Daejeon District Court 201Guhap718 ( November 30, 2011), Daejeon District Court 201

National Tax Service Review Division 2010-0186 ( November 15, 2010)

The officetel of this case is leased for residential purpose, and therefore is used exclusively for tax exemption business.

Since it is reasonable to deem that the instant officetel was leased as a permanent residential building, the instant disposition was legitimate, deeming that the instant officetel was leased as a temporary residential building, and as long as the instant officetel was leased as a residence, it cannot be deemed that the period of residence indicated in the lessee’s certificate is different from the fact, as long as the instant officetel was leased as a residence.

Article 6 of the Value-Added Tax Act, Article 12 of the Value-Added Tax Act, Article 17 of the Value-Adde

Article 15 of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act, Article 34 of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act, Article 49

2012Nu100 Revocation of Disposition of Imposition of Value-Added Tax

XX

Daejeon Head of the District Tax Office

Daejeon District Court Decision 201Guhap718 Decided November 30, 2011

July 19, 2012

August 30, 2012

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked, and the imposition of value-added tax of KRW 000 (including additional tax of KRW 000) against the plaintiff on September 1, 2010 shall be revoked.

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasoning for the court's explanation concerning this case is as follows: Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act cited the part concerning Article 8 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act as "No. 11 of the judgment of the court of first instance" as "No. 9 of the judgment of the court of first instance," and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Parts to be dried;

A) Determination on the Plaintiff’s first argument

(1) Whether a lessee constitutes a lease of a house exempt from value-added tax shall be determined on the basis of whether the lessee actually uses the house as a permanent residence based on the objective purpose of using the relevant building. In a case where the use of the object indicated in the usage classification or lease agreement in the public account book and the lessee actually uses the building, the determination shall be made on the basis of the latter (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu12707, Jul. 24, 1992).

(2) Facts of recognition

(A) ParkA (former name: BB) leased and used each of the instant officetels from November 2006 to January 2007, and the tea from February 2007 to June 2007 to the Plaintiff for residential purposes.

(B) In relation to the lease of the instant officetel, the Plaintiff is a false lessee who did not rent the instant officetel, as stated in the specification of the real estate lease supply price submitted by the Plaintiff at the time of the return of value-added tax from January 2006 to February 2, 2008.

[Ground of recognition] Gap evidence 1, Eul evidence 3-1 to 8, Eul evidence 4-1, Eul evidence 4-2, Eul evidence 5-1, 2, 3, Eul evidence 7, and 8, Eul evidence 5-1, 2, 3, 7, and 8, evidence of the court of first instance, the testimony of Park Jong-A by the court of first instance, the fact-finding results of the court of first instance as to XX gas company, the purport of the whole pleadings

(3) Determination

(A) In light of the above facts, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff leased the instant officetel to Park A around November 2006, and around February 2007, the tea used the instant officetel as a permanent residential building exempt from value-added tax. The evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to reverse the instant disposition. Therefore, the instant disposition, deeming that the instant officetel was supplied by the Plaintiff as an exclusive use for the duty-free business, is legitimate.

(B) The Plaintiff asserts that the instant disposition, which is based on the facts, should be revoked on the ground of the instant written confirmation (No. 5-3) that: (a) ParkA’s written confirmation (No. 5-3) entered that the instant officetel was transferred to the instant officetel in 2006 and used for residential purpose; (b) however, it was merely about two months that ParkA resided in the instant officetel in the instant officetel in the latter part of 2007; (c) the instant disposition based on the facts, should be revoked. Unlike the Plaintiff’s assertion, the instant disposition’s written confirmation (No. 5-3) was written as the first half of 2 months from 2006 to 207, which had been recognized as the period of residence; (d) the Plaintiff leased the instant officetel to the said officetel for residential purpose; and (e) the period during which ParkA resided in the instant officetel for residential purpose was not a reason for the instant disposition; and (e) the Plaintiff’s assertion that the details of the instant disposition were not unlawful as seen earlier.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case shall be dismissed as it is without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is justified as it is so decided, and it is so decided as per Disposition.