The case recognizing the subsequent completion of the appeal

On May 22, 1974, prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit, the Defendant moved at the Defendant’s domicile at the gusheet equipment gusheet on March 27, 1974, and the Plaintiff was aware that the instant lawsuit was filed and the judgment was rendered. On April 2, 1975, the Plaintiff was subject to compulsory execution against the Defendant’s movable property on the basis of an executory exemplification of the judgment with executory power on April 2, 1975, and subsequently filed the instant appeal on April 14, 199, the Defendant was aware that the said judgment was rendered, and that the Defendant did not comply with the peremptory period for filing the

Articles 378 and 160 of the Civil Procedure Act

Supreme Court Decision 73Da1164 delivered on December 26, 1973 (Supreme Court Decision 213Da1605 delivered on Supreme Court Decision 10605 delivered on Supreme Court Decision 213Da234 delivered on Supreme Court Decision 480No7650 delivered on July 24, 1970 (Supreme Court Decision 90Da1015 delivered on July 24, 1970) (Supreme Court Decision 9019 delivered on Supreme Court Decision 18Du200 delivered on Supreme Court Decision 160(38)850 of Civil Procedure Act)

New East Asia Traffic Corporation

Kim Chang-chul

Daegu District Court (74Gahap465) in the first instance

The part against the defendant in the original judgment shall be revoked.

The plaintiff's office corresponding to the above cancellation part is dismissed.

All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff in the first and second instances.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 1,124,810 won with an annual amount of 5% from the day from the day after the notice of the copy of the gushed, to the day after the full payment is served. The costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant and a declaration of provisional execution.

The same shall apply to the order.

The plaintiff's appellant asserts that the defendant's appeal should be dismissed because the defendant's appeal period should be excessive, since it is unlawful, the defendant's appeal period should be dismissed. Thus, according to the defendant's testimony of the court of first instance, the court below served the defendant on May 30, 1974 as the defendant 132-1, Daegu-gu, Daegu-gu, 132-1, 493-3, which entered in the address so as to make it difficult to serve as a director, but the defendant sent the above documents to be served as a director, 1, 493-3, Nam-gu, Seoul-gu, 194, where the plaintiff revised, the court below permitted the defendant to serve as a document of this case as a service by public notice, and accordingly, the court below's decision was announced on December 26, 1974, and the above judgment also was delivered to the defendant on May 30, 1975 as a service by public notice, and the defendant's remaining 1,2394, 197.

Thus, unless there are other special circumstances, this case's appeal is lawful, since the defendant's identity was caused by the cause not attributable to the defendant's failure to observe the peremptory period of the above appeal, and the appeal for this case's appeal that the defendant neglected to perform the above procedural acts is lawful.

On December 24, 1973, 1977, the plaintiff 1's representative transferred the above vehicle to the non-party 1, 124,810 won to the non-party 1, the plaintiff 2, who was not the defendant's owner of the above 1394. The plaintiff 1, the non-party 2, who was the driver of the above 1394. The plaintiff 2, who was the plaintiff 1, 197, was the plaintiff 1, 197, and was the plaintiff 1, the plaintiff 2, who was the plaintiff 1,24, and was the plaintiff 1, 200, the plaintiff 1, 200, the plaintiff 1, 300, the plaintiff 1, and the plaintiff 2, who was the plaintiff 1, was the plaintiff 1,60, and the plaintiff 1, who was the plaintiff 1, was the defendant's defendant 1, who was the plaintiff 1, and the plaintiff 2, who was the plaintiff's witness 1, was the defendant 5.

Therefore, even if the automobile is owned by the defendant on the original register, as long as the defendant has already transferred the above automobile to another person and operates it under the control of another person, the defendant cannot be deemed to be a person who operates the automobile for himself under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, and it is clear that the defendant is not an employee of the defendant who is the driver of this case, and therefore, the defendant does not have the liability for damages under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act or as an employer under the Civil Act.

Therefore, since the plaintiff's main claim is without merit in this respect, the part against the defendant among the judgment of the court below that differs from this part of the judgment below, is revoked, and it is so decided as per Disposition by applying Articles 36 and 89 of the same Act with respect to the burden of litigation costs.

Judge Lee Jong-dae (Presiding Judge)