, and if the result resulted in the death of the victim, a proximate causal relationship between the violation of the defendant's duty of care and the death of the victim

In addition, since the defendant is not in a horizontal division relationship with the defendant 1, etc., but in a command and supervision relationship, the defendant is not in a horizontal division relationship with the defendant 1, etc., in particular, even if the defendant expected and trusted the management and confirmation and report of the situation of leaving school vehicles directly connected to the life and body of the original child, the defendant cannot be exempted from liability for the result.

Application of Statutes

1. Article relevant to the facts constituting an offense and the selection of punishment;

Defendants: Articles 268 and 30 of the Criminal Act; Imprisonment without prison labor

1. Suspension of execution;

Defendant 4: Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act

1. Social service order;

Defendant 4: Article 62-2 of the Criminal Act

Reasons for sentencing

[Scope of Recommendations according to Sentencing Criteria by the Supreme Court]

Degressive crime group due to negligence shall be subject to Type 3 (Occupational Negligence, Gross Negligence, Death, etc.). The basic area of punishment is subject to the degree of violation of duty of care.

【Determination of Sentence】

1. The seriousness of a crime;

The Defendants’ breach of the duty of care caused the result that the victims were dead. The Defendants’ body did not have any mental suffering that the bereaved families, who left the same her mother due to the negligence on the part of the child care center where her body was her body, are unable to suffer from the same psychological suffering. The parents of the victims are able to take their own responsibility in the investigative agency, who was able to have no knowledge of the situation at all within the time when her her her son died on the vehicle where her her her her her son got off without knowing of the situation at all.”

At the present time, many moral and legal problems related to the operation of child-care centers have emerged in large and small society, and in this case, the Defendants' negligence was so significant that the Defendants did not know about it, which led to the loss of young children, and the parents who sent young children to child-care centers, as well as the parents who sent them to the whole members of society, and also led to the revision of the Road Traffic Act.

Some of the Defendants expressed their mistakes as “one-year, one-way, and so on” through the reflection submitted several times. However, the Defendants’ duty of care is too unreasonable and serious, and thus, it is necessary to evaluate the Defendants’ breach of such duty as “the so-called “the so-called “the so-called so-called as and the grave fatherism.” As mentioned in several times, the demand level is high as the infant’s duty of care is highly likely to cause harm to the life and body of infants.

2. Common elements of sentencing to the Defendants

(a) The will of bereaved family members not to be punished;

During the trial, the Defendants agreed with the bereaved family members of the victim, and their bereaved family members agreed with the victim’s bereaved family members, and expressed to the court their intent not to punish the Defendants. In light of their attitude toward the Defendants immediately after the occurrence of the case and the investigation process, the bereaved family members, who have lost their father without their mistake, have reached a conflict with the Defendants several times to indicate their intention not to punish the Defendants. In other words, the victim’s mother, in the police investigation, stated, “I would be sentenced to imprisonment without a suspended sentence of execution. I would see that I would be able to do so. I would see if this accident would have occurred again with the accident in this case.” The father of the victim stated that “I would be able to report to the police without having to go back” without having refused to go through the victim’s family members visiting the house to transfer the intent of the crime of death.

The victim of the instant crime does not have to confirm the intent to punish the Defendants of the victim himself/herself because he/she had already died. Generally, it is true that the victim’s wishes not to punish the Defendant of the victim who died of any crime is treated as a person favorable to the sentencing. For example, if the victim’s bereaved family members in the case of a traffic death accident, if agreement with the victim is reached, it can be said that the court has imposed a sentence suspending the execution of imprisonment without prison labor, unless it is not a significant violation of the victim’s duty of care, such as special criminal records or drinking driving.

However, the instant accident differs from those of such general traffic accidents. The head of a child care center and other infant care staff are infants and children who can be deemed to have significantly deteriorated or little ability to act and deal with the situation compared to that of their duties, so there was sufficient opportunity to predict the risk of their breach of their duty of care and to avoid such accident. In addition, the Defendants’ breach of duty of care and its result were in a continuous and viable state, not in an irrecoverable state, such as traffic accidents, in terms of the fact that if the victims on a vehicle were discovered early, they would not cause the result of their death. This is the case’s accident that is close to the instant accident, and the possibility of criticism against the Defendants is significant.

In addition, the intention of the victim or his/her bereaved family members to not punish the victim or his/her bereaved family members is limited to the victim's individual area, and the impact of the crime on the society is limited to the victim's individual area, and the impact of the damage on the society is increasing more favorable to the sentencing. On the contrary, the impact of the damage on the society beyond the victim's individual area, and the impact of the damage on the society becomes more favorable to the sentencing. In this case, the narrow sense of the case is the death of the victim, who is his/her bereaved family members, but the broad sense of social strike, such as the occurrence of a significant impact on the safety problem of the child care center, and the damage caused by the crime was not limited to the victim's individual area, and thus, it is not a case that can entirely depend on the victim's bereaved family's will in determining the punishment.

Therefore, the punishment should be determined by respecting the victim's bereaved family members' intention not to be punished, and the general preventive aspect of the punishment to be promoted through punishment for the defendants should also be considered sufficiently.

B. General and preventive aspects of punishment

In a complex division, members of our society are living in the area of control and management by others in which they are established. In such a risk society, they must always endeavor to clarify and fulfill their duty of care that the breach of their duty of care may cause serious harm to the life or body of others. On the contrary, it is very important to set up and supplement social and institutional measures to ensure that the Defendants who have breached such duty of care may be severely punished and those engaged in the same industry and those engaged in the same industry as well as the general public may take a look at and prepare for these types of accidents in the future.

(c) Compensation for damage;

Although the result of the victim’s death is not sufficiently recovered in money, the circumstance that the victim’s bereaved families receive a certain mutual-aid amount from the Child-Care Safety Mutual Aid Association in which the child-care center of this case was admitted cannot be considered in sentencing.

(d) Responsibility as an offender through negligence;

Defendants are not intentional criminals, but criminal negligence. Our criminal law stipulates that criminal negligence shall be exceptionally punished only in cases where there are special provisions in the law. The criminal law provides that criminal negligence is punishable in the same way. While the result of the crime of death by occupational negligence is serious aspect of the death of the victim, the statutory punishment is stipulated as “a imprisonment without prison labor for not more than five years or a fine not exceeding twenty million won” with the focus of the fact that the act is negligence. It is not desirable from the perspective of the principle of responsibility, which is the major principle of the criminal law, to punish the Defendants who are criminal negligence with excessive emphasis only on the result of the instant accident.

(e) Criminal records and relationships;

Defendant 1, Defendant 3, and Defendant 4 are first offenders with no criminal power, and Defendant 2 also has no criminal power, except for those punished by a fine for long-term traffic accidents.

(f) Anti-discrimination;

The defendants seems to have been generally divided into their own mistakes, and they seem to be against themselves. In the case of Defendant 4, there is a reason to deny the crime, but it seems to be true that they are responsible as the president for accidents that occurred in the child-care center operated by themselves, such as making efforts to take advantage of the victims' bereaved families, etc.

3. Individual sentencing factors of the Defendants

A. Defendant 1

The Defendant is a person who is directly responsible for the occurrence of the instant accident. The Defendant died due to the Defendant’s failure to get off the instant child care center. Although the Defendant had much worked at the instant child care center, the Defendant had worked as a child care teacher for about four years since graduating from the university in 2012, and had worked as a child care teacher for about four years since he/she graduated from the university in 2014 for four months. Nevertheless, the Defendant has a very fundamental duty of care and has a primary responsibility for causing the instant accident.

However, the accident of this case occurred only on the 16th day after the defendant was present at the child care center of this case, and only on the 16th day after he was present at the school of this case, and the circumstances leading to such accident are considered as favorable circumstances.

B. Defendant 2

The Defendant, as a part-time employee, was on duty as a dry field, did not check the inside of the vehicle with his own duties in mind, and did not check the inside of the vehicle. The Defendant, as a driver of a vehicle attending school, is a person who is obligated to check the infant and child under the law and subordinate statutes, along with Defendant 1. The Defendant was aware that his duties are duties that may have a significant impact on the infant’s life and body, and prepared relevant books formally.

However, under the condition that the defendant was a part-time worker who receives KRW 400,000 per month from the child care center of this case on condition that he was driving and immediately leaving the school only twice in the morning, the fact that a majority of the defendant's branch wanted to leave the school shall be considered in favor of others.

C. Defendant 3

Since the graduation of the university around 2010, the Defendant served as a nursery teacher for about eight years, and from around 2014, the Defendant had been working for the child care center in this case. A Ban that the Defendant was in charge of the entrance appears to have no internal and external factors that could hinder the confirmation of the situation of the birth of the child in question on the date of the accident as 14 general members. In particular, the Defendant was well aware of the victim's whereabouts even in 2017, so it was easy to confirm the situation of the victim's withdrawal. Nevertheless, the Defendant did not check the fact that the victim was absent from school, and even after recognizing that the victim did not want to have the victim's attendance at around 10:00, the Defendant did not report it to the guardian or the head of the child care staff at least 16:00, and the Defendant did not report it to the other victim, such as the death or injury of the victim.

However, due to the fact that the defendant suffers from the urology due to the urology, the health condition is not good, and the fact that many people of the defendant's urology want the urology.

D. Defendant 4

A person in a higher position and position in the relevant organization has the authority to make a practical decision in order to avoid an accident that may cause the relevant organization’s work compared to those with low class and position. From the perspective of the substantial decision-making authority to avoid such accident, in order to avoid the occurrence of an accident, Defendant 1, etc., who is given monthly pay from the Defendant and takes partial charge of his/her duties, is more responsible for the overall management of the child care center of this case, and Defendant, etc., who has the right to manage and supervise his/her own duties, issued an order to correct the occurrence of an accident, where he/she is found to have an opportunity to take the source of risk of the accident as in this case, by establishing the system for the management of the situation of getting off and going out of school vehicles and the system built, and observe and observe it carefully at all times. Nevertheless, Defendant 1, etc., who is in direct charge of infant care, was also liable for the occurrence of the accident of this case.

However, the Defendant’s breach of the duty of care, in essence, committed a violation of the duty of care as an agent of a certain organization, and thus, it seems inappropriate to hold Defendant 1 and other direct actors liable for more or the same level of responsibility than Defendant 1, etc., and considering the favorable circumstances that the Defendant decided to operate the instant childcare center only until February 2019, with the agreement with △△ City, while taking responsibility for the instant accident at the end of February 2019.

4. Conclusion

In full view of the circumstances surrounding the crime including the above circumstances, the details of the duty of care and the degree of violation, the result of the crime, the circumstances after the crime, the age, environment, criminal record, and sentencing cases in similar cases, the punishment as set forth in the Disposition shall be determined.

[Attachment] Relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, etc.: omitted

Judges Kim Jong-chul

(1) The indictment is a duty of care required against Defendant 4, which includes “the obligation to have Defendant 3 exercise due care and supervision to properly confirm the situation of the birth of the child’s children” (Article 4.6-8 of the indictment), but it omitted the content that Defendant 4 violated the duty of care. However, Defendant 4 and his defense counsel have argued that Defendant 4 and his defense counsel fulfilled the duty of care to manage and supervise the situation of the birth of the child at the school in addition to the part on the lower-class management of the vehicle at school in the trial process. However, even if they were added without any changes in the indictment that they breached the duty of care, there is no substantial disadvantage in exercising the right of defense. Meanwhile, in the indictment, Defendant 1 did not take corrective measures with knowledge that the lower-class management of the child on board the vehicle at the school is not proper, such as without signing in the confirmation column of the school operation of the nursery school.” The part that Defendant 4 did not perform the duty of management and supervision on the affairs of Defendant 1, as a whole, did not eliminate the Defendants’s defense right.

2) The amended Road Traffic Act, promulgated on October 16, 2018 and announced to enter into force on April 17, 2019, newly established Articles 53(5) and 138-2(2) of the same Act, which requires the driver of children’s school to operate the vehicle verification device when confirming whether the driver of the vehicle is a infant’s getting out of the school, and provided that the State or a local government may fully or partially subsidize expenses incurred in the installation and operation of the vehicle verification device.

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